

SENSATIONAL MEMOIRS

If BERI

SPETSHRAN SENSATIONAL MEMOIRS

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If BERI

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“To live another 20 years!” - L.P. Beria wrote in his diary shortly before his death.

Probably everyone who is not indifferent to the fate of the Fatherland wondered: what if these hopes came true and Beria led the country until the 1970s? What if not Judas and mediocrity like Khrushchev, but the only worthy heir of the Leader, stood at the head of the USSR? If neither the accursed 20th Congress, nor the “exposure of the personality cult”, nor the anti-Stalinist hysteria, nor the betrayal of the ideals of socialism had happened? What unprecedented heights, what power and prosperity. what greatness would our Motherland achieve? ..

A NEW BOOK by the leading Stalinist historian, completing his many years of work on the study of the personality and accomplishments of L.P. Beria, answers all these questions. This is the best epitaph for the greatest statesman of the USSR after Stalin. This is a farewell bow to the unbending communist patriot, the creator of the Superpower, the last genius of the unforgettable Stalin era. Eternal memory to him!

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Alexander Osipsov and Nikolai Soroka - with a friendly handshake

Foreword by Beria - a missed chance for power

The book “If Beria had not been killed...” is not the first of my books dedicated to Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, but, presumably, the last. In it, I finish the analysis of the role of Beria in that era, on which the imprint of his personality was imprinted to a large extent.

In my past books about Beria and Stalin, about the USSR of Stalin and Beria, in extensive comments on the personal diaries and other secret materials of Lavrenty Pavlovich, I tried to say as much as possible about Beria - a real person, a statesman, a reformer of Georgia and one of the founders of the mighty USSR.

About a man whose deeds have weightily and visibly entered the history of Russia and the world.

But the theme of Beria has another aspect - a virtual one, because the questions will be quite legitimate and historically sound: “What would happen if Beria had not been killed? What would the history of the USSR be like if Beria had been alive by the end of 1953 and remained in power?”

By the way, these questions were asked, and quite publicly and, in fact, in real time, in November 1957, Khrushchev.

The previous short chronology here is...

In October 1952, the 19th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - the CPSU, took place, setting before the country a well-founded task of building communism in the USSR. It was not a slogan, but a real plan, calculated with a pencil in hand, for the powerful all-round development of the USSR. By the way, in the coming years, a transition to a six-hour working day was also planned.

However, further events went more and more not according to the plans of the Stalinist Kremlin, but according to the plans of the Washington White House.

In early March 1953, Stalin was poisoned.

At the end of June 1953, Beria was arrested, and, most likely, at the beginning of August 1953, he was shot.

In the autumn of 1953, the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU introduced the post of first secretary of the Central Committee, which Khrushchev was elected.

In the spring of 1954, the "virgin saga" inspired by agents of influence began, which actually disrupted the implementation of the Directives of the 19th Congress on the 5th five-year plan for the development of the USSR in the field of agriculture (including the social development of the Russian countryside).

In the spring of 1954, Khrushchev declared the "Leningrad case" falsified, according to which the former chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR Voznesensky, secretary of the Central Committee, Kuz

Netsov-Leningradsky and about ten more smaller figures.

In the winter of 1956, the 20th Congress of the CPSU was convened, after which, in violation of all statutory norms, Khrushchev delivered "his" subversive and false report "On the cult of personality and its consequences."

Stalin's closest associates - Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, "surrendering" Beria to Khrushchev in July 1953, remained silent in 1956. In fact, they "surrendered" the Trotskyist Khrushchev and the now growing "fifth column" in the country to Stalin.

At the end of June 1957, Khrushchev, with the active support of Marshal Zhukov and the leading "partoplasm", drifting towards self-seekers, cracked down on the alleged "anti-party group" - Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich. All their "guilt" was that they tried to counteract the adventurism of Khrushchev, who intended to overtake the United States in the production of meat and milk per capita by 1960!

In October 1957, the turn of Marshal Zhukov, who had too much self-importance, came - at the next plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, he was overthrown from the post of Minister of Defense of the USSR into political oblivion.

And on November 1, 1957, Khrushchev, speaking at a meeting of the activists of the Moscow Regional Organization, directly asked from the podium: "If the party could not cope with Beria, where would we go then?"

And really, where?

Perhaps, only by answering such a question, one can consider the topic of Beria more or less fully disclosed. But first, a little something else...

In the decades that have passed since the death of Stalin, the question has been asked more than once: "What would happen if Stalin had lived for a few more years?"

Well, the question is also not idle and quite legitimate. Therefore, it is necessary to devote at least a few lines in the preface to this issue.

I think that in a book about Beria, Stalin's great comrade-in-arms, this would be useful.

Stalin in 1953 was in his 74th year, he would hardly have lived for a long time. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that he would have lived for some time, and the assassination of Stalin interrupted a very promising line in the life of the USSR and all mankind. Stalin was killed on the eve of the serious reforms he planned in the USSR in the direction of the development of socialist democracy for the masses, while at the same time a severe increase in demand from the leaders of these masses.

An ever more comprehensively developing, more and more educated and ever more prosperous mass of the people would become a guarantee of the indestructible existence of socialism in the USSR and the strengthening of the positions of the world socialist camp.

And the increase in systemic and moral requirements for the leading stratum of socialist society would provide the necessary

the quality of management of all aspects of the life of Soviet society.

As a result, socialism would continue to develop successfully and harmoniously, and the task of building a communist society in the USSR would become quite real. Socialism in the early 1950s had very powerful prospects. But Stalin's death already called them into question. And ahead was the death of Beria.

The percentage of serious mistakes made by Stalin in his political life is very low. Before the war, I personally counted only two of them: 1) underestimation of the potential of Soviet-German strategic cooperation; 2) the conclusion on April 5, 1941 of the Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression (!) with pro-British Yugoslavia. But after the war, the main, and moreover fatal, mistake of Stalin was his vague position on the issue of his worthy successor.

Taking a critical look at that era, one can understand that objectively only Beria could become such a successor, although Stalin outwardly gravitated towards Bulganin through the Council of Ministers, and in terms of leading the party (which, however, Beria never claimed) priority was given to Malenkov.

It can be assumed, however, that Stalin was not so much mistaken as delaying the solution of the issue and was killed just on the eve of decisive personal changes in the structure of the country's top leadership.

The next best option would be

(and it is very likely that Stalin intended to implement it at the beginning of March 1953)...

At the Plenum of the Central Committee, which was scheduled for Monday, March 2, 1953, Stalin proposes to convene an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, at which Comrade I.V. Stalin should be elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and Comrade Stalin USSR to appoint a comrade ...

And here the hitch arose!

Suggest comrade L.P. Beria? But one more Georgian in the highest position in the USSR would not have looked the best - for any of his outstanding business qualities. Therefore, Stalin could, in agreement with Beria, appoint either Malenkov or Bulganin as the new chairman of the Council of Ministers under the first deputy chairman of Beria, transferring to Beria the post of minister of the united Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD + MGB) of the USSR.

Stalin's new position as the official head of the Soviet Union would immediately, firstly, automatically transfer the center of power from party bodies to the bodies of Soviet power. Secondly, Stalin's new, but still supreme leadership position would have made it possible to carry out the reform of the top leadership of the USSR in the most painless way.

At the same time, for example, Malenkov, being the chairman of the Council of Ministers, could have remained the secretary of the Central Committee - there was a precedent in the face of Stalin himself.

At the Central Committee Plenum on March 2, Stalin could also approve special powers - until the convening of a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, a new leading

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troika (L.P. Beria, G.M. Malenkov, and N.A. Bulganin), which was actually created at the beginning of 1953 (I emphasized this more than once in my books).

In the future, a reasonable option for the future of the USSR and the CPSU would actually be the official approval of the leading "tandem" in the person of Malenkov and Beria, where Beria would sit behind Malenkov, but would pedal with might and main. Such a "tandem" under the "coach" Stalin could carry and carry the country to a brighter future. And - to carry even after the death of the "coach".

Khrushchev, after the Stalinist Plenum on March 2, most likely would have remained for some time the secretary of the Central Committee, but would have lost the post of the first secretary of the Moscow Party Committee - the failures of the Moscow region were precisely in agriculture, in which Khrushchev was considered a specialist became more and more obvious. One way or another, Khrushchev's star would start naturally
roll up.

But the Stalinist Plenum of the Central Committee on March 2 did not take place. And the death of Stalin mixed up all plans - except for the secret plans of the enemies of the USSR and socialism.

However, in 1953, Beria still remained in reserve for the era.

So in what direction would Russia go if the new "captain" (or at least the "pilot") of the Soviet state "ship" turned out to be him, the great manager of socialism?

What would have happened to us if Beria had not been killed?

Or, to paraphrase Khrushchev's question on November 1, 1957, if the party

eleven

could accept the leadership of Beria, where would we go then?

This is the question I will try to answer in my book. Moreover, I am not inclined to fantasize, but I prefer to turn to figures and facts as the basis for a logically and historically consistent analysis of the issue. I will write about the virtual USSR of Beria based on the real actions of the real Beria in 1953 and earlier.

I leave the ahistorical idle fantasies to the falsifiers of history, one of which I will remind the reader a little later, in Chapter One.

Here, concluding my short preface, I will say that Beria really became a missed chance for Russia. And the point is not that everything would be "tied" to one very large, talented and active person.

No, Beria, who lives and is at the heights of state power, like Stalin before that, would be a full-fledged unifier of truly nationwide creative efforts. He would be a powerful guarantor that creators, builders, engineers and scientists, socialist managers and workers of socialist culture will continue to have space in the life of Russia.

At the same time, Beria was exactly twenty years younger than Stalin. In 1953, Beria was only in his 54th year, and he could well live at the head of the USSR until the age of Stalin, that is, until the beginning of the 70s!

Leading the USSR, Beria would become natural

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a center of gravity for all healthy socialist forces in the USSR, and this would strengthen the USSR and make the USSR a natural center of gravity for all healthy, anti-capitalist and democratic forces in the world.

Such a situation for some period became a fact for Khrushchev's USSR and even for the early Brezhnev's USSR. But it was not strengthened by either Khrushchev or Brezhnev - under them, the USSR gradually lost its internal pace, then its international prestige, and then its stable historical prospects.

Under Beria at the head of the USSR, I am sure that everything could have gone differently. Otherwise, both in the USSR and in the world.

And the history of mankind in the second half of the 20th century could take other paths - not the paths of militarization and capitalization, but more and more - the paths of creating a global society worthy of all working people.

In this sense, one can speak of Beria as a missed chance not only for Russia, but for everything humanity.

Sergei Kremlev (Brezkun), January 4, 2012

Chapter 1

"If Beria had not been arrested ..." - Leonid Mlechin's phantasmagoria

In No. 41 of Novoye Vremya for 1993, a magazine completely perestroika during the perestroika years and anti-Soviet before the slobbering splashes of the Yeltsinoid years, some material appeared. On pages 34-38 of the magazine was published Leonid Mlechin's "documentary phantasmagoria" "If Lavrenty Beria had not been arrested ...".

I cited excerpts from it for the first time in my first book about Lavrenty Pavlovich - "Beria: the best manager of socialism", but now, I have to refer to this phantasmagoria again.

She started like this:

"Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria spoke at the closing of the 20th Congress of the CPSU.

"First of all," he said, "I would like to congratulate all of us on this congress. It was a renewal congress... The times when socialist legality was violated, when the norms of party life were violated, are gone forever.

The 20th Congress was the first at which Beria delivered a report.

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When he was given the final word, the audience rose and applauded for a long time. Beria smiled and made a gesture with his hand, meaning that he was asking everyone to calm down and sit down. But the delegates continued to applaud, looking at the presidium, which also stood up to greet the leader of a great country ... "

Mlechin's "reconstruction" was not only historically untenable, but also psychologically mediocre, because from the rostrum of the "Mlechinsky" version of the 20th Congress, for some reason, Beria began to recall - for no apparent reason - about the times old in relation to both the real Khrushchev and the virtual Beria's 20th Congress. In 1956, the virtual Beria Mlechina told the delegates of the 20th Congress about what these delegates should have already known well, namely, about how events unfolded after Stalin's death.

Mlechin, of course, does not think about why Beria in 1956, and even in his closing speech, began to recall the events of 1953.

Yes, and why?

Hot things don't get wet, and smelly things aren't particularly sniffed at. And Mlechin enthusiastically "fantasmagorized":

"The delegates and guests of the 20th Congress listened to this story of Beria with bated breath.

The coup was prepared by the cunning and insidious Nikita Khrushchev, who played the role of a simpleton, tried to be friends with everyone ...

Khrushchev, Beria said, wanted to permanently conserve what Stalin had created. Khrushchev was characterized by subjectivism and voluntarism,

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complete incompetence, the desire to decide everything on your own, without consulting with experts...

<...>

Khrushchev, an intriguer and anti-Party man, guilty of violations of socialist legality in the Ukraine and then in Moscow ... began to prepare a coup. He sought to seize all power in the country. To do this, he decided to destroy Beria - the only person who could resist his ambitions ...

<...>

The arrest of Beria was scheduled for June 26 ... "

In the "phantasmagoria" of Mlechin, everyone who was involved in it in reality turned out to be involved in Khrushchev's conspiracy: Bulganin, Beria's deputies for the Ministry of Internal Affairs Serov and Kruglov, Marshal Zhukov, generals Batitsky and Moskalenko ... However, Beria - according to Mlechin - was on the alert and on the morning of June 26, 1953 came to Malenkov.

Mlechin describes the situation as follows:

"What, Yegor, have you decided to oppose me? Beria asked, looking him straight in the eyes.

The frightened Malenkov hastened to go over to the side of Beria and gave out a plan for the Khrushchev operation.

Then, of course, everything developed "exactly the opposite" in relation to the real story: Kobulov, at the head of the operatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, arrested Zhukov and his people, arrested Serov and

Kruglov, and when at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee Khrushchev, after accusations against Beria, pressed the "secret button", officers of the internal troops entered the hall instead of Zhukov.

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"Khrushchev, Bulganin, Zhukov and others," Mlechin continued, "tried by a military tribunal. Based on the totality of crimes against the Motherland, they were sentenced to death.

Malenkov and Mikoyan Beria left on their

fear.

<...>

After the arrest of Khrushchev and his henchmen, who also turned out to be agents of American intelligence, Beria became chairman of the Council of Ministers.

No one could challenge his right to lead the party and the country.

It was Beria who spoke out against the omnipotence of the party apparatus and incompetent interference in economic affairs ... "

etc.

When I started reading this fourteen-year-old "phantasmagoria" in 2007, I was extremely surprised. Was Leonid Mlechin (Mlechin!) In 1993, almost the first to evaluate Beria objectively? This is Mlechin, a figure who is simply imbued with custom-made "anti-Sovietism", just as during the time of the Central Committee of the CPSU he was imbued with ostentatious "anti-imperialism".

But soon everything fell into place!

Delegates of the 20th Congress - along Mlechin - after thorough and long-accustomed checks by the posts of internal troops - are transported from Vnukovo, fenced with barbed wire, by military transport aircraft (there is no civil aviation, because "no one just hung around the country") .

All construction, as well as production at defense plants in the Soviet Union of the sample

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Mlechinsky Beria "was carried out with the help of the Main Directorate of Camps." Mlechin continued to "phantasmagorize":

"The Chairman of the State Planning Commission, Amayak Kobulov, named in his speech (at the "phantasmagoric" 20th congress. — S.K.) the target figures for the five-year period: 83 percent of industrial production to be provided through the use of the labor resources of the Main Directorate of Camps...

The 20th Congress set the government the task of freeing the Soviet people as much as possible from hard physical labor, transferring almost the entire industry to the jurisdiction of the Main Directorate of Camps.

etc. and so on.

But why did Mlechin in 1993, after the destruction of Soviet power and the Soviet Union, need to draw even negative attention to the figure that was forgotten in the USSR and, without any Mlechins, betrayed by historical anathema?

Well, the author of the libel on Beria and his era did not hide the purpose of writing his "phantasmagoria". According to Mlechin, he wanted to prove that:

"History is multifaceted. The fate of socialism in Russia also depended on many factors ... But the country would have developed in the same circle from the Gulag to the reform.

The multivariance of real socialism is reduced to a minimum, because the general scheme for the existence of a socialist society is

terror..."

Mlechin concluded his false "phantasmagoria" as follows:

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"Beria's reforms of 1953, which frightened his colleagues in the party leadership, were the first attempt at self-salvation. But even if the reforms were successful, the country would soon return to the GU LAS again. This would continue until socialism collapsed.

The multivariance of socialism is hopeless."

In other words, the Mlechins, knowing full well that already in 1993 the time of enlightenment was coming for many, began to throw mud at not only Beria personally, but also the very principle of socialism. And, it must be admitted, the Mlechins were very successful in this, although the insight, perhaps belated, but inevitable for the peoples of Russia and the USSR, is yet to come.

The author of the anti-Beria and at the same time anti-socialist "phantasmagoria", born in 1957 and graduating from the Faculty of Journalism of Moscow State University, prospered well in the Brezhnev era, squeezing "political stories" in the Soviet publishing houses in the series "On the Other Side". As a "fighter of the ideological front of the Central Committee of the CPSU", he exposed "myths about the Soviet threat", talked about how "American intelligence services are cracking down on anti-war activists" movement", etc.

Fitting into the era of "stagnation", Mlechin naturally became a disinformation affiliation of the "liberal" "era". There are no scum in political life - everything can be useful as personnel.

There is no need to study history deeply - its elementary knowledge is enough to understand that Mlechinsky Beria is a complete antipode of that

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real Beria, who acted from the moment of Stalin's death until the moment of his arrest on June 26, 1953.

So, Mlechin kept silent, for example, about the transfer by the new Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria of all industrial production from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the sectoral ministries and about the transfer by him to the Ministry of Justice of the USSR of the Gulag itself - the Main Directorate of Camps of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. And this "forgetfulness" of Mlechin is quite understandable - the mere mention of these two facts immediately brings down the entire gloomy "phantasmagoria" of Mlechin.

But what is interesting in this "phantasmagoria"! As an alternative to Khrushchev, it considers not Bulganin, not Malenkov, not Molotov or Mikoyan, or anyone else, namely Beria!

And this is demonstrative and evidence-based!

As you know, the most notorious liar does not lie in everything - if he lies openly, then no one will believe him, so the lie must somehow be camouflaged under the truth. As a result, even a liar blurts out something ...

So Mlechin unwittingly showed with his “phantasmagoria” that the history of the USSR could have gone in a fundamentally different way only if only and exclusively Beria had been at the head of the USSR instead of Khrushchev, and not someone else from former Stalinist “team”.

And here it is - but only in this! — Leonid Mlechin is right. Those positive tendencies that were laid down by Beria's activities after Stalin's death could only be developed by Beria,

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just as those negative tendencies that were laid down after the death of Stalin by the activities of Khrushchev could also be neutralized only by Beria.

It was under Beria as a possible leading figure in the political life of the post-Stalin USSR that the top leadership of the country would not have been able to get away from the activity and ideas of the most active member of this leadership. After all, he grasped everything better than others for a long time, and even, perhaps, better and deeper than the late Stalin — if it was not about questions of the theory of social processes, but about practical priorities determined by the logic of Russia's socialist development.

So what could be Beria's creative tendencies?

What could be the “Beria” XX Congress of the CPSU in 1956?

And what could be Beria's USSR?

This and something else we will talk about further.

Chapter 2

“One Hundred Days” by Beria, or What Mlechin and Others Have Silent About...

Mlechin's “Phantasmagoria” is nothing more than a political-historical insinuation. But in itself, a virtual “reconstruction” of the possible development of events in the post-Stalin USSR is not only scientifically admissible, it is even necessary from the point of view of both the completeness of historical analysis and the urgent needs of our today and tomorrow.

With this question: “How could everything be under Beria at the head of the USSR?” asked and asked by very different people. In order to give a reasonable answer to such a question, one must first look at how events unfolded in the USSR after Stalin's death, when Beria was actually one of the top leaders of the country? After all, as they say, Beria managed to designate the vector of possible own reforms. By the way he began, one could fully judge how and with what he would continue ...

So how did the real Beria begin to act in a country already living without Stalin? Where

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indicated the “Beria vector” of 1953 - up, down, right, left?

Until March 6, 1953, all the initiatives and plans of Beria had to undergo a mandatory approbation with Stalin. Now Stalin was gone, and the place of the conductor of the administrative ensemble of the USSR turned out to be vacant. Someone had to pick up the “conductor's baton” that had fallen out of Stalin's hands, and although formally it was not Beria who received it – as discussed below, the very course of events determined the undoubted fact that only Beria was able to write updated scores for the administrative ensemble of the USSR .

And he immediately offered them to his colleagues in the “ensemble”. Moreover, the initiatives put forward by Beria would be enough for everyone else - Lavrenty Pavlovich began to act so energetically in conditions when the effectiveness of his ideas was no longer evaluated by Stalin, but by life itself.

But were Beria's efforts at that time positive - objectively? Strange as it may seem, even the biggest haters of Beria, who portray him as a monster, cannot deny him the positive potential of activity in the spring and summer of 1953.

Here, for example, is the modern semi-official professor-"historian" V. Naumov. In his article "Was there a conspiracy of Beria?", Published in No. 5 of the journal "New and Contemporary History" for 1998, he wrote that "a number of modern authors, speaking out against the clichés of the Soviet (it would be more accurate to say "Khrushchev's." - With .K.) isto

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riography, positively assess the activities of Beria after the death of Stalin ... "

Naumov also writes that Beria's actions are "interpreted as the first attempt at de-Stalinization and ... the first steps towards a thaw."

Even before Professor Naumov, Alexander Frolov published in 1992 in Sovetskaya Rossiya an article with a characteristic title: "Unknown perestroika. 113 days in the life of a "faithful disciple and closest comrade-in-arms".

Frolov, unlike ex-communists like Naumov, was and remained a communist, and in a small but capacious publication he noted all the positive and overdue initiatives of Beria after Stalin's death, with which Beria, in Frolov's words, "gushed". However, Frolov did not fully understand the phenomenon of Beria - and then it was difficult to do this, the time had not yet come for a qualitative comprehensive analysis of the activities of L.P. Beria.

Thus, Frolov mentioned almost all of Beria's "post-Stalinist" actions, but argued that "Beria's "liberalization", "depoliticization", "national revival" and "new thinking" clearly had a double bottom..."

And here the author of "Soviet Russia" was clearly mistaken, starting with the fact that the concepts of "liberalization", "depoliticization", "national revival" and "new thinking" are not from Beria's vocabulary. These are the false fetishes of Gorbachev's "perestroika", aptly named "catastrophe".

And just Gorbachev's policy had a double bottom, in which they hid for the time being

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time, the collapse of the USSR, the restoration of capitalism and the degradation of Russia and the Soviet Union.

The activities of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria did not have a double bottom.

What happened?

And there were just those "Hundred Days" about which many wrote (including myself) and which it would not be out of place for us to take a careful look again.

Let me remind you that the very concept of "Hundred Days" originally referred to the short period of Napoleon's activity as Emperor of France from his flight in 1815 from the Mediterranean island of Elba to the mainland, to France, and until the defeat at Waterloo and the second, already windows contemplative, renunciation.

Later, the concept of "Hundred Days" acquired the character of a common noun and began to mean the initial period of activity of a political figure after he came to power in a legitimate or not very legitimate way.

At the same time, this is indicative...

Although the formal leaders of the USSR after Stalin's death were Kliment Voroshilov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Georgy Malenkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and Nikita Khrushchev, Secretary (since the autumn of 1953, First Secretary) of the Central Committee of the CPSU, no one ever came across - I thought of talking about the "Hundred Days" of someone from the trinity mentioned above.

But about the "Hundred Days" of Beria they say and write both his ill-wishers and those who appreciate

et it objectively, that is, positively. This already shows the true scale of Beria - he was the only completely original figure in Stalin's "team".

The distribution of new duties between the members of this "team" took place at a joint meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on March 6, 1953. The meeting took place the day after Stalin's official death and authorized "a number of measures to organize the party and state leadership"...

On March 15, the 4th session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR opened, which approved the decisions adopted on March 6 and gave them the force of law.

Voroshilov replaced as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Shvernik, "recommended" by the Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.

Instead of Stalin, Malenkov became Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and his first deputies were Beria, Molotov, Bulganin and Kaganovich.

Today, it is sometimes argued that Beria made a cunning move - the first member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU proposed to elect Malenkov as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and he had no choice but to name Beria's name first, proposing the candidacies of his first deputies.

But the question is, who was to be the "first among equals" in the USSR Council of Ministers, if not Beria, who in the first place "pulled" the Council of Ministers while Stalin was still alive? Who else could

to propose Malenkov to the "workhorses" of the Council of Ministers instead of Beria?

Now it is often written that, both before Stalin's death and, especially, after his death, various kinds of intrigues were characteristic of the top Soviet leadership. In relation to Stalin's "team" itself, this is, of course, not true. To be more precise - almost incorrect, and why "almost" I will say a little later.

In general, during the time of the mature Stalin, that is, the pre-war Stalin, who suppressed the internal enemies of socialism, his inner circle was not accustomed to intrigue and fight for power, because additional power then gave not "pies and donuts", but "bruises and bumps." And even the late Stalin of the early 1950s did not intentionally push his foreheads against any of his comrades-in-arms. And it was not in Stalin's nature that this was the case, and not in the spirit of the then authorities.

However, Stalin's death itself was the result of an intrigue. And that's why I'm a little higher on

put the word "almost" ...

Alas, the only, but clever and skillfully disguised intriguer in the "team" of Stalin was still. And it was Khrushchev. All subsequent events in the political life of the USSR proved this convincingly. Moreover, Khrushchev, after Stalin's death, managed to involve in his petty selfish dealings the rest of Stalin's former comrades-in-arms, except for Beria, against whom Khrushchev led his

digging

The question of alleged intrigues in the Stalinist "corridors of power" is utterly confused today, if not

conscientious, and some conscientious, but poorly understood the essence of that time historians. An example of the latter is Yury Zhukov, author of the books "The Other Stalin" and "Stalin: Secrets of Power". Without going into an analysis of his views, I will simply say here that the illegal approach leads Yuri Zhukov to explain the processes in the period shortly before Stalin's death and shortly after Stalin's death exclusively by "intrigues" of various "groups".

Yuri Zhukov also explains the behavior of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria in the spring and summer of 1953 by multi-way intrigues and a thirst for power, and not by fundamental considerations.

As mentioned above, with the departure of Stalin, Khrushchev brought intrigues among the top leadership of the USSR. So the intrigues have begun. However, their character is now being distorted and their scale is inflated.

Of course, both the objective needs of the situation and the personal

nye likes or dislikes.

Intertwined, objective and subjective factors programmed, alas, the appearance in the future of some "blocs" in the top leadership of the USSR. But in the period between the death of Stalin and the arrest of Beria, no hard "groupings" were yet observed - a split was ahead. And the general nature of the post-Stalinist personnel and managerial changes was largely justified and reasonable.

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Thus, it was quite logical that the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the MGB were again merged into one Ministry of the Interior under the hand of Beria, the only professional Chekist among all the last major associates of Stalin.

It was logical to appoint Malenkov as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and even Voroshilov as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Quite justified was the return, instead of the numerous Presidium of the Central Committee, elected after the 19th Congress, to such a "cut down" composition of the Presidium of the Central Committee, which actually repeated the old Politburo.

The first "post-Stalinist" Presidium consisted of: Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov, Pervukhin. Candidate members: Shvernink, Ponomarenko, Melnikov, Bagirov.

Such a return to a narrow composition made it possible to manage without any particular disputes. Everyone knew each other well and for a long time, and unity in a difficult period in the life of the USSR was worth a lot.

But then Molotov again became Minister of Foreign Affairs instead of Vyshinsky, who replaced Molotov in the Foreign Ministry in March 1949. Such a "renaissance" of Molotov could be somehow justified if Vyshinsky retained the post of First Deputy Minister. However, Andrei Yanuarievich, a strong and tough diplomat, was sent "to hell in the middle of nowhere" - the permanent representative of the USSR to the UN. And this was clearly a manifestation of Molotov's personal antipathies.

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At the same time, Molotov, not having the nature of an inveterate intriguer, could be drawn into the intrigue due to his political ambition, although carefully concealed, but present in him (in the everyday sense, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich was, on the contrary, very modest).

Even more true was such a statement regarding Mikoyan, under whose hand the Ministries of Foreign Trade and Trade were united. Mikoyan had reasons to envy Beria, and Molotov envied him and it's not good at all - there is reason to doubt that today

No. Such envy also hid the danger of Molotov leaving his positions of principle and moving to positions of business.

Bulganin replaced Marshal Vasilevsky, who was moved to first deputies, as Minister of War, and Marshal Zhukov, who had returned from the Urals, was appointed second deputy, also potentially no stranger to intrigue. Beria counted on his support, but the future showed that the marshal preferred to support Khrushchev.

About Khrushchev, in a joint Decree of March 6, 1953, the following was said:

"Recognize it necessary that comrade. Khrushchev N.S. concentrated on work in the Central Committee of the CPSU, and in connection with this, release him from the duties of the first secretary of the Moscow Committee of the CPSU.

In the days before the assassination of Stalin, in which Khrushchev was undoubtedly involved, "We kyta" clearly lost Stalin's trust - not without reason in

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In his memoirs, Khrushchev so persistently tried to prove the opposite.

Khrushchev could not enjoy special authority with his longtime colleagues in management either. It could be expected that for the time being he would work in the Central Committee for lack of a better candidate, and in the meantime the managerial "tandem" "Beria - Malenkov" would in fact transfer the decision-making arrows from the Central Committee to the Council of Ministers - as expected make Stalin.

The obvious business and any other superiority of Malenkov and Beria over Khrushchev and the lack of warmth in Khrushchev's relations with all other members of the top leadership would seem to guarantee the success of such managerial reform.

Everything here was reasonable from the standpoint of strengthening socialism, but Beria, like Stalin before, who believed Khrushchev as a colleague, could not even take into his head that only the strengthening of his personal positions mattered to Khrushchev.

And Beria, confident that his old comrades would always support his reasonable proposals, which, moreover, were largely in line with the ideas of Comrade Stalin, rushed towards his "Hundred days"...

What were they marked with?

Under what sign did you go?

All of Beria's main initiatives have already been repeatedly and repeatedly listed and described, including by me in my past books. At each of the "significant" initiatives of Lavrenty Pavlovich ("significant", however, were

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almost all of them) I will go into more detail in the relevant chapters. Now I just remember them...

Based on these real ideas, proposals and actions of the real Beria, one can not adventurously, not maliciously or apologetically, but quite reasonably, in fact, scientifically draw conclusions about what political and state line could be expected in the future. from the virtual Beria, if he had not been killed in 1953.

So, this is what Beria did and proposed for the period from the beginning of March to the end of June 1953 - for his "Hundred Days".

Already on March 26, after a corresponding study of the issue within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Beria did nothing. "with a tip" — a note was sent to Malenkov to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU about the need holding an amnesty for that part of the prisoners who did not commit serious crimes, and a corresponding relaxation of all criminal legislation. About the last Historians tend to forget the sentence, but in vain.

On April 4, 1953, Beria issued an order for the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs No. 0068 "On the prohibition of the use of arrested by any measures of coercion and physical influence. This canceled the "investigative" practice requested by Ignatiev from Stalin.

Beria quickly carried out a series of proposals for the rehabilitation of Mikhail Kaganovich, Marshal of the

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Tillieria Yakovlev, General Volkotrubenko, aviation generals Repin, Shimanov, Seleznev, former people's commissar of the aviation industry Shakhurin, former deputy minister of armaments Mirzakhanov and others.

Submitted notes to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the abolition of passport restrictions and regime localities, as well as - on the restriction of the rights of the Special Meeting under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

Submitted well-reasoned, with specific figures, notes of the Ministry of Internal Affairs about the unfavorable political and economic state of the western regions of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian SSR and Lithuania. According to these notes, where it was proposed, in particular, to correct obvious personnel excesses (for example, in Lithuania, out of 85 heads of district police departments, only 10 were Lithuanians), Decrees of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU are adopted, which were canceled after the arrest of Beria.

At the end of March, Beria sent a note to the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR proposing termination of construction or liquidation of a number of facilities, "the implementation of which in coming years is not caused by the urgent needs of the national economy," including - the Volga-Ural gravity canal, the tunnel under the Tatar Strait from the mainland to Sakhalin, Big Turkmen Canal, etc.

By March 28, Beria ensured the adoption of the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers "On the transfer from Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR to the Ministry of Justice of corrective labor la

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heroes and colonies" (I especially remind Mlechins of all sorts of this).

At the same time, Beria insisted on the transfer of all production national economic structures (enterprises, organizations, trusts, etc.), which were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, to the corresponding sectoral ministries according to their affiliation (I also remind all lovers of this to create anti-historical "phantasmagoria").

On May 9, 1953, Beria initiated the adoption of the Decree of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On the design of columns of demonstrators and buildings of enterprises, institutions and organizations on the days of state festive holidays." According to the Decree, the design of columns was canceled and buildings with portraits of leaders, and the practice of proclaiming from the government rostrums of appeals addressed to the demonstrators. (After the arrest of Beria and this Decree was canceled.)

In connection with the unbalanced policy of the authorities in Czechoslovakia, which led to the speeches of 1-4 June 1953, Beria proposed to eliminate the unjustified duplication of interstate coordinating bodies through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Military Coordinating Committee and create a single body of representatives of the countries of the people's democracy and the USSR.

Beria prepared such a reform of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which was supposed to transform the Ministry of Internal Affairs from the previous of the entire repressive body in the first place

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a supervisory body that provides objective information about the state of affairs in society and the economy to the top and regional party and state leadership.

On May 5, Beria initiated the cancellation of the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of May 20, 1950 on the expansion of grain crops in the republics of the Caucasus. This cancellation made it possible to use the agricultural areas of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, unique in the geographical conditions of the USSR, for growing crops that could grow only there (citrus fruits and other subtropical crops, tobacco, tea, etc.). On the other hand, such a measure strengthened mutual dependence of the union republics, which objectively strengthened the Soviet Union.

Beria came close to considering the issue of introducing new allied orders and a number of republican orders for awarding, first of all, cultural figures - orders Shevchenko, Nizami, Navoi, Rustaveli, etc.

On May 20, at the suggestion of Beria, the Decree of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On the reorganization of the apparatus of the Plenipotentiary of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR in the German Democratic Republic" was adopted, according to which significantly reduced the bureaucracy.

At the initiative of Beria, who had previously worked deeply with his assistants and experts on this issue, on June 2, the current Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On measures to improve the political situation in the GDR" was also adopted.

Of particular note is the activity of Beria in the development of atomic work in the USSR in 1953 - as weapons, and national economic. In addition to the great national work of Beria after Stalin's death - as well as before Stalin's death - daily paid attention not only "atomic", but also rocket work.

Actually, only Beria - one (except for the deceased Stalin) from the top leadership of the USSR - freely and competently guided in these matters. The same, for example, Malenkov and Bulganin had a fundamental opportunity to be aware of the problem, but did not do so.

On March 25, 1953, an order of the USSR Council of Ministers "On the work plan of KB-11 for 1953" was adopted. year". KB-11 was the only center for the development of nuclear weapons in the USSR at that time, stationed in the village of Sarov at the junction of Mordovia and the Gorky region. In 1953, the creation of the first Soviet thermonuclear ("hydrogen") bomb RDS-6s was being completed there, and Beria carefully and actively monitored the state of this and other developments of KB-11.

If we look at what other members of the top leadership were doing during the same period, we will see that they were inclined to simply maintain the position and the course of affairs that was instituted under Stalin, but without the rigidity that was characteristic of the late Stalin.

The death of Stalin, to one degree or another, turned out to be for all members of his "team" something like the death of a very strict father. And I feel sorry for my father

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Yes, and some relief is felt. Everyone felt that way, everyone except Beria.

He did not feel relieved, but even greater than under Stalin, responsibility and need for active transformation of life in the USSR and the world for the better. And he worked in this direction. He was really loyal to the cause of Stalin in the highest sense of the word - in his practical actions. At the same time, Beria was better than anyone else aware of the fact that if

If Stalin were alive, then in this case in the USSR already from the spring of 1953 serious changes would take place, conceived by Stalin himself. And conceived together with Beria.

In connection with the foregoing, I will draw the reader's attention to one more "assessment" of those days, given by a certain Peter Wagner. In March 2004, he posted on the Internet an extensive publication "A few remarks on the activities of L.P. Beria after the death of I.V. Stalin."

In general, Wagner - as a "liberal" (that is, as a combination of a rotten liberal with political perversion) - does not like Beria, but hates the Soviet system. Wagner pays tribute to the mind and scale of Beria, but states that to conduct a discussion about Beria's reformist plans means "to stand on fairly thin ice," because, they say, "to this day, no document has been found, if at all, that would we were unequivocally convinced of any comprehensive reform plan that Beria could have at his disposal ... "

And then Wagner adds: "... Trying to

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based on some of Beria's partial reformist steps to make him almost an apostle of perestroika—to sin against history."

Peter Wagner hardly guessed how right he was in his last statement!

The apostles of perestroika sat in the Western Sovietological centers, due to which Gorbachev's "perestroika", presented as a reform of socialism, became a "catastrophe" - a contract killing of socialism and the Soviet Union.

Beria, on the other hand, thought and acted with the reform of socialism in mind. Let me remind you that the concept of "political reform" means some changes, innovations that do not affect the foundations of the existing state system and are aimed at strengthening it.

It was precisely in the name of strengthening the Soviet Union and socialism that Beria worked in it - both under Stalin and after his death.

As for the "comprehensive reform plan", which allegedly, according to the Wagners, Beria "did not have", in fact, such a plan was, in many of its main features, worked out during Stalin's lifetime!

I mean both the preparation by Stalin, with the help of the Troika headed by Beria (with members Malenkov and Bulganin), for the aborted Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU on March 2, 1953, and the Directive of the 19th Congress on a new five-year plan.

We must not forget about the drafts of the new edition of the CPSU program, as well as about Stalin's "Economic Problems of Socialism ..." - which will be discussed later.

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At the same time, Beria, although he could not help but understand that Stalin was no longer right in everything, remained a student of Stalin, fully aware of his scale and greatness.

The pages of the "memoirs" are filled with fables such as that when the film director Mikhail Chiaureli allegedly brought Beria the script for a new film about Stalin, Beria allegedly threw the script away and yelled rudely: "Forget about this son of a bitch! Stalin was a scoundrel, a scoundrel, a tyrant!"

Even if we proceed from the fact that Beria regarded Stalin in this way (and we have very convincing evidence to the contrary), then all the same he would not have behaved in this way between March 5 and June 26, 1953, because it would be politically stupid, but Beria was not a fool.

Without a doubt, he assessed Stalin soberly, but that is why he could not help treating the figure of Stalin with great respect. In any case, the open "positioning", as they now say, of oneself as a hater of Stalin in front of Chiaureli, a man who was not professionally restrained in his language, was more than inappropriate and simply premature.

The pages of the "memoirs" are also filled with fables such as Molotov allegedly "remembered" that Beria allegedly whispered to him on the podium of the Mausoleum during Stalin's funeral that it was he, Beria, who killed Stalin and "all of us saved"...

However, today it can be confidently stated that Beria's true attitude towards Stalin was deeply respectful. To make sure

In this case, it is enough to carefully read Beria's letters "from the bunker" written by him after his arrest.

If Beria had been an anti-Stalinist and did not hide this from his colleagues in the post-Stalinist leadership and even from figures like Chiaureli, then in letters to the Presidium of the Central Committee he would have written like this - they say, together we suffered from a tyrant and dreamed of getting rid of this scoundrel! And I delivered you from it.

And I would sum it up in the spirit of Molotov's "revelations": so why did you put me in jail, I'm my own, anti-Stalinist!

But Beria wrote differently. Already in his first brief letter dated June 28, 1953, he recalled that "he was infinitely devoted to the party of Lenin-Stalin" and wished his colleagues "great success for the cause of Lenin-Stalin."

In a detailed letter to Malenkov and others dated July 1, 1953, Beria wrote as follows:

"Among other comrades, I also firmly and energetically set to work with the only thought to do everything possible and not to fail for all of us without Comrade Stalin ..."

Yes, this phrase alone puts an end to all anti-Stalinist insinuations against Beria! In any case, for any person with a mind and a heart. After all, this was written in a state of extreme stress! Written at the "moment of truth" — when, voluntarily or involuntarily, only sincere intonations break through from the writer!..

And all subsequent, very frequent, references to L.P. Beria named after Stalin in a letter on this or that occasion and references to Stalin about

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nicknamed with sincere respect for the personality of Stalin and for his memory. To deny this, knowing the full text of the letter dated July 1, 1953, is simply impossible - for a minimally honest and thoughtful person.

And could Beria, if he hated Stalin, in his third and last letter to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU dated [2] July 1953, insist on the intervention of his former comrades in his fate, "in the name of the memory of Lenin and Stalin"?

Well, in fact, gentlemen pseudo-historians, lie, lie, but do not lie!

The great supreme leader of the USSR, senior comrade and leader Beria died.

Beria, in order to declare himself as a potential supreme leader of the USSR, was allotted by the fate of only "One Hundred Days".

However, these "Hundred" (more precisely, one hundred and thirteen) days of his had, without a doubt, a Stalinist basis.

Stalin's directives, Beria's initiatives and Khrushchev's adjustments

Yes, the study of the events of the three spring and first summer months of 1953, which turned out to be the most important for the future of the USSR, allows us to say today that many of Beria's initiatives were not only his personal initiatives, but turned out to be the development of Stalin's plans and ideas. Those plans that Stalin intended to implement after the Plenum of the Central Committee on March 2, 1953, but could not implement, because he was preempted and eliminated by forces hostile to Stalin, and therefore hostile to Russia.

In confirmation of the assumption about the Stalinist basis of Beria's initiatives, the assumption that allows us to look differently at many things in the life of the USSR after Stalin's death, I can refer to the following lines from Beria's letter to Malenkov, written by Lavrenty Pavlovich on July 1, 1953, after his arrest ...

Beria wrote then:

"If initiative questions were introduced by me, then I reviewed them several times together with my comrades working with me, so as not to make a mistake

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and not let the Central Committee and the Government down. I stayed at the Council of Ministers, I did not have time to submit a memorandum to you, and a draft decision on streamlining award cases, I spent about two months on this. The question of this, as you know, we have long nurtured during the life of Comrade Stalin ... "

Beria had in mind the project of establishing new orders of the USSR, and from the above passage it is clear that for the first time the idea arose during the life of Stalin. This means that it is highly probable that Stalin was familiar with this idea and, in principle, approved of it.

The same can be said about some of Beria's other initiatives. Here is a quote from an essay by Konstantin Simonov, published in the "Anti-Beria" collection of Politizdat in 1991. On the whole, this essay is a libel that does no credit to Simonov. But something can be gleaned from Simonov, at that time a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Here is what he wrote:

"Why, then, was Beria interested in Malenkov becoming Stalin's heir precisely in the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Stalin's post in the Secretariat of the Central Committee would be taken by a person, from the point of view of Beria, of a secondary scale - Khrushchev, in whose personality and character Beria did not figure it out until the day of his fall? And it's very simple. Beria's idea was to ensure that the main role in the leadership of the country was played by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and his
deputies..."

But let us ask ourselves - was it only Beria's idea that the idea of the changing role of the party was? After all, today everything proves that the strengthening of the significance of the organs of Soviet power (and the Council of Ministers is

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its highest executive body) corresponded to the spirit of Stalin's ideas! And the idea that the main role in the leadership of the country should henceforth be played by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and his deputies, and not the secretaries of the Central Committee, was the thought of Stalin himself.

Let's also think about this...

Simonov testifies that Beria "did not understand the personality and character" of Khrushchev "until the very day of his fall." So who was the man with a double soul - Beria or Khrushchev? In fact, Simonov, wanting to denigrate Beria, brought an argument in his favor!

At the same time, Simonov correctly noted that the "nerve" of the political situation in the USSR after Stalin's death was set not by the Malenkov-Khrushchev line, but by the Khrushchev-Beria line.

This is a very important point!

The son of Georgy Maksimilianovich Malenkov, Andrey Malenkov, reports that, being retired, his father told him the following about Stalin's last minutes:

"I, Molotov, Beria, Mikoyan, Voroshilov, Kaganovich arrived at Stalin's nearby dacha. He was paralyzed, could not speak, could only move one hand. Weak, calling movements of the hand. Molotov approaches Stalin. Stalin makes a sign - "depart". Beria fits. Again, the sign - "go away." Mikoyan approaches - "move away." Then I come up. Stalin holds my hand without letting go. A few minutes later he dies without saying a word, only soundlessly moving his lips.

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Leonid, for example, Mlechin, in his books, written already in the 2000s, assures that "in reality it was different." But just in reality, everything could be just that!

On the one hand, it is unlikely that Malenkov would lie about this in a frank conversation with his son. Of course, the son himself could lie later in order to emphasize the role of the father. But the thing is that, according to the situation that then developed, apart from Malenkov, there was no one to put on the first - in terms of real significance - place in the state objectively ... And Stalin - albeit already poisoned, paralyzed, however who retained the clarity of mind, could not help but understand this.

At the time of the crisis that suddenly fell on the country, it was impossible not to put Malenkov at the head of the USSR. But if Stalin had clearly defined his successor, while still in strength and on his feet, then Beria could well have become him.

Already in the spring or summer of 1953.

I think the best option would be the following...

Stalin becomes the head of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, that is, the head of Soviet power. Beria, recommended by Stalin, is appointed at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, that is, the head of the economy.

Malenkov becomes the first person in the Central Committee of the CPSU after Stalin, that is, the party "working lo shady".

The Presovmina of the USSR Beria and the leading secretary of the Central Committee Malenkov, together with the political commissar Bulganin in the Military Ministry

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could form a completely effective new top of Stalin's "team".

Molotov and Mikoyan and Kaganovich would not have lost their places in this "team", but would have receded into the background, but new members of the "team" - Pervukhin and Saburov - would have found themselves in business.

Most likely, Stalin was thinking in this direction, but the enemies of Russia were ahead of him. And now, in the last moments of an unexpectedly ending life, Stalin understood that the new "layout" should be different from what was planned, and there was no one to transfer the country to except Malenkov.

At the same time, Stalin, most likely, took into account that Beria would still be the actual core of power and a reliable support for Malenkov. After all, Beria worked with him long ago even before the war, and even during

wars even more so.

So the scene described by Malenkov's son could well have taken place in reality, and not in apocryphal memoirs.

The above is confirmed in fact by the widow L.P. Beria - Nino Beria, who in July 1990, in an interview with the Georgian newspaper 7 DGE, she stated:

"I knew my husband: he was a man of practical mind and understood that after the death of Stal it was impossible for a Georgian to become the head of state. That's probably why he went towards the person he needs, such as Malenkov.

The key here can be considered the word "after [Stalin's death]." (which, moreover, no one among the people as a group

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I didn't perceive zina for a long time) the Georgian Beria could become not the head of the Soviet state, but head of the Soviet government. And successful work in this prominent post (actually Beria was not particularly famous among the people) the Georgians Beria, under living Stalin, could quickly become such a popular figure that over time, after Stalin's death, he could have headed country.

But everything turned out differently, and precisely because Beria was a man of practical mind, he, after Stalin's death was supported by Malenkov, whom, moreover, going into the coffin, he blessed with his close associates of Stalin himself.

Of course, the reliability of this last Stalinist "directive" can be disputed. What Immediately after Stalin's death, Malenkov occupied the post that, after the abolition of the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee, became the main one in the USSR, that is, the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers. USSR, this is a fact. And the fact that Malenkov became one with the blessing of Stalin is only a hypothesis.

However, Stalin left the country and his direct last directives. In the field of world outlook and politics, these were "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR", and in the purely economic field, the Directives of the MX Congress on the Fifth Five-Year Development Plan of the national economy of the USSR for 1955-1959.

I draw the reader's attention to the fact that the directives on the five-year plan, starting in 1955, were adopted at the end of 1952. This alone suggests that Stalin, being in

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advanced age, wanted to give the country his vision of its promising economies during his lifetime. ical and social tasks.

So, the Fifth Five-Year Plan was developed with the direct participation of Stalin and according to his concepts, so the Fifth Five-Year Plan can be considered Stalin's economic testament. And the essence of the new plan was the harmonious, balanced development of the economy in the interests of creating a solid material base for the development and prosperity of the peoples of the USSR, creating foundations of communist society.

Here, balance should be understood as such development when not a single industry develops to a greater extent than is necessary for the internal needs of the economy. What, for example, is the use of powerful shipbuilding if there is nothing to transport on the huge fleet that has been built? Or there will be no ports for it ...

You can, of course, try to charter the new fleet. But will it be a smart policy when the country lacks, for example, tractors or turbines of its own production?

The last Stalinist five-year plan, the directives for which were approved by the 19th Congress of the CPSU on October 12, 1952, had a balanced and thoughtful character.

Already by 1955, the overall level of industrial production should have increased by 70% compared to 1950.

The average annual growth rate of the entire gross output was determined at the rate of about 12 per cents.

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The development of all types of metallurgy was supposed to be the basis for the growth of industry and the entire national economy. Thus, the production of pig iron was to increase by 76% over the five-year period; steel — by 62%; rolled products — by 64%; refined copper — by 90%; lead - by 270%, aluminum - not less than 2.6 times; zinc - 2.5 times; nickel - by 53% and tin by 80%.

The sharp increase in the production of lead, aluminum and zinc was explained by the special shortage of these strategic metals and the growing needs within the country. Export was supposed only to the extent that it was possible to satisfy the demand of the Soviet industry itself.

So - highlighting internal needs as a priority - Stalin thought. But Beria thought the same way, which is directly confirmed by Mikoyan's speech at the anti-Beria plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in July 1953.

Mikoyan, burning Beria and throwing mud at him, then said a curious thing! He said (I give the text according to the uncorrected transcript):

"..Or another question... The Indians are playing between us and the Americans. They turned to us, so that we, Russians, would give them a certain amount of grain, about 300 thousand tons, and for this they would give us their goods. The Presidium of the Central Committee said that it would be good if the Indians were not refused, in order to reduce the influence of the Americans and knock the ground out of those enemies of the Soviet people who are in India. Molotov and I were instructed to prepare such a project.

We have prepared. We found grain from export resources by removing the sale to other capitalist countries in order to sell this grain

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Indians, meaning a politically more profitable business. They made an offer. He (L.P. Beria. - S.K.) says you can't take it, it's not known where this grain comes from. I say that it is calculated that it is within the limits of the export fund. And he says - maybe then exports should be reduced, who checked the balance?

[In the corrected transcript, this passage looks like this: "Beria suggested not accepting this project and postponing it until the country's grain and fodder balance and the grain export fund are checked." - S.K.].

I answer him that this is within the limits of export, there is no overspending. Then he says that it is necessary to create a commission, and the question of India was removed ... And only when Beria was arrested, we managed (? - S.K.) to carry out this decision, which was introduced by Molotov and me, because it was right."

Let's think about what Mikoyan said?

And here's what...

The Indians asked us for grain, but there was not enough grain in the country - by the end of 1953 the situation turned out to be so bad that a "virgin project" hastily arose, about which

discussed separately below. And in this situation, Beria learns that his colleagues involved in agriculture and exports are ready to sell to India the grain that we ourselves need.

They explain to him that this grain is all the same, they say, it was decided to sell it to the capitalist countries. And now, they say, we will sell them less, and due to this we will satisfy India (although 300 thousand tons of grain for huge India is one tooth).

And then Beria reasonably asks - and since you have export reserves, then maybe

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are they formed in such a way that it infringes on the domestic consumption of grain?

And if it is simpler: do we have the right to float grain abroad - to developed countries or, there, in the starving, there is no doubt, India, if our people are not fed, if we have not provided our own needs for grain?

What is the use of appeasing the Indians (who will still look more into the hands of the Americans, because they are rich), if we in our country create legitimate discontent among our own citizens?

No, dear comrades, let us first recalculate everything carefully, and perhaps then it will turn out that we have gone too far with grain exports, that the export fund is too high and should be cut in favor of domestic consumption.

Well, if after all the assessments it turns out that there are reserves, then we will decide everything definitively.

This is how Beria thought.

And did he think wrong?

And what is interesting is that everyone else seemed to support Molotov and Mikoyan, but the opinion of one person, Beria, outweighed it.

Why?

Is it because he was right?

And, of course, this constant correctness of his, this ability to approach the issue comprehensively, could not but irritate Beria's colleagues, because they were not able to think in such a complex way - they always relied on Comrade Stalin. And here is Be

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Riya gave Stalin his due, but he also knew how to live with his mind.

Only after the arrest of Beria on July 1, 1953, the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On the conclusion of a trade agreement with India and negotiations on the sale of wheat to India" was adopted.

As you can see, instead of the sober Stalinist and Beria's calculation, generous Khrushchev's assistance to anyone outside the country at the expense of the Soviet people began to enter the life of the country - in the name of mythical "political benefits". In the Brezhnev era, this line degenerated into support for dubious African "leaders," who did not even always camouflage their primitiveness with pseudo-Marxist phrases.

Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites began to introduce their own corrections, destructive for the USSR, into the Stalinist directives, in line with which Beria undertook his initiatives.

On the one hand, even after Stalin's death, the directives of the 19th Congress remained the official systemic reference point for the USSR. Coal production was to increase by 43%; electricity production - by 80%; steam turbines - 2.3 times; hydro turbines - 7.7 times; oil equipment - 3.5 times; large metal-cutting machine tools - 2.6 times.

Further powerful electrification and the construction of a number of large hydroelectric power stations over the five-year period were envisaged, and machine building, shipbuilding, machine tool building, the timber and wood-chemical industries, light and food industries were to be developed and developed.

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New huge construction of all kinds was planned. During the five-year plan, the fleet of excavators in construction was to increase approximately 2.5 times, scrapers - 3 times, bulldozers - 4 times, mobile cranes - 4.5 times.

All the main seaports of the USSR, the ports of the Far East, were to be capitally expanded.

Where by half, where by two-thirds, and where and at times, the production of food and light industry should have grown. In the direction of personal consumption, the defense industries were turning, for example, the production of radios and televisions was supposed to be doubled.

And all of these were real, mutually linked and more than once calculated and recalculated figures, the fulfillment of which was supposed to increase the country's overall potential by about 60-70 percent.

On the other hand, almost immediately after the assassination of Stalin and then the assassination of Beria, priorities began to shift imperceptibly towards more and more exports of raw materials for the sake of exports.

Separately, I will focus on oil.

According to the directives of the 19th Congress, its production was to increase by 75-80 percent. And I especially draw the reader's attention to the fact that, according to Stalin's directives, oil production was to increase only slightly more than gross production.

And it was clear! Why extract so much more oil than you can process it and

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put on the needs of the country? At the same time, oil was one of the main items of Soviet export, and therefore it was necessary to extract more of it than was required by ourselves.

But more - by a dozen or two percent, and not many times - as in the case of planning an increase in the production of acutely scarce non-ferrous metals, construction equipment, energy equipment, new consumer goods, etc.

Such a balanced increase in oil production by Stalin and Beria was planned, at a level of up to 80 percent.

Stalin, in his speech at the pre-election meeting of voters in the Stalinist electoral district of Moscow on February 9, 1946, spoke of the need to increase annual oil production to 60 million tons as the most important long-term task. At the same time, Stalin said that perhaps three new five-year plans, if not more, would be used to solve this problem, and added: "But this work can be done, and we must do it.

1946 + 15 years = 1961. That is, according to Stalin's directives, by the end of the fifth five-year plan of the USSR, it was necessary to produce approximately 60 million tons of crude oil. And the then minister

In the oil industry, Baibakov, already much later than the murder of Beria, declared that such a plan was supposedly Beria's adventure.

However, Baibakov vulgarly lied.

On the eve of the war, the USSR produced 34 million tons of oil per year, immediately after the war - 19 million

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lion tons. And in 1960, when the name of Beria had long been cursed, 148 tons of oil were produced in the USSR, not counting the fact that by this year natural gas production had increased 15 (fifteen) times.

This fact somehow has not attracted the attention of researchers to this day, and I myself have paid attention to it only recently.

And the fact is curious, if not unique! Khrushchev's corrections of Stalin's directives and Beria's perspectives blocked these directives and perspectives by almost two and a half times!

But by what miracle did it all happen? Why did oil production in the USSR increase so sharply in a matter of years? After all, in order for this to become possible, it was necessary to divert forces and resources from the development of other branches, and yet their balance was carefully weighed before drawing up directives for the fifth five-year plan - Stalin's last ...

So, isn't the key to the "miracle" that by 1960 the annual export of crude oil from the USSR amounted to 17.8 million tons (12.1% of total production), and, in addition, the export of petroleum products and synthetic liquid fuel additionally "pulled" by 15.4 million tons?

The direct Soviet economy did not need such a huge amount of oil as was produced in the USSR by 1960. The control figures for the overall development of the economy were at the level of approximately directive figures set even under Stalin (that is, an increase, on average, by about 70%).

So why was so much oil produced? In the name of export?

It turns out yes...

And who needed such hypertrophied oil exports? National economy of the USSR? The peoples of the Soviet Union?

Don't think...

The enemies of socialism needed the cunning mutilation of the Stalinist plan to create an economic base for communist construction in the USSR by Khrushchev's corrections. And by the hands of the Khrushchevites, these destructive adjustments were made.

If Beria had been alive, this, of course, would not have been possible. Beria always and in everything thought systematically, saw problems in a complex and in all their internal relationships. Therefore, Beria would never go for the intensification of oil production, not for the sake of domestic needs, but in the name of increasing its exports to expand imports.

Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites, including among the latter agents of Western influence, made their vile corrections to the reasonable Stalinist directives and led the Soviet economy down a shaky path of dependence both on raw material exports and on increasing various imports.

Foreign trade ties are a necessary and inevitable thing, but they are good for the country when these ties are firmly conditioned by internal economic opportunities and needs.

countries.

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So it was under Stalin, so it certainly would have been under Beria, but it did not go that way under Khrushchev.

It is significant that in the beginning everything was different with gas than with oil. Oil can be transported abroad in tanks by rail, in tankers along rivers and seas. With gas, with large exports, this is more difficult to do. Therefore, although by 1960 the production of natural gas in the USSR had increased 15 times, the volume of its export in 1960 amounted to only 0.2 billion cubic meters (0.5% of the total production).

One should not be surprised - at that time there were no pipelines running through our lands, sucking Soviet gas from the Soviet bowels for the benefit of foreign lands. Powerful gas exports, in addition to oil exports, were "organized" for us by agents of Western influence already in the Brezhnev era. Back in 1970, the USSR exported only 3.3 billion cubic meters, but already in 1980 - 54.2 billion cubic meters, and in 1986 - 79.2 billion cubic meters.

For reference, in 2006 the volume of gas exports from the Russian Federation alone to "far-abroad countries" amounted to 165 billion m³ (only 41.1 billion m³ were supplied to the CIS countries).

Like this!

At the same time, Khrushchev's "oil" adjustments, which violated the balance of Stalin's directives, were not the only systemic economic sabotage against socialism in the USSR. Unjustified by internal needs intensification of oil production undermining

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la balance of industrial development. But there was also agriculture. After all, it also had to be undermined by disproportions and encouraged by "failed" tendencies.

Well, the Khrushchevites, whom Beria could no longer restrain, made devastating adjustments to the Stalinist plan for the rise of agriculture as early as 1954. I mean the "virgin" "epo sing", which I have already written about in previous books, but I will have to repeat myself.

It was planned to increase the gross harvest of grain crops by 40-50 per cent over the five-year period. At the same time, it was supposed to increase the yield of grain crops per hectare in the regions of Southern Ukraine and the North Caucasus to 20-22 centners and on irrigated lands to 30-34 centners; in the regions of the Volga region up to 14-15 centners and on irrigated lands up to 25-28 centners; in the Central Chernozem regions up to 16-18 centners and on irrigated lands up to 30-34 centners; in the non-chernozem zone up to 17-19 centners; in the regions of the Urals, Siberia and North-Eastern Kazakhstan up to 15-16 centners and on irrigated lands up to 24-26 centners; in the regions of Transcaucasia up to 20-22 centners and on irrigated lands up to 30-34 centners ...

As you can see, the average grain yield in the Union should have been at a level not lower than 15 or even 20 centners per hectare after the five-year plan.

The milk yield per cow on collective farms, even in the non-chernozem zone, was supposed to be brought up to

1800-2000 kilograms, and in state farms - up to 3500-3900 kilograms.

Accordingly, in 1955 it was supposed to sell meat products to the population - by 90 percent; fish products - by 70 percent; animal oils — by 70 percent; cheese - 2 times and sugar 2 times more than in 1950.

This, too, was all calculated in advance, and the directives of the 19th Congress in the field of agriculture could be fulfilled. However, they were not fulfilled, a solid basis for the decision to continue

we did not get a free problem.

Why?

But, among other things, why - because of the "virgin epic" ...

There was not a word about the notorious "development of virgin and fallow lands" in Stalin's directives, which began to be trumpeted from the spring of 1954. Speaking at the congress, the Kazakhstani secretary Shayakhmetov, speaking of "tremendous successes", noted only "insufficient attention of the Ministry of Agriculture of the USSR to the development of animal husbandry in Kazakhstan."

In the directives, in the section on agriculture, it was only said about Kazakhstan that it was necessary to ensure there "the creation of high-yielding hayfields and pastures through the use of local irrigation and the use of artesian waters in order to gradually reduce long-distance cattle transhumance".

There was no talk of any virginity! And this was quite understandable: objectively, the country was not up to virgin lands. During the war, the Germans burned and destroyed

70 thousand Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian villages and villages were destroyed, 98 thousand collective farms, 1876 state farms were destroyed and plundered, while even in areas that were not subject to occupation, the material and technical base of agriculture was severely undermined by the war. And all this had to be restored — in the RSFSR, in the Ukrainian SSR, in the BSSR, which was what the directives provided for.

The directives on the post-war five-year plan for the development of the Soviet economy are a thoughtful and calculated document. In the late USSR, Stalin learned to plan based on the real possibilities and needs of the country and they planned well, and the plans themselves were tense precisely because they included intensive, without latent reserves, indicators.

In other words, if in 1955-1959 the introduction of the virgin lands of Kazakhstan into circulation was not provided for by the plan, then it should not have been.

And suddenly, almost immediately after the death of Stalin and the liquidation of Beria, like a jack-in-the-box, this strangely hasty project appears in the life of the USSR.

In September 1953, the next plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU was convened. He introduces the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee under Khrushchev. And on September 7, 1953, the same plenum adopted a resolution "On measures for the further development of agriculture in the USSR". Grain was sent to India, but in 1953 it was harvested at a "record" low

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some quantity. In the 6th volume of Brezhnev's "History of the Socialist Economy of the USSR" it is said that in 1953 "a little more than 31 million tons of grain were harvested (by the state - S.K.), and more than 32 million tons were used, which forced the partial use of state reserves".

What should have been done?

Of course, to devote all our efforts to the development of collective and state farms in the Russian Non-Chernozem region and the creation in the European part of the USSR - in the RSFSR, in Ukraine and in Belarus - of a modern agricultural base. There were huge growth reserves here, and the political effect would have been very relevant - after all, it was these regions that suffered the most from the war.

However, in late February - early March 1954, another Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU was convened, mainly on agricultural issues. On February 23, Khrushchev made a report, and on March 2, 1954, the Plenum issued a resolution "On a further increase in grain production and on

development of virgin and fallow lands. The areas of new grain production are Western and Eastern Siberia, the Far East, the Urals, the North Caucasus, but above all, the Kazakh SSR.

In 1954, the lands of Kiev, Smolensk, Poltava, Kharkov, Oryol, Kursk, Bryansk, Belgorod, Sumy and many other regions of Russia and Ukraine, not to mention the lands of Belarus, still bore the terrible marks of war. Worn out

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the fleet of machines, the shortage of workers, the obviously insufficient construction...

And so all that equipment, all the forces and personnel that were so lacking for agriculture in the European part of the Union, were poured in a wave over three to nine lands - into the uninhabited desert steppes.

In 1954-1955, 40 large machine and tractor stations (MTS) were created in virgin lands development areas, where 120,000 tractors (in 15-horsepower terms) and 23,000 combines were sent. 425 new state farms received 136,000 tractors (in terms of 15 hp) and 55,000 combines.

November 6, 1951 L.P. Beria, in his report at the solemn meeting of the Moscow City Council, reported:

"Agriculture annually receives a large number of the latest machines from the state. This year, it will receive 137,000 tractors converted to 15-horsepower, 54,000 grain harvesters, of which 29,000 are self-propelled, as well as two million other agricultural machines and implements."

Comparing the "virgin" figures with the figures for the all-Union production of agricultural machinery, one can understand that the "virgin" corrections of the directives of the 19th Congress actually blew up these directives! To hell with carefully considered plans...

Yes, things with state procurements in the USSR in 1953 did not develop in the best way. But it wasn't all that disastrous! In general, as early as 1950, the USSR produced 81.2 million tons of grain, and even

1945 - 47.3 million tons (in 1940 - 95.6 million tons, while in 1941, if not for the war, the collection would have clearly exceeded 100 million tons, without any virgin soil).

The sensible line was, I repeat, clear—to rapidly restore the traditional regions of new grain production while increasing productivity in every possible way (which, in fact, was envisaged by Stalin's directives for the five-year plan). Instead, since 1954, 350,000 young men and women, having received a ticket from the Komsomol committee, left "for the development of virgin lands."

During 1954-1955, 33 million hectares of new land were plowed up in the USSR, 18 million of them in Kazakhstan.

In 1954, Kazakhstan produced 250 million poods (4 million tons) of grain, 150 million poods (2.4 million tons) more than before. An increase that the traditional areas of grain production could well have given if the Khrushchevites had not "ripped off" them in favor of virgin lands.

1955 was a lean year in the virgin lands. And only in 1956, Kazakhstan "gave the country the first Kazakh billion poods of bread", that is, 16 million tons. At the same time, in two years, the sown area was increased to 27 million hectares.

Simple arithmetic shows that the average yield in Kazakhstan was "awesome" - about 6 centners per hectare.

The directives of the congress provided for an increase in productivity in North-Eastern Kazakhstan to 15-16 centners and on irrigated

lands to 24-26 centners, but, firstly, by 1959, and secondly (and this is the most important) on fundamentally smaller sown areas!

The Russian and Ukrainian villages did not receive the vital necessities, and huge funds continued to be invested in the "virgin lands". Instead of restoring the Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian villages that had suffered, were devastated by the war and the occupation, the construction of virgin settlements began in the middle of nowhere. New highways and railways were built in Kazakhstan and Siberia.

Such an unexpected, previously unplanned redistribution of all-Union funds hit the Russian countryside especially hard. And today we can confidently assert that the anti-popular and asocial policy of Brezhnevism in relation to "unpromising villages" had its origins in the "virgin epic" of Khrushchevism.

Here are the figures for the gross grain harvest in the USSR by years: 1950 - 81.2 million tons; 1951 - 78.7 million tons; 1952 - 92.2 million tons; 1953 - 82.5 million tons; 1954 - 85.6 million tons; 1955 - 103.7 million tons; 1956 - 125 million tons; 1957 - 102 million tons; 1958 - 134.7 million tons; 1959 - 119.5 million tons; 1960 - 125.5 million tons.

And here are the figures for yields in centners per hectare: 1949 - 6.9; 1950 - 7.9; 1951 - 7.4; 1952 - 8.6; 1953 - 7.8; 1954 - 7.7; 1955 - 8.4; 1956 - 9.9; 1957 - 8.4; 1958 - 11.1; 1959 - 10.4.

As we can see, in general, the planned task of the directives to increase grain production was

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achieved: instead of 81.5 million tons in 1950, 119.5 million tons were produced in 1959, that is, almost one and a half times more.

However, all the blueprints for yield directives were thwarted. And this means that the growth of grain production was ensured not due to intensive, as Stalin's directives envisaged, but due to Khrushchev's extensive development of grain production.

Stalin's plan was to lay a solid foundation for a new powerful upsurge in the countryside.

Beria's promising approach - if he had survived, would have ensured the development of Soviet agriculture according to the Stalinist plan.

Khrushchev's adjustments ruined this plan.

It is indicative that the anti-Soviet Peter Wagner, mentioned in the previous chapter, wrote in 2004 about virgin lands, which were Khrushchev's, and later Brezhnev's "pride", as a symbol of the "communist experiment going to a dead end". They say that virgin lands "at first saved the USSR from serious problems with a lack of food, but after a few years it itself became a difficult problem to solve."

Alas, there is nothing to argue here.

Yes, and there is no need.

After the assassination of Stalin and the massacre of Beria in 1953, after Khrushchev's report on the cult of personality "at the end" of the 20th Congress in 1956, and after the political assassination of Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich by the Khrushchevites in 1957, the Soviet Union really went (or rather, he was vilely led) to a dead end and then to an abyss.

But this was not the logical result of the "communist experiment", but the result of a comprehensive plan for the gradual destruction of socialism. And Khrushchev's voluntaristic adjustments to Stalin's directives were one part of this vile plan.

However, this book is about something else. Namely, about what the development of the USSR could be like when Beria was alive, and not killed.

So let's see what course Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria could lead the country if he had not been killed.

Chapter 4

Beria and the reform of the political system

There is every reason to believe that Beria, had he lived, would have ensured the most important political reform conceived by Stalin - the transfer of the center of state power from party to Soviet bodies.

The political system of the Soviet Union on the eve of its collapse in 1991 was based on the "leading and guiding role of the CPSU", which was constitutionally enshrined in the famous Article 6 of the USSR Constitution.

But was this principle correct?

And how did it form in the USSR?

Until October 1917, Lenin viewed the party as an instrument for the working people to gain political power in the form of Soviets and put forward the slogan "All power to the Soviets!", and not "All power to the RSDPI(b)!".

After the victory of October, Lenin considered the party as an instrument for strengthening, again, Soviet power, that is, the power of the Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies.

From this, in fact, the principle of the primacy of the party did not follow, however, the real course of events

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ty in Russia put the party bodies at the head of all transformations. From the very beginning, the Soviet organs acquired a subordinate significance, because the internal overthrown classes and external intervention already in 1918 placed the young Soviet government in the force majeure circumstances of a civil war.

And so it went on - in the future, the role of the party in organizing life in the USSR only increased and strengthened, and this was also justified - the political "force majeure" continued and it could be overcome only if all the active forces of society were united which could only be provided by a strong political party of the Bolsheviks.

But the Soviet Union was developing, new generations were growing en masse, born and brought up already under Soviet power. These generations were staunch supporters and builders of socialism, and their representatives increasingly determined the nature of activity in all spheres of society. Therefore, real management was increasingly shifted from party to economic bodies, the top of which were the people's commissariats and the Council of People's Commissars - the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

The Council of People's Commissars, and after the war - the Council of Ministers of the USSR, was the executive body formed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, that is, the Soviet power. And therefore, from some point (specifically, from the beginning of the 1950s), there was a need to reconsider the view on the role and place of the Communist Party in the political

system of the USSR. Priority had to be given to the bodies of Soviet power—the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the Union Republics, the regional, district, and city Soviets of Working People's Deputies. Party bodies, on the other hand, were supposed to ensure the cementing of society into a single spiritual

a monolith due to the particularly high moral qualities of the communists, due to the fact that they are the moral vanguard of Soviet society.

Stalin was determined to start such a gradual reform, which became one of the internal reasons for his elimination by the emerging "partoplasm". At the same time, when Stalin spoke of the party as an "order of swordsmen", he did not mean the isolation of the communists from the people, but, on the contrary, the requirement for party members of chivalrous behavior, nobility and renunciation of selfish motives as an example for non-party .

Would Beria carry out such a reform?

The answer to this question was given, in fact, by Khrushchev himself.

In June 1953, Khrushchev got rid of Beria.

In June 1957, Khrushchev, with the active help of Marshal Zhukov, carried out an intra-party (and anti-party) coup at the Plenum of the Central Committee, declaring Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich an "anti-party group".

In October of the same 1957, Khrushchev got rid of Zhukov.

If under Stalin there were major changes in the nat, no matter how harsh and even cruel

However they were, they were conditioned by the interests of the state, then the elimination of Beria became not a political act, but a politic one, personally needed by Khrushchev, who managed to provoke the rest into politicking. And from that moment on, the truly political (that is, in the interests of the party, state and people) line within the leadership of the CPSU was under threat.

The 20th Congress almost broke the right line, and the attempt of Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich to restore it cost them their place in the top leadership.

In fact, since June 1957, the Bolshevik statesmen have lost political power in Russia, and politicians have come to power — for the time being, however, not thinking about the restoration of capitalism, but really working for this future restoration. By November 1957, Khrushchev's personal positions were completely strengthened, which meant the strengthening of those "gray cardinals" such as Kuusinen and others who prepared the ground for the restoration of capitalism, which was impossible without the elimination of socialism.

Beria was the systemic antipode of Khrushchev, so he would have carried out the reform necessary for socialism.

As the reader already knows, on November 1, 1957, Khrushchev spoke at a meeting of the activists of the Moscow Regional Organization, where he asked his sacramental question: "If the party could not cope with Beria, where would we go then?"

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But then Khrushchev reasoned like this:

"Take Beria. Beria, after the death of Stalin, in what direction did he act? He began to strengthen the Ministry of Internal Affairs and weaken the party ... and we literally caught Beria by the tail when he began to smash party organizations in Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia (? - S.K.), Estonia (? - S.K.), and he would, of course, get to the Russian Federation ... "

Khrushchev lied, taking advantage of the fact that his audience did not know and could not know the true situation affairs.

Beria did not strengthen the Ministry of Internal Affairs as a repressive body - he, on the contrary, proposed limiting the rights of the Special Conference, saved the Ministry of Internal Affairs from the Gulag, transferring it to the Ministry of Justice of the USSR, and also relieved the Ministry of Internal Affairs from national economic functions, transferring the entire industry of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to - branch ministries.

Beria conceived the reform of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the spirit that the control and information role of the Ministry of Internal Affairs should have been strengthened and the transformation of state security agencies on the ground into a kind of "Peter's sergeants" of the Soviet government, which would provide direct information from the places of higher and regional guides about the real situation in society and economy.

Beria did not smash party organizations, but reasonably pointed out the ugly personnel policy in specific "new" regions - in Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Lithuania (there was no talk of Latvia and Estonia), where national cadres played an insignificant role at that time. role, but political banditry was developed on the basis of nationalism.

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In the "old" union republics, the situation was also far from favorable. But there, national cadres were created from the beginning of the 1920s. Therefore, Beria did not talk about the "old" union republics, although even here he had some considerations.

At the same time, Khrushchev's words that Beria allegedly began to "weaken the party" are revealing. After all, Beria really believed that all the main practical issues should be raised where they are then practically resolved, that is, not in the Central Committee of the CPSU, but in the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

And this opinion of his coincided with Stalin's.

However, not only with Stalin!

Khrushchev on November 1, 1957 said:

"This, comrades, was a campaign against the party, to defeat the party, to strengthen the personal role (whoever's cow lowed! - S.K.), this would lead to the restoration of capitalism ..."

And then continued like this:

"Now look, if you take Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Shepilov, then what a dispute there was again with Molotov. Well, Beria and Molotov are, of course, different people, completely different. But Molotov and I had a big argument as soon as Stalin died. He said that the role of Soviet organizations should be strengthened. We (I wonder who Khrushchev meant by this "we"? - S.K.) said: no, we need to strengthen the role of party organs. Why? This is a fundamental dispute. He (Molotov. — S.K.) countered that after the October Revolution, Lenin did not become a secretary (of the Central Committee — S.K.), but became chairman (of the Council of People's Commissars. — S.K.). Comrades, it is impossible to compare, it was Lenin, and where Lenin is, there is the party. Mayakovsky said it best. What is possible for Lenin cannot be given to another. That, comrades, should be clear."

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As you can see, Khrushchev, not very burdened with erudition, even remembered Mayakovsky. ("We say "Lenin" - we mean "party", we say "party" - we mean "Lenin"...).

But the example was incorrect.

Lenin is the very beginning of young Soviet history. At that time, the head of the Council of People's Commissars more often led the country not through Soviet bodies, but through party bodies, because it was precisely the party bodies that consisted of not just supporters, but organizers of Soviet power.

But since the time of Lenin, in the history of Russia, in fact, several historical epochs have changed in a matter of decades! The country has changed beyond recognition, and it was necessary to bring the political system in line with these changes.

It was precisely this that Khrushchev was afraid of, and with him the growing "partoplasm" was afraid.

Khrushchev said:

"Comrades! If the Party is strong, if it is united, then the construction of socialism and the development of this construction in the communist direction will be ensured. If, however, the Party is weakened, if it loses its influence on the Communists, then, comrades, all sorts of adventurist manifestations may break out in the country.

Who is able to crush the enemy in the party? The consignment. Therefore, the question of the party is the main thing. If the party could not cope with Beria, where would we go then?

At the same time, Khrushchev did not understand that he whipped himself and exposed himself. Having said that "the party will be weakened" if it "loses its influence

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against the communists," Khrushchev clearly showed that by "party" he meant not millions of party masses, but only the top of the party!

According to Khrushchev, it was not the communists who had to morally influence the non-party, but the party elite should have the right to influence the rank-and-file communists simply by virtue of their being in leadership positions.

Mayakovsky was brilliantly precise, emphasizing the identity of the party and its founder, Lenin. Khrushchev actually said that when he said "party" he meant by this Khrushchev and Khrushchev's Presidium of the Central Committee. However, was it possible to say: "We say "Khrushchev" – we mean "party"..."?

But Khrushchev said on November 1, 1957, and this is what:

"Let us even take an example of the struggle (all those present know about this from studying the history of the party, and some of the older generation were themselves participants) of the Soviet government against the White Guards. You know what the slogans of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Anarchists and all sorts of others were then. When Lenin said: "All power to the Soviets!" they began to adapt and say - all power to the Soviets, but without the communists. Why? Because power itself is organizational forms, and the socialist direction is the content that is given by the communists. Therefore, they thought that by eliminating the communists, the form could be adapted to the bourgeois state, to the bourgeois system.

That is why the question of the party, the question of the role of the party, is the main question not only today, but also tomorrow."

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Khrushchev accidentally "blurted out" to the "point" - ion himself, and most of his listeners knew about long-standing events precisely not from personal experience, but "from studying the history of the party." But Khrushchev also distorted the history of the party.

The real conflict he described above was not an episode of the struggle of "Soviet power against the White Guards", but an episode of the struggle for the future Soviet power against the compromising Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik Soviets until October 1917 and the struggle of Soviet power against the Socialist-Revolutionary rebels (for example, the Antonov rebels). in the Tambov region) after October 1917.

But when was it!

Then the question of the role of the party in society stood in one way, but now, in the fortieth year of Soviet power, it is different. But Khrushchev did not need those changes that were needed by the Soviet government and the peoples living according to the laws of the Soviet government.

But Beria was convinced of the need for such overdue changes. Interesting in this regard is the slanderous Anti-Beria note dated July 6, 1953 in the Central Committee of the CPSU ML. Pomaznev (1911-1987), managing director of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. He wrote:

"...7. Beria was intolerant of party and public bodies, workers and events. He cultivated disrespect for the apparatus of the Central Committee. Participation in public events was considered idleness. When I had to be present at the party committee (during working hours, presumably, - S.K.), at a meeting or meeting, and at that time there was a call from Beria, there was always a scandal. He said many times that only loafers could allow this.

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8. The Special Committee (on atomic and rocket affairs. — S.K.) appointed and dismissed workers on its own line without the Central Committee, the CPSU, i.e. The special committee (in Pomaznev with a lowercase letter, although the official name of the Special Committee was written with a capital letter. - S.K.) replaced not only the Council of Ministers (but Beria was actually the first Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. - S.K.), but also the Central Committee of the CPSU. Not without the influence of Beria, a completely abnormal situation developed when senior officials of the Council of Ministers were not approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU.

From the standpoint of today and knowledge of the entire subsequent history of the USSR, I somehow do not really want to comment on these "revelations" in detail, but I will note one thing.

In a kholuy rage and a desire to serve the secretary (for the time being, just the secretary) of the Central Committee of the CPSU "Comrade. Khrushchev N.S." Pomaznev went too far and let slip about what one could have kept silent about ...

"Partocratically" thinking Pomaznev wrote about the highest executive body of the Soviet government — the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as if it were some kind of apolitical, almost bourgeois body, in large and small opposed to the "Leninist-Khrushchev » CE CPSU! And the fact that Beria, when approving worthy Soviet specialists in the Council of Ministers, did without formalities in the bureaucratizing apparatus of the Central Committee, Pomaznev saw a kind of crime.

N-yes!

Pomaznev's note also contained the following curious passage:

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"In the winter of 1952/53, the issue of the state with the delivery of vegetables and potatoes to Moscow was considered. The delivery plan was not carried out well. Beria did his best to blame this matter on Comrade. Khrushcheva N.S." etc.

The question is - in the light of the thesis about the primacy of the party - and who, if not the first secretary of the Moscow regional and city committees of the CPSU, a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU and secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU "comrade. Khrushchev N.S." was supposed to organize the supply of Moscow with food and bear full responsibility for this? After all, Khrushchev declared that without a "party" (that is, without him, Khrushchev), the non-party masses are not capable of sneezing. And I didn't bring potatoes to the shops.

Here, in fact, this is where we will finish with the topic of the reform of the political system, which would become one of the major events in the post-Stalin virtual USSR of Beria.

At the same time, having carried out a political reform, Beria would not stop there. After all, other reforms are ripe in Soviet society.

Chapter 5 Beria and the democratization of society

Beria's major real initiatives to democratize Soviet society after March 1953 is a fact that even his most malicious ill-wishers cannot deny.

We must begin, of course, with the famous amnesty of 1953. True, even here it was not without slander against Beria. It is often written that allegedly "thanks to Beria" an "uncontrollable wave of bandits" flooded the country. Perhaps so - this question is rather obscure (I wrote about this in my book "Beria - the best manager of the twentieth century").

However, Beria was not to blame for excesses, if, of course, they took place in reality, and not in film fakes and "yellow" publications. One way or another, by March 1953, Beria had not been in charge of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (NKVD) for eight years, transferring the Commissariat on January 10, 1946 to Sergei Kruglov. Kruglov was not a weak organizer, but he was not particularly strong either. Accordingly, the order in the Ministry of Internal Affairs-53 was not yet Beria's, there was enough confusion and confusion, and it was impossible to fix everything at once.

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In addition, according to Beria's plan, the amnesty was supposed to cover only the socially harmless part of the prisoners. On March 26, 1953, Beria, in note No. LB-25, proposed amnesty for about 1,000,000 people from among very specific categories of prisoners, namely:

- convicted for up to 5 years;
- convicted regardless of the term of punishment, for official, economic and some military crimes;
- women with children under 10 and pregnant women;
- minors under the age of 18; elderly men and women and patients suffering from severe incurable ailments.

In his note, Beria wrote:

"The maintenance of a large number of prisoners in camps, prisons and colonies, among which there is a significant part of convicts who do not pose a serious danger to society, including women, adolescents, the elderly and sick people, is not caused by state necessity ..."

The categories of prisoners offered by Beria for amnesty looked like this numerically:

- convicted for up to 5 years — 590,000 people;
- convicted for a term of 5 to 10 years for official, economic and military crimes (chairmen of collective farms, foremen, heads of enterprises, etc.) — 30,000 people;
- women - out of a total of 438,788 serving sentences: 6,286 pregnant women

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and 35,505 with children under two years of age;

- elderly, terminally ill and minors (under the age of 18), respectively: 238,000; 198,000 and 31,181 people.

Could such a contingent give rise to a powerful "wave of violence"? Personally, I doubt it - it is unlikely that these liberated people were able to go into all serious troubles immediately after their release, although some excesses could take place - for various reasons.

In the same note No. LB-25, it was proposed "to revise the criminal legislation, meaning to replace criminal liability for certain economic, official, domestic and other less dangerous crimes with administrative and disciplinary measures, as well as to mitigate criminal responsibility for certain crimes".

Beria explained:

"A revision of the criminal law is necessary because over 1.5 million people are convicted every year, including up to 650 thousand to various terms of imprisonment, of which most are convicted for crimes that do not pose a particular danger to the state. If this is not done, in 1-2 years the total number of prisoners will again reach 2.5-3 million people (as of March 1953 there were 2,526,402 people. — S.K.)."

Leonid Mlechin, in his "phantasmagoria" about Beria's virtual USSR, drove the whole country into the Gulag. However, as we see, the real Beria acted just the opposite, taking care of

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to minimize the Gulag system as much as possible.

At the same time, the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria generally refused the GULAG in the Ministry of Internal Affairs "in favor" of the Minister of Justice Gorshenin. On March 28, 1953, at the suggestion of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On the transfer of labor camps and colonies from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR to the Ministry of Justice of the USSR" was adopted.

Only special camps and prisons remained behind the Beria Ministry of Internal Affairs, where especially dangerous state criminals were kept, sentenced to imprisonment: spies, saboteurs, terrorists, Trotskyists, rightists, Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, anarchists, nationalists, white émigrés...

(Let me note in brackets that on January 21, 1954, the GULAG was transferred from the USSR Ministry of Justice by a decree of the "Khrushchev's" Council of Ministers of the USSR back to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs).

Let's move on...

Realizing the principle of democratization of society, Lavrenty Pavlovich also initiated the adoption of the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On the abolition of passport restrictions and regime areas". On May 13, 1953, he submits to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU a voluminous note No. 58/B, where, among other things, it was said:

"T. Malenkov G.M.

<...>

At present, in the Soviet Union, passport restrictions apply to 340 regime towns, localities, railway junctions, as well as to the border zone along the entire border of the country with a width of 15 to 200 kilometers ...

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Thus, if you look at the map of the USSR, you can see that the whole country is full of regime cities and various restricted areas where citizens are forbidden to live, having a criminal record and having served a sentence.

Under the current situation, citizens who have served their sentences in places of detention or exile and thereby atoned for their guilt before society continue to experience deprivation and are doomed to ordeal...

The presence of broad passport restrictions in the country creates difficulties... not only for citizens who have served their sentences, but also for members of their families, who, in this regard, also often live in poverty and experience material deprivation...

The established restrictions on free movement and residence on the territory of the USSR cause fair criticism and dissatisfaction on the part of citizens.

It should be noted that such a practice of passport restrictions does not exist in any country. In many capitalist countries - in the USA, England, Canada, Finland and Sweden - the population does not have passports at all, there are no marks in personal documents about a criminal record.

being done..."

I already wrote once that if you quote the last quotation without indicating the authorship, then the written "democrat" will most likely define it as "samizdat", exposing the "oprichnik" Beria.

But this is a note from the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR Comrade L.P. Beria to the highest party body of the USSR. And on May 20, 1953, at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a Resolution was adopted, which approved the draft Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, developed by Beria and removing passport restrictions.

Only for Kronstadt, Sevastopol and Vladivostok, the order of entry according to the permit was retained.

certificates issued by militia bodies at the place of residence.

At the July Anti-Beria Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Anastas Mikoyan, Beria's former colleague at work in Baku and on Stalin's "command", accused Lavrenty Pavlovich of all sins, starting with double-dealing in Musavat Baku (although Mikoyan knew he was lying). However, Mikoyan unwittingly said an interesting thing (I quote from an uncorrected transcript):

"When he (Beria. - S.K.) spoke on Red Square over the coffin of Comrade Stalin, then after his speech I said: there is a place in your speech to guarantee every citizen the rights and freedoms,

provided by the Constitution. This is not an empty phrase in the speech of a simple speaker, but in the speech of the minister of internal

early affairs is a program of action, you must fulfill it. He answered me: I will fulfill it ... "

In a speech at a funeral meeting on the occasion of the funeral of I.V. Stalin Beria from the highest public platform of the state really said:

"The workers, the collective farm peasantry, the intelligentsia of our country can work calmly and confidently, knowing that the Soviet government will carefully and tirelessly protect their rights, written down in the Stalinist Constitution."

If Beria had not been killed, he would have carried out his democratization program in full.

Yes, he has already started doing it!

But a solid foundation for genuine (that is, socialist) democracy can only be a developed economy that works for the benefit of the people. Here, Beria also had enough ideas - in matters of organizing the economy, he, as they say, ate the dog.

Chapter 6 Beria and the possible flourishing of the economy

There is also no doubt that under Beria the Soviet economy would have flourished and developed in a balanced way, without relying on raw material exports, without grain imports, etc., either.

Prosperity would have been ensured, firstly, because Beria always knew how to select effective "teams" in everything, and secondly, because Beria had an excellent, rich personal experience in the complex organization of the economy. After all, from 1931 to 1938 he led Georgia, and in these few, if you think about it, years, he proved himself to be an outstanding reformer.

Beria had his own views on economic priorities, which were optimal for society. He was faster than other colleagues and was guided in those specific issues, to the solution of which he was involved. Moreover, he decided everything without unnecessary verbiage, but only after a thorough and comprehensive discussion.

At the "Anti-Beria" plenum, his former deputy for the Special Committee, the head of the "atomic" First Main Directorate, Zavenyagin, condemned Beria: "And when we dealt with any issue, he said: drop it, to hell

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the one to do this business, you are the organizers. Then Zavenyagin asked: "How can work be organized without understanding the essence of the matter?"

Beria understood the essence of the matter, but he understood it precisely as an organizer. Otherwise, Zavenyagin, reporting to Beria on the progress of certain works, would not end his reports each time with the same: "I ask for your instructions ..." This fact is known today not from "memoirs", but from declassified documents of the Atomic Project.

Zavenyagin, being a metallurgist by education, considered it possible for himself even to propose physical schemes of nuclear charges to theoretical physicists. Beria, on the other hand, never got into such "know-it-alls", but he knew how to organize a high-quality expert study of any issue. After all, it is very significant that in his letter to Malenkov, written on July 1, 1953 after his arrest, Beria noted:

"If initiative questions were introduced by me, I revised them several times together with the comrades working with me so as not to make a mistake and not let the Central Committee and the government down."

The key words here are both the words "several times" and the words "together with comrades".

Beria knew the economic problems better than any other head of state from both the Stalinist Politburo and the post-Stalinist Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Here only Kaganovich, Saburov and Pervukhin could somehow be compared with him, but the first was already very not young, and the last two always had

lower state status than Beria, and did not have his influence.

When he was the leader of Georgia, Beria worked as an organizer of the economy simply brilliantly, with originality. For example, he held Plenums of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Georgia, not in general "on questions of agriculture", but on individual agricultural crops. Here it was in essence, here it was concretely!

The results corresponded to the formulation of the question.

If Beria had not been killed, this practice could have been extended to the whole country. For example, a plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU is being held not just on the issues of "raising livestock breeding", but, for example, on the development of the fodder base for livestock breeding or on selection, etc.

At the same time, it would be possible to completely refuse to consider economic questions in the Central Committee, and deal with them in the government, in the Council of Ministers of the USSR. After all, this was precisely the fundamental new line of both Stalin and Beria.

After the death of Stalin, Beria transferred practical work to the USSR Council of Ministers even more. Let me remind you that on May 5, 1953, at the initiative of Beria, the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of May 20, 1950 on the expansion of grain crops in the republics of Transcaucasia was canceled.

It was reasonable.

You can't keep track of everything, Stalin in the 50s did not control all issues, and the adoption in 1950 of the decision to expand the "grain" profile of Transcaucasia was a thoughtful step not

you call. The agricultural potential of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, unique for the geographical conditions of the USSR, was more appropriately used to grow crops that could grow only there. In the practice of Beria, there was already a case when, having become the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Georgia in 1931, he achieved the re-profiling of Georgian agriculture from grain production to a sharp increase in the production of citrus and other subtropical crops, as well as grapes, tobacco, tea...

Then his opponents in Georgia shouted: "And who will feed the Georgian peasants with bread if they do not sow wheat and corn?" And Beria rightly answered that bread could be obtained from other republics of the Soviet Union, but lemons do not grow near Kharkov. In addition, subtropical crops are highly profitable.

Beria knew how to manage, and under him the Soviet economy would not have been destroyed by the "erosion" of the virgin adventure, would not have sat on the "oil pipe" of thoughtless exports, would not have spent funds on ineffective, but ruinous projects ...

It was Beria who initiated the curtailment of a number of expensive, but not vital, construction projects, such as an underwater tunnel from the mainland to Sakhalin Island. After all, if his proposals were not justified, they would not be accepted.

In the post-Stalinist leadership, Beria formally did not have any special rights.

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He did not head the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, being only a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. On the party line, he was only one of nine members of the Presidium of the Central Committee and not even a secretary of the Central Committee. On the state line, he was not the Presovmin, but one of the three first deputies of the Presovmin.

Nevertheless, almost all of Beria's proposals, including those in the economic sphere, were quickly accepted. And they were accepted precisely because of their thoughtfulness, irresistible expediency.

And if Beria had formally become the head of the country?

Accustomed to saving since childhood, he always and in everything demanded savings from everyone with whom he worked - not a penny, but a well-thought-out one. And this also distinguished him from all the other members of the Presidium of the Central Committee.

Characteristic in this regard are the complaints of the aforementioned Zavenyagin, who at the "anti-Beria" plenum said this:

"After the death of Comrade Stalin, he had a habit of playing, playing a game of economy: we need money, we need to save, we need to develop industry, culture, help agriculture, but there are questions in which we could not afford excessive savings. It is necessary to develop capacities in the field of atomic energy... Beria says: "To hell with it, you are throwing a lot of money, fit into the five-year plan."

It must be said that by the beginning of the 1950s, the executives of the young nuclear industry had managed to become somewhat corrupt in the sense that during the formation of the industry, it used

absolute priority in everything - in personnel, in financing, in supply, in awards ...

And then the costs were not particularly considered. If you need so much, then you need so much. After all, the speedy elimination of the US nuclear monopoly was a matter of vital importance for the Soviet Union. The fact that the nuclear industry enjoyed the most favored nation treatment on the personal instructions of Stalin also played a role.

But by 1953, the CCGT system under the Council of Ministers of the USSR was already sufficiently formed; in the summer of 1953, it was planned to test the first Soviet thermonuclear bomb. It was time to get used to the fact that now the regime of economy and optimization of efforts should also come to nuclear work. And many did not want to get used to saving, weaning from excess expenses.

Before that, Beria held back lovers of large spending, and now, if he had remained alive, he would have achieved a savings regime, and not only in the CCGT system. After the death of Beria, the special position of the nuclear industry, unjustified by the situation, remained for a long time, not contributing to the rooting of economic methods of rational management in it.

For comparison, I will quote from Khrushchev's "memoirs"...

Speaking of work in the field of missile defense, he "boasted":

"..To launch one rocket costs millions. Now I can't specifically name how much, not because of secrecy, but simply I don't know, but this is a huge amount of money ... "

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Khrushchev did not even have the intelligence to pretend that he "did not know, but forgot." He just thumped - I don't know what was there and how it cost ...

Not a lordly, they say, and not a Central Committee secretarial business - to click on the accounts.

For Beria, rationality and economy were, I would say, a business fetish. He simply did not know how not to see the main thing, without losing sight of the secondary, but capable of severely damaging the main thing.

Having headed the NEVD of the USSR at the end of 1938, Beria quickly reformed it so that the Main Economic Directorate (GEM) of the NKVD became a structure capable of not only competently revealing sabotage or negligence in industry, but also conducting a qualified examination and issuing technically justified - bathroom recommendations for fixing polo

zheniya.

Now, having headed the Ministry of Internal Affairs already at a new round of his activity, being not just a minister, but one of the top leaders of a great power, Beria again conceived a new reform of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and intended to carry it out taking into account all the experience that accumulated over many years, he himself and the whole country.

Naturally, the united Ministry of Internal Affairs should have retained its traditional functions of ensuring state security and public law and order. However, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was released from the economic functions, but its tasks of objectively informing the state leadership were strengthened.

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about the state of society, its painful problems and specific shortcomings and shortcomings. Including in the field of economics.

This is not about the fight against theft of socialist property, which was done in the OBKhSS, but about an objective independent analysis of affairs in the economy.

Such a Ministry of Internal Affairs could, in its natural development, become a structure that very effectively serves the interests of society - something like the Rabkrin, which never became a serious force, whose active work Lenin dreamed of.

The testimonies of Beria's son, Sergo Beria, cited in his book about his father, can not always be trusted, but I believe him when he claims that his father "as a specialist ... believed that the Ministry of Internal Affairs should ... inform the ministries - sterstvo and departments, to help them in solving certain specific issues.

Sergo Beria writes:

"Having enormous potential, the ministries of internal affairs of the republics could become analytical bodies and work in the interests of the national economy. The party apparatus, which always knew everything, never gave a complete picture of what was happening. And the Ministry of Internal Affairs such an objective analysis was forces.

"You don't have to chase with a gun, but think with your head," my father said.

As applied to the entire economy, this principle could be reformulated as follows: "You should not bang the table with your fist, but seek accurate information and think. And thinking about it, do it.

That is how Beria worked. He knew how to strike with his fist and swear - but only those who

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he deserved it, even when he knew that his harsh reaction would become an additional factor in the success of the case. At the same time, Beria did not become a tyrant. There is an interesting confirmation of this, found in the book of the German scientist Nikolaus Riehl.

Riehl played a significant role in the success of the first Soviet atomic work and received the title of Hero of Socialist Labor and the Stalin Prize of the 1st degree for this. He was born in 1901 in St. Petersburg in the family of the chief engineer of the Siemens and Halske factories and his wife Elena, née Kogan. In 1918 he left for Germany, graduated from the University of Berlin, worked for Otto Hahn and Lise Meitner, founded the production of uranium for nuclear reactors in Nazi Germany. After the war, Riel was taken to the Soviet Union, and in 1955 he returned to Germany - to the FRG.

In his book, somewhat provocatively titled "Ten Years in a Golden Cage", Riel also writes about his two meetings with Beria. During the second, Beria, starting the conversation with the question of what the Germans were doing now and how things were going, then asked if Ril had any complaints?

Riehl complained about the lack of especially pure chemicals, but Beria, as Riehl writes, said that "it cannot be that there was only one complaint." Riel additionally complained about the lack of high-temperature crucibles in the Soviet Union, but Beria did not let up, asked about personal things and said: "This is impossible, everyone can always complain about something"...

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Further - directly in the text of Riel's book:

"He pushed me further, and finally I said: "If you insist that I complain to anyone, then I will do it. I have a complaint against you!" The effect was amazing. All of Beria's entourage was numb, and he himself asked with feigned fear: "At me ?!" I said that he himself ordered a strict regime of secrecy and control, and therefore our freedom is terribly limited and we suffer from it ... "

You can't get away from yourself, and if Beria were full of arrogance and conceit - as slanderers attribute to him - then Ril, of course, would not be mixed into the notorious "camp dust", but Beria's reaction would not be good.

Beria or...

However, again - right in the text:

"Beria began to consult with his neighbors (PSU employees accompanying him, etc. - S.K.), whether it was possible to make any exceptions for my group ..."

It must be said that during Beria's visit, Ril, although he was at work, was not in good health. Nothing fatal was observed - on that day, Riel "due to the flu" just "refused my usual cigar." Immediately upon arrival, Beria affably (Ril's assessment) asked the German: "How are you?", And he replied: "It's bad, I have the flu." Then a conversation began, during which Riel complained to Beria about Beria. At the end of the conversation, Beria went to inspect the plant, and Zavenyagin, who was also with Beria, wanted Ril to go with them.

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However, Beria objected: "The man is sick, he should be in bed."

A trifle?

Seems Yes. But maybe not a very small thing...

Khrushchev was a tyrant and did not forgive the most objective criticism even to his comrades-in-arms - there is evidence of this from, for example, a major party leader Shepilov. But such a feature of the head of state could not but harm the cause to a great extent.

And harmed.

Beria, on the other hand, was just business-like tough, but at the same time he respected someone else's opinion, and someone else's personality - if this personality was in cash. And such a leadership style would also ensure not throwing the economy from side to side, as happened under Khrushchev, but its confident progressive development.

Here is another testimony of a person who is not disposed towards Beria, the famous rocket scientist Chertok, who recently died. In his major work "Rockets and People," he reports that Minister Ustinov, having taken up rocket affairs, by 1949 understood the "absurdity" of the structure of the industry's leading research institute, NII-88, but he did not dare to reorganize, because over THE "omnipotent" apparatus of the Defense Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, headed by Ivan Serbin (1910-1981), who had the nickname "Ivan the Terrible", stood NIM.

Chertok - in his memoirs this happens, alas, often - he did not quite correctly indicate Serbin's then position - in the late 40s

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he was deputy head of the Department of Mechanical Engineering of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. But Chertok described the general state of affairs correctly.

So, without Serbin's sanction, no changes, incentives, etc. were possible, and Chertok recalls that he had the opportunity to see for himself more than once: Serbin's ministers were "afraid" and "never risked" arguing with him .

But in the nuclear industry and the developers of the Berkut air defense system, everything was, according to Chertok, fundamentally different. And he even reports with some sadness that where Beria led, everything

personnel decisions, for example, were made by Vannikov, coordinating them with Kurchatov and submitting them to Beria for approval.

And the "small apparatus of Special Committee No. 1" prepared draft resolutions on appointments, which Beria gave Stalin for signature.

Khrushchev, who knew little about economics, tried to be a plug in every barrel, not trusting people, not respecting them, not appreciating them and not being able to organize them sensibly.

Beria, as we see, was the leader of the opposite warehouse, and in the case of leadership of the country, he would have strengthened and strengthened its economic power.

However, for sustainable success by the second half of the 20th century, it was not enough to choose the right priorities for the development of the economy and ensure the increase in production - it was also necessary to provide an effective system of economic management. In the USSR Stalin this problem

much attention has been paid, which is quite understandable: socialism is a system of planned economy. But by the beginning of the 1950s, Soviet socialism had become a huge economic giant, in comparison with which any capitalist corporations looked like dwarfs.

And this ever-expanding and expanding supercorporation had to be managed.

Khrushchev and Bulganin did not cope with the problem of managing the economy. In particular, the attempt to divide district party committees into "industrial" and "rural" ones was just as stupid and bastard as the organization of territorial economic councils - economic councils.

Brezhnev and Kosygin also failed to cope with this problem, starting in 1965 such an economic "reform" that marked the systemic beginning of the death of socialism, which will be discussed later.

But would Beria have coped with the problem of increasingly complex management?

And if you could, how?

Chapter 7 Beria and the reform of economic management

As a system of economic management, and not as a trend of social thought, socialism began to take shape only in 1918, and we could not use anyone else's experience - it was not for nothing that they talked a lot about an unprecedented socialist experiment. On the contrary, starting from the 1930s, capitalism began to look more and more closely at the emerging Soviet experience in planning and organizing the economy and to use it more and more widely in practice.

In this respect, too, capitalism turned out to be a more diligent student of Stalinist Marxism-Leninism than the working masses of the planet.

Thus, in France, since 1947, the General Secretariat of Planning was formed, whose task was to develop ... five-year plans.

In Japan, since 1954, the Office of Economic Planning began to function, which develops plans for the economic and social development of Japan.

Economic programming began to be introduced after the war in Italy, Holland, Sweden

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tion, England and in the United States of America.

Not without the influence of socialism, capitalism began to replace market mechanisms of regulation with planned ones. Today in "Rossiyaniya" they keep quiet about this, but it was so!

Yes, in fact, it is so now.

Even today, it is useful to read, for example, Lenin's works "Outline of a plan for scientific and technical work", "On a unified national economic plan", "On giving legislative functions to the State Planning Commission" ... It is no less interesting to get acquainted, starting from 1918, and with the minutes of the meetings of the then main planning body of the RSFSR - the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council (Supreme Council of the National Economy of the RSFSR).

After all, here we were not just going "ahead of the rest of the planet" and not just ahead of everyone, but setting the right guidelines even for the capitalist system of "management". In the 20th century, classical capitalism no longer knew how to organize the life of the world in such a way that it would not be a movement towards disaster. Real Soviet socialism pointed out the right path - the transition to planning.

Soviet Russia was the first to say this to the world!

And this was said to Russia by none other than Lenin: "Socialism is a plan and accounting."

The Supreme Economic Council, formed on the basis of a decree signed by Lenin, Sverdlov and Stalin on December 5 (18), 1917, became the first general economic center of the new socialist state and, in general, the first in the world

new organ. The tasks and functions of the Supreme Economic Council changed over time, and on January 5, 1932, by decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, on the basis of the Supreme Economic Council, the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, the People's Commissariat of Light Industry and the People's Commissariat of the Forestry Industry were created. But then the State Planning Committee of the USSR already existed.

At the same time, it would be useful to remind the reader that in 1920 the State Commission for the Electrification Plan for the Electrification of Soviet Russia - GOELRO was formed, and on February 22, 1921, the State General Planning Commission under the Council of Labor and Defense was created by Lenin's decree .

The first Soviet Gosplan was created "to develop a unified nationwide economic plan on the basis of the electrification plan approved by the US Congress of Soviets and for general supervision of the implementation of this plan."

Beria never worked directly in the planning bodies, but through his work in the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and then in the Council of Ministers of the USSR, he collaborated extensively with the State Planning Committee of the USSR during and after the war, and even drew very intelligent personnel from its units for the USSR Atomic Project . That is, he understood the importance of planning for successful work and sustainable prospects not in a slogan, not "in general", but specifically, from his daily practice as an organizer of the economy.

At the same time, Beria was well aware of the promising areas of scientific and technological progress.

In 1952, the most important fundamental systemic questions of the further development of the country were publicly and publicly raised in the USSR—I mean the publication in Pravda on the eve of the 19th Congress of Stalin's work, The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR.

In March 1953, the author of "Economic Problems ..." died. However, the economic problems themselves remained, and they had to be solved.

Beria took up this matter energetically and, as he wrote in a letter to Malenkov after his arrest, "with the sole thought of doing everything possible and not to fail for all of us without Comrade Stalin."

Beria would not have failed without Comrade Stalin. But his colleagues in the leadership of the country without Comrade Stalin failed, and not least because they did not act

only without Comrade Stalin, but also without Comrade Beria. And the most significant and sinister the failures did not occur in the agricultural sector (although these failures became apparent by beginning of the 60s), and not in the sphere of industry, but in the sphere of organization of modern management of the huge Soviet economy.

In the Soviet Union, industrial giants were still building, they were still "making rockets and conquering the Yenisei", but they could no longer fully manage this economic colossus.

Would such a situation have arisen in the sphere of governance if Beria had led the country?

I'm sure - no.

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And in order to understand what form the management of the Soviet economy could take under Beria, we must definitely dwell at least a little on the ideas of Academician V.M. Glushkov — one of the founders of Soviet cybernetics, allegedly destroyed by Stalin and Beria, and actually supported by them in every possible way.

As a theory of social control - which some of its apologists claimed - cybernetics could only be useful to the bourgeoisie, as the theory of keeping the social order in obedience. redneck. It was precisely such cybernetics in the USSR that Stalin was not seen "at point-blank range" and rightly so. ticked.

As for technical cybernetics, it developed in Stalin's USSR at the same outstripping pace as in the USA. Examples of this are not only a number of eminent scientists in this sphere encouraged by Stalin, beginning with academician Kolmogorov, but also the Soviet successes of that time in the development of electronic computers.

Academician Glushkov is exactly from the cohort of Soviet cybernetiks.

Viktor Mikhailovich Glushkov (1923-1982), an outstanding Soviet scientist, Hero of Socialist Labor, is almost unknown today precisely because acquaintance with his life and work clarifies a lot about how the Soviet Union was collapsed and why it was able to break up.

Glushkov was an outstanding Soviet patriot

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volume and at the same time one of the largest world figures both in the field of theoretical cybernetics, and in the development of real electronic computers (computers), then there is what is now universally called computers. In order to understand Glushkov's level, let me tell you that the famous Anglo-American Encyclopædia Britannica, at the height of the Cold War, commissioned Glushkov's article Cybernetics. Here it is quite appropriate to remark: "Mo commete!"

In the early 60s, Glushkov, the creator of the first in the USSR control computer "Dnepr" - put forward the idea of a National Automated System (OGAS) for the collection, transfer and processing of information used in management. In fact, it was about a through - from below up to the top and from top to bottom - a computer system for managing the national economy.

At that time, people with a state mind in the USSR already understood that the old, administrative methods could not effectively manage the growing centralized economy, based on public property - it is necessary to switch to automated management

leniya.

So Glushkov proposed to automate the management of the Soviet economy on the basis of a computer network. The technical base of the OGAS was supposed to include hierarchical cybernetic systems operating on the principles of time-sharing multiprogramming. And it was a real project prepared

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all the previous development of Soviet computers and methods of their use.

The myth that Stalin slowed down the development of Soviet cybernetics has long been a persistent one, and that is why we have lagged behind in the computer sphere. However, just under Stalin, the Soviet science of automatic computers and control computers developed so rapidly as it never developed in the USSR later! Glushkov was one of those who created Soviet cybernetics with the full support of the Stalinist state.

The idea of OGAS was conceived broadly and comprehensively. So, Glushkov even then proposed the transfer of wages to "electronic money" - what is now called a "plastic card". Viktor Mikhailovich quite rightly believed that in this way effective barriers are created on the way of the "shadow" economy and the plundering of the country, because with electronic accounting it is easy to establish complete control over the measure of labor and consumption of any member of society. For an honest worker, such control is absolutely not terrible, but for a thief ...

Back then, in the early 1960s, Glushkov was not alone. He was supported, in particular, by Academician N.P. Fedorenko, director of the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; director of the Computing Center of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR from 1955 to 1989, twice Hero of Socialist Labor Academician A.A. Dorodnitsyn (1910-1994) and others...

Back in 1955, the Academy of Sciences of the USSR

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made proposals on the creation of a system of computer centers. The head of the Computing Center of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR A.I. Zhukov. The latter later became one of Glushkov's closest collaborators, and first proposed a unified system for automated management of the national economy and the Armed Forces in 1959! And all this was rooted in the works and ideas of the late 40s and early 50s, that is, in the era of Stalin and Beria.

Under the general idea, by the end of the 1950s, a powerful concrete base arose in the USSR in the form of new computers. In 1958, the State Commission adopted Academician Lebedev's M-20 computer, which became the fastest in the world, despite the fact that it had five times fewer lamps than in the similar American machine Nork-2. "

In those first years of the development of computers, the Soviet Union, in fact, was not inferior to the United States of America with their powerful science, which was also fed by the outstanding minds of the whole world. We then had very encouraging prospects.

And one of the enthusiasts for the creation of computers in the USSR was just the curator of the Soviet atomic and rocket problems L.P. Beria! He actively contributed to the development of this area both in scientific terms and in terms of the development of computers and their widespread implementation in scientific calculations, etc. It was with the support of Beria that the foundations were laid

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We are our successes in the field of computers and cybernetics, which were clearly manifested in the 50s.

In the Khrushchev USSR, until the early 60s, this line was still rapidly developing on the basis that arose under Stalin and Beria and with their personal interest in the problem.

Then, from the beginning of the 1960s, in the late Khrushchev USSR, work on computers began to slow down, so that in the Brezhnev USSR it would shrink more and more — with the loss of all former priorities and achievements, with an increasingly noticeable lag behind the United States.

At the same time, work on the introduction of automated control systems (ACS) into the life of the USSR began to acquire an increasingly formal character, although this abbreviation itself was constantly heard, especially among newspaper people. A lot has been said and written about ACS, but Glushkov's ideas on OGAS were invariably suppressed (I apologize for the involuntary pun).

Today there is no doubt that in all this the blackest, most — without exaggeration — sinister role was played by the “moles” of the West, surrounded by Soviet leaders and in the highest structures of state and party power.

If Beria had been at the head of the USSR, nothing like this would have happened!

Already in the process of working on this book, they brought me a rather old (2003), but timeless article by V.D. Pikhorovich "An unclaimed alternative to market reform", written for the 80th anniversary of the birth of

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of Academician Glushkov. I highly recommend this most interesting article to the reader, but here I give only brief extracts from it. The author of the article believes that Glushkov himself did not fully realize the full potential of the OGAS idea and other similar ideas of his, which were crucial for socialism, but V.D. Pikhorovich, it seems, did not himself understand how important the topic he raised and highlighted in an outstanding way. He's writing:

“It so happened that it was precisely in connection with the OGAS that the Soviet leadership found itself in front of an alternative: which way to go - either along the way of improving the planning system throughout the country, or along the way of returning to market regulators of productive forces... For a very long time senior management hesitated. The very fact that Viktor Mikhailovich (Glushkov. - S.K.) was instructed to head the commission for preparing materials for the Council of Ministers' resolution on OGAS speaks volumes.

For reasons that are not entirely clear today, instead, a resolution was adopted that gave rise to the notorious economic reform of 1965 (V.D. Pikhorovich is highlighted in the quote everywhere. - S.K.). economy on the basis of computer technology remained the main one. But B... at the very last moment, he was rejected. Preference was given to the introduction of market mechanisms for managing the national economy...

<...>

“It is incomprehensible how it could happen that preference at the very last moment was given to the project of the so-called economists. The people who initiated the reform were little known, they fell like snow on their heads, and immediately began to play almost a key role in Soviet economic science.”

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Alas, today everything is more or less clear: in 1965, “agents of influence” under the guise of “economic reform” carried out the largest action to undermine and future destruction of socialism in the USSR and the USSR itself!

In my books, I have touched on this sad story more than once, including writing about the “unexpected” rise of the gray Kharkov professor Yevsey Lieberman, etc. For now, I'll just emphasize the following.

All the viciousness of the "ideas" of the "economic reform" of 1965, which was called the "Kosygin reform" and for which Kosygin was the same screen (involuntary, of course) as (quite consciously) Lieberman, was predicted long before this destructive one itself. reforms."

Predicted in 1952.

And it was predicted by Stalin in his last work "The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR".

By the way, the force of the article by V.D. Pikhorovich lies also in the fact that he understands this and directly connects the collapse of the Soviet economy, under which a long-term mine was laid in 1965, with the fact that the issues raised by Stalin in "Economic Problems ..." , in the USSR was never understood. Moreover, after Stalin's death this work was quickly consigned to ridicule and oblivion in the USSR.

And this is by no means accidental. Without excluding from the life of the USSR the potential ideological and practical influence of "Economic problems ...",

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it would be difficult to break up the USSR and lead it to death.

Below I will have to briefly repeat what I have already explained several times in my previous books, but it is necessary to repeat here.

One of the most important philosophical discoveries of Stalin, important for further practical work on the construction of socialism and communism after the 19th Congress, was the idea that economic social laws in those periods while they are in force are no less unshakable than the laws of nature. V.D. Pikhorovich, recognizing the importance of such a thought, writes:

"Stalin explains that the task of socialism is to overcome the commodity nature of production (that is, the transition to direct social product exchange between producers. - S.K.), but this overcoming cannot occur at the subjective desire of the leaders, the party or the people - yes in general. It is impossible without taking into account objective historical laws."

That's right!

Stalin warned that social laws reflect objective processes that occur independently of the will of people in society, just as the laws of nature reflect objective processes that occur independently of the will of people in nature.

The peculiarity of the laws of political economy, Stalin wrote, is that "its laws, unlike the laws of natural science, are short-lived", that they "are valid for a certain period of time".

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divided historical period, after which ... they give way to new laws.

But while they are in effect, they cannot be circumvented and cannot be canceled - how can this be done with legal laws, Stalin warned.

At the same time, Stalin absolutely precisely formulated both the basic economic law of capitalism and the basic economic law of socialism:

"The main features and requirements of the basic economic law of modern capitalism could be formulated approximately as follows: ensuring the maximum capitalist profit ...

The essential features and requirements of the basic economic law of socialism could be formulated approximately as follows: ensuring maximum satisfaction of the constantly growing material and cultural needs of the whole society through the continuous growth and improvement of socialist production on the basis of higher technology."

Stalin understood that the economy cannot operate at a loss, but he correctly noted that only such an economy can be healthy, which does not increase profits, but reduces the cost of production. At the same time, an economically justified cost reduction is impossible without the introduction of new, "higher" technology, including computing and management.

Stalin innovatively posed before the Soviet society the problem of the practical organization of direct commodity exchange, overcoming

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in a socialist society, production is still of a commodity character.

In fact, at a fundamentally new round of historical development, society faced the need to move to the newest form of a kind of subsistence economy, but with the use of computer capabilities for organizing natural exchange, with electronic "money", etc.

However, in 1965, an "economic" "reform" began, which was named after Kosygin, but behind which stood a number of "shadow" agents of capital influence. The September Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1965 declared that it was necessary "...to improve the use of such important economic levers as profit, price, premium, credit."

Making profit, and not a comprehensively developed person, the main goal of economic activity in the USSR, the initiators of the economic reform of 1965 ignored the basic economic law of socialism. And thus systematically laid the trend of death socialism.

After all, the production of profit is the economic law of capitalism, and the fact that this profit was called "socialist" by the initiators of the reform did not change the essence of the matter.

"Kosygin's reform", from a purely scientific point of view, immutably, with the inexorability of the laws of nature, laid the methodological foundations for the destruction of socialism as an economic phenomena, as well as mortgages

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led to the future destruction of the conscious builder of socialism in the average Soviet person.

If capitalism ignores its fundamental law and ceases to prioritize profit, it will not be able to exist as capitalism and will turn into its opposite, socialism. But socialism, if it ignores its fundamental law and stops putting the needs of a comprehensively developed person at the forefront, will also not be able to exist as socialism and will turn into its opposite, capitalism.

In Khrushchev's late USSR, the processes of computerization of life in the USSR were artificially inhibited and the origins of the "libermanization" of the Soviet economy were laid.

And in the early USSR of Brezhnev, the vices of "Khrushchevism" not only were not overcome, but only worsened, including. because the Trojan horse of the "Kosygin reform" was dragged into the economy of the USSR at the very beginning of the "era" of Brezhnev.

And even the fact that in 1967 in the USSR at the Lvov TV Plant a highly efficient local automated control system "Lvov" was put into operation did not change anything on the whole. Instead of the computer-assisted centralization of the Soviet economy, the factor of "socialist profit" increasingly dominated it.

And this factor increasingly ruined socialism.

Even twenty years after the idea of OGAS was put forward, ten years after the implementation

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ACS "Lvov" in a joint textbook of the correspondence Higher Party School under the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Leningrad Higher Party School "Planning the National Economy of the USSR", from the publishing house "Thought" in 1977 (!) About OGAS was said in passing - a couple of lines .

Would it be so if Beria was at the head of the USSR?

Of course not!

In 1969, Lavrenty Pavlovich would have turned 70 years old, and in the 16 years since Stalin's death, Beria, the most active member of Stalin's "team," would certainly have been able to ensure the growing prosperity of the Soviet economy both due to its computer optimization, and through a thoughtful approach to the theoretical economic problems of socialism. After all, Beria was one of the few who really showed genuine interest in Stalin's latest work.

At the 19th Congress, a lot of empty praises were uttered at Stalin's "Economic Problems ..." (which, presumably, once again convinced Stalin of the need for serious managerial and personnel reforms). And here is how and what Beria said about that in his speech at the 19th Congress:

"A huge event in the ideological life of the party is the further development of Marxist-Leninist theory by Comrade Stalin in his work (Beria was one of the few who did not stick the epithet "brilliant" before the word "work." - S.K.) "Economic problems of socialism in USSR".

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The provisions and conclusions given to the theory by Comrade Stalin in this work are of particular importance because they open a new chapter in the development of Marxist-Leninist science and are inextricably linked with the main tasks of the practice of communist construction in the USSR ... "

So it really was. And then Beria showed that he fully understands the dynamics of the development and deepening of Marxism:

"It is known that Marx and Engels transformed socialism from a utopia into a science. Developing Marxism, the great Lenin created the doctrine of the socialist state and the ways of building a classless socialist society in our country. By putting this doctrine into practice, the Party, under the leadership of Comrade Stalin, achieved a world-historic victory: socialism turned from a dream of the best minds of mankind into reality. The Soviet people built socialism, and our country entered a period of gradual transition from socialism to communism.

Under these conditions, new questions of Marxist-Leninist theory arose before our Party. What preconditions must be created for the transition from socialism to communism to take place? What needs to be done for this? What are the main patterns (bold italics mine. — S.K.) of this important historical period? And we see how Comrade Stalin gave all these urgent, vitally important questions of the movement of our

Soviet society clear and precise answers that illuminated the path ahead for the parties and the Soviet people...”

In this assessment of Stalin's work by Beria, the key word is “regularity” ... After all, not everyone caught on that Stalin was not an opinion

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expresses his own, not a wish, but speaks of the need for knowledge of objective laws socialism.

It is unlikely that Beria understood everything here as well and with such clarity as Stalin wanted. After all, in Economic Problems Stalin did not so much give answers as he posed questions. But there is no doubt that Beria understood the conceptual significance of Stalin's work.

And this means that Beria would have approached the problems of the economic development of the USSR even after Stalin's death in line with Stalin's ideas, that is, from scientific, and not voluntaristic positions, as happened under Khrushchev.

Perhaps, the potential of the last Stalinist work was realized, besides Beria, by others - the same Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov. But they failed to resist the impudence of Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites, and Beria - if he had not been killed - could!

And the practical interpretation of Stalin's ideas in the economic and social life of the USSR would inevitably require more and more comprehensive accounting of the movement of all finances and means, more and more centralization and more and more profound all-Union planning, which would not be possible without modern cybernetic machine systems of the type proposed by Glushkov. OGAS.

I will give one more extract from the article by V.D. Pikhovich - it's very good there about something says:

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“From the first years of its existence, our state has accumulated remarkable experience in implementing major socio-economic programs...

It begins with a fundamental and radical decision - to be according to this! The main thing is not to put off .. indefinitely, not to attribute to fantasies what we can actually implement.

Unfortunately, our party acted the other way around — it attributed to fantasies what could and should have been implemented in reality — the idea of transferring centralized management of the economy to a new technical and scientific basis, and undertook to implement what in fact turned out to be without - a competent and harmful fantasy - the idea of managing a single dynamically developing national economic complex of a country that has already passed half the way to communism, with the help of archaic market methods, from which by this time a long time ago

the capitalist monopolies have been abandoned.

Here it is only necessary to clarify that the idea of the supposedly beneficial introduction of market indicators (profitability, profit, etc.) into the planning of a socialist economy was not a “harmful fantasy”, but a destructive conscious provocation by the enemies of socialism and the USSR.

And this idea was not “illiterate”, but very well thought out, but not from the point of view of the development of socialism in the USSR into communism, but from the point of view of the systemic undermining of socialism.

With Khrushchev and Brezhnev, the pro-Western “gray cardinals” did everything in the best possible way - Gorbachev and Yeltsin only had to complete the work of the collapse and liquidation of socialism.

But with Comrade Beria, these "gray cardinals" would not have broken off!

After all, Comrade Beria was a great manager of socialism...

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Chapter 8 Beria and indestructible defense

This chapter will be relatively short in the book, precisely because on the topics "Beria and the defense", "Beria and the strengthening of the defense of the USSR", one can (and should) write separate multi-volume documentary studies.

So, for example, the significance of the activities of a member of the State Defense Committee (and then the Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee) L.P. Beria on organizing the work of the Soviet rear for the needs of the front during the Great Patriotic War is second only to the significance of the activities of Stalin himself at that time. One way or another, Beria oversaw the production of almost all types of weapons - from small arms and mortars to tanks and aircraft.

However, this is recognized today, albeit reluctantly, even by Beria's ill-wishers. But his role in the war was in fact even more significant and diverse... Actually, Beria made his first major contribution to the future victory before the war - as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, who also subordinated the border troops. And this point requires special explanation.

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Before Beria, the people's commissariat was headed by Yagoda and Yezhov. This is not the place to touch on the aspect of their anti-state activities (unfortunately, both were engaged in it), so I'll just say...

Both Yagoda and Yezhov could not but do a lot of things that were necessary and useful for the country (otherwise they would quickly lose their posts), but they did not do much with regard to border protection, not because they deliberately wanted to weaken borders, but because they did not see the problem in all its

completeness.

And I saw Beria!

Until the age of 32, Beria was formed as a professional Chekist, and almost immediately at a high leadership level, and even closely connected with border problems. At the same time, the region near Beria was very hot in terms of borders - Transcaucasia.

Here it was necessary to think about everything at once ... And about the organization of operational communications, and about personnel selection, and about organizing border reconnaissance work, and about thorough individual training of Red Army border guards, which makes it possible to fight skillfully and in any conditions.

proactively.

Arriving at the NVKD of the USSR, Beria used all his Caucasian KGB experience for an effective and large-scale reform of all border troops of the USSR. It can be said without exaggeration that Beria's reform determined their appearance for decades to come. In some ways, the ideas of the Beria reform have survived to this day.

As a result, the border troops of the NKVD of the USSR did not

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called upon to solve any military tasks with the outbreak of war, in fact played, no doubt, a strategic role in containing the first onslaught of the Wehrmacht. I have already written about this more than once. And the role of the People's Commissar in the outstanding military accomplishment of the Soviet border guards during the border battle is beyond doubt. At the same time, in the first weeks of the war, Beria's border troops

they did for the future Victory - if we take the specific, so to speak, indicators, perhaps more than the Red Army itself.

After the outbreak of the war, Beria was entrusted with the formation of fifteen NKVD rifle divisions from the personnel of the border and internal troops for the Reserve Front, covering Moscow. Beria and his "team" brilliantly coped with this task as well. And from July 1941, Beria, as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and a member of the State Defense Committee, began to organize the work of the defense industries, as already mentioned.

As a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and a member of the GKO, Beria organized the defense of the Caucasus in late August - early September 1942. And he also fulfilled this task of the Motherland and Stalin brilliantly, in an outstanding way.

In general, it can be said that during the war, Beria acquired a huge and comprehensive experience in the field of defense and military activities of the state, and if he were at the head of the USSR, then his decisions in this area would also be thought out and deeply justified.

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Khrushchev was no match for Beria in this respect either.

Brezhnev, who replaced Khrushchev, had common sense, but nothing more. Leonid Ilyich generally did not belong to the bright figures of history, although he approved a number of important defense decisions (for example, the creation of ICBMs with MIRVs). On the whole, under Brezhnev, defense issues were resolved outwardly on a grand scale, but in fact, also without great intelligence. Under Beria, things would have been different.

Already during the war, Beria connected to the main defense work in his life and in the life of the Soviet Union - to the atomic project, to the uranium problem.

Everyone who was fully familiar with the contribution of Lavrenty Pavlovich to the cause of the elimination of the US atomic monopoly, unanimously declared that without Beria we would not have created our own atomic bomb so quickly.

It is so indeed!

Moreover, Beria saw all aspects of the atomic problem, from technical to military-political ones. From the very beginning, he considered Soviet nuclear weapons not as a means of waging war, but as a means of deterrence. It is not for nothing that Soviet nuclear weapons in the first years of their existence were under the control not of the military, but of the state security structures, which closed themselves on the top political leadership.

At the end of June 1953, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria was arrested. And on July 1, 1953, Comrade L.P. Beria, former Deputy Chairman

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giver of the State Defense Committee comrade. Stalin, former First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, former member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU and former chairman of the Special Atomic Committee, was in isolation for the fifth day. And he wrote a huge letter to the Central Committee - Georgy Malenkov.

Beria wrote about many things, actually summing up what he managed to do over the decades of honest work for the state. He also wrote about this (a number of grammatical errors, etc., explained by the state of Beria, have been corrected by me hereinafter without reservation):

"..I should especially note our joint active long-term work in the Special Committee under the Council of Ministers on the creation of atomic weapons, and later on the systems "Kometa" and "Berkut" - guided missiles. I have never forgotten your great comradely

human attitude towards me, when, for reasons known to you, in a depressed mood, I flew in 1948 to the Semipalatinsk region of the Kazakh SSR, where, as you know, the test of atomic weapons was successfully completed (Beria made a mistake - the RDS-1 test took place August 29, 1949 - S.K.).

As you well know, and lately also Comrade N.A. Bulganin, organizations controlled by the Special Committee, the First and Second Main Directorates and their enterprises and scientific and technical forces, laboratories, design bureaus and the institutions represent a colossal achievement, it is the pride of our country. I reported to you in passing and instructed you to draw up a detailed report for the Government on the state of our atomic affairs. Already this year, several explosions should be carried out, including one super-powerful model equal to 250-300 thousand tons of TNT.

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By the summer of 1953, the first serial production of atomic bombs had already been mastered in the USSR, and work on the first Soviet thermonuclear (hydrogen) bomb, RDS-6s, was being completed. It was her that Beria had in mind when he wrote about the "heavy duty model." Moreover, I emphasize that Beria expressed himself delicately on this score, without revealing the "zest" of the "heavy duty model".

The Kometa system mentioned in Beria's letter is a project of a long-range cruise missile dropped from a carrier aircraft to hit small targets, including ships.

The Berkut system, developed by Pavel Kuksenko and Sergo Beria in a special KB-1, is an "absolute" Moscow air defense system developed on Stalin's personal assignment based on powerful systems for detecting, capturing and tracking air targets and aviation and missile means of their interception and destruction.

What Beria wrote about was known then in the country, except for the developers, of course, a few people. At the same time, even in 1953 there were almost no members of the top leadership among the initiates, except, perhaps, Malenkov, Bulganin and Pervukhin ...

The same Khrushchev, for example, and even Molotov, Mikoyan and others, Stalin did not involve in the atomic and missile problems - there was no need for that. But even formally initiated (with the exception of Pervukhin, who worked closely in the Special Committee) were not very interested in the current

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a promising and promising state of affairs — Beria, Kurchatov, Vannikov, Zavenyagin worked on the "atomic" cases, and Beria, Ustinov, Ryabikov, Kuksenko, Korolev worked on missile cases...

I draw the reader's attention to the following lines from Beria's letter: "I casually reported to you (i.e. Malenkov — S.K.) and instructed the Government to draw up a detailed report on state of our atomic affairs.

On the one hand, Malenkov, as a long-term member of the Special Committee, and since March 1953 - Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, could have known everything without Beria's report. The same can be said about Bulganin.

On the other hand, Beria, as we see, was aware that in the new conditions, when there is no Stalin, it is impossible to have such a situation when members of the top leadership are not aware of the level of development and the state of our newest strategic weapons. Therefore, Beria instructed to draw up a detailed report for the government "on the state of our atomic affairs," and at the same time, missile ones.

Further, in a letter to Malenkov, he wrote:

"According to the Berkut, the tests were completed successfully. Now it is all a matter of ensuring serial production and appropriate personnel, and a lot is being done in this area by the relevant ministries. Most importantly, based on the Kometa and Berkut, there are colossal opportunities for further improvements in the field of guided missiles, both in terms of accuracy, and in terms of speed and range. A special report is being prepared for the government. This is yelling

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we must move forward, this is the real future, with which we must equip the army of our country. The United States and Britain attach exceptional importance to this. I repeat, all this was achieved because the party and the government wanted it, but I wanted to say, and here we worked together ... "

How many days later, at the Anti-Beria plenum, Beria will be accused in absentia of allegedly hiding new works from the government and the Central Committee, but in fact, Beria acted in the opposite way. And this was a guarantee that the important defense problems of Beria - if he had not been killed - would be submitted for general consideration and would try to solve them.

collectively.

Khrushchev acted differently - subsequently, without the involvement of experts, he simply rained down on the heads of the military and defense industry his "initiatives" - poorly or not at all thought out. And therefore, even those ideas of Khrushchev, which were objectively reasonable, in Khrushchev's execution more often did not strengthen, but destroyed the defense.

Even the missile problems in their defense setting Khrushchev, an avid enthusiast of "non-drilling" missiles, did not solve them in the best way, just as he carried out the reduction of the Armed Forces of the USSR not in the best way.

It cannot be denied that Khrushchev had fairly correct priorities in the field of defense, namely: he understood the need to develop the nuclear missile component of the Armed Forces in every possible way, strengthening its deterrent qualities, while at the same time reducing conventional weapons. But in life

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Khrushchev carried out these principles with such distortions that he received negative results instead of positive ones.

Thus, with huge social costs, the army was reduced by 1 million 200 thousand people. Among the officers then there was a saying: "A court of honor - and a million two hundred."

If Beria had not been killed, then with his attention to the interests of honest ordinary citizens of the country, he would have carried out the reform of the army without breaking many thousands of human destinies, and would have optimized the defense.

At the same time, defense issues would have been resolved under Beria without the extravagance that became characteristic of the Brezhnev era. For example, during the Brezhnev era, the range of both missile weapons, from strategic to naval, and the range of nuclear equipment for these weapons were unjustifiably swollen. Here, those tendencies of parochialism and the desire to receive an extra Gold Star or laureate medal, which began to manifest themselves already in the late Khrushchev era, were manifested, and in the Brezhnev "epoch" they blossomed into a double bloom.

Beria, who curtailed the construction of even national economic facilities that were not needed in the first place, Beria, who introduced the swollen requests of nuclear scientists into a rigid economic framework, would not allow spending more on defense than was required by the interests of Soviet society.

By the middle of the "Brezhnev" 80s due to

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post-Stalinist defense efforts - for the first time in the history of Russia and the world - the threat of external aggression against Russia was actually eliminated. So powerful were our then possibilities of guaranteed retribution.

Alas, much more effort and money was expended to ensure this state of affairs than was necessary. After all, the concept of "optimization" for both Khrushchev and Brezhnev was an empty phrase.

For Beria, however, optimization was a daily principle in any business he led.

The security of the USSR under Beria would have turned out to be just as indestructible, absolute, as it actually became by the 80s. It would rest, as it actually did, on the foundation of mighty nuclear missile weapons. However, the peoples of the USSR under the leadership of Beria would have achieved this at a lower cost - by optimizing defense.

Finally, I must say, perhaps, about one more subtle circumstance ...

Khrushchev in his conspiracy against Beria relied on the military - he attracted the generals not only to ensure the imprisonment of Beria and the falsification of his trial, but also to his arrest itself. Thus, Khrushchev inevitably increased the role of the generals in the political life of the USSR.

And it was a very bad detail.

The pre-war conspiracy in the leadership of the Red Army, headed by Tukhachevsky, Uborevich and Yakir, was clearly Bonapartist in nature (character

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but that about Bonapartism, for example, Uborevich, they talked in Siberia back in the 20s). Tukhachevsky's fix idea is, in fact, a military junta.

Of course, nothing would have come of the "Red Bonapartists" - only insufficient political development did not allow them to understand this themselves. However, these "Bonapartists" could bring a lot of harm to Russia. Stalin burned the ulcer of the conspiracy in the Red Army out of necessity cruelly, but, it seems, not completely. And it seems that the failures of 1941 are not least due to the "burp" of the Tukhachevsky conspiracy.

The political ambitions and claims of the military are always dangerous and antisocial, unless the military find themselves at the very edge of the political process as a result of either the fact that society puts them there (the example of de Gaulle in France), or the fact that the military objectively express the innermost aspirations of society (the example of Nasser in Egypt).

I mean that, having gone to arrest Beria by the military, Khrushchev not only became dependent on the highest generals, but also gave impetus to the marshal's ambitions - the same Zhukov, and not him alone. The logical conclusion of such a process in Khrushchev's times was the actions of Zhukov and Konev in June 1957, when it was the military who ensured the rapid delivery of members of the Central Committee to Moscow for that emergency Plenum of the Central Committee, where Khrushchev held an anti-party (and, in fact, anti-state) coup, having committed the political assassination of the "anti-party group" of Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich.

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The fact that Khrushchev dismissed Zhukov four months later did not change the situation in a systemic sense, just because Zhukov's dismissal itself could hardly have taken place without the assistance and approval of the top military.

The Brezhnev era did not become something fundamentally different here - the highest generals hung over the civilian political leadership and could crush any

live initiatives. Soviet society did not feel this, but Brezhnev's Politburo...

If Beria had become the head of the USSR after Stalin's death, then he would not have needed to involve the generals in the political process. Marshal's political ambitions and inclinations would have dried up under Beria "on the vine", and this would exclude the swelling of the Armed Forces, military production, etc. and so on.

Accordingly, Soviet society would not have been pressed by the excessive burden of military spending, in the expansion of which the appetites of the generals played no small role.

Instead of excessive spending on "defence", under Beria, Soviet society could have developed and financed, first of all, the social sphere more intensively, that is, it could have been widely engaged in exactly what Soviet society was created for.

Of course, the powerful and sustainable flourishing of the social sphere under Beria would have been due not only to the optimization of defense spending and the transfer of funds to the civilian sphere. Down

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Mania for social issues was for Beria in general one of the constant highest priorities in all periods of his activity, starting from the Caucasian, when he stood at the head of Transcaucasia, and ending with the last, post-Stalin, period, interrupted by an unjust arrest.

Social policy in the eyes of Beria was the core and ultimate goal of state policy as a whole. Therefore, the social sphere in the USSR of Beria would flourish and flourish.

Chapter 9

Beria and social policy in the name of man

Yes, concern for ordinary citizens, for those whom he leads, either directly or indirectly, was for Beria a completely organic feature of his personality. Of course, the entire generation of political figures to which Beria belonged was brought up in a similar spirit. But not everyone was brought up in such a spirit. And Beria perceived social priorities as the most important even in his youth.

Let me take a little digression...

In Soviet history, we have four of the largest examples of the brutal overthrow of Soviet politicians of the first rank into almost ordinary life. These are Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Khrushchev.

V.M. Molotov (1890-1986) and N.S. Khrushchev (1894-1971) were immediately retired after their resignation, in 1957 and 1964, respectively.

Molotov behaved in retirement with dignity, modestly, did not distance himself from people, ordinary people respected him, and he lived for almost thirty years.

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years old, dying at the age of 96. Khrushchev avoided people in retirement, no one felt love and respect for him, and seven years later Khrushchev died at the age of 77. But for all the difference in the post-political destinies of Molotov and Khrushchev, they had in common that we cannot compare the activities of Molotov and Khrushchev in major posts and in positions of modest, but also leading ones.

Things are different with Malenkov and Kaganovich. After the Khrushchevites in June 1957 enrolled them together with Molotov and Shepilov in the "anti-party group", Malenkov and

Kaganovich for some time still worked as leaders of a very modest (for their former scale) rank.

Former Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR G.M. Malenkov (1902-1988) from the end of 1957 became only the director of the Ust-Kamenogorsk hydroelectric power station, then he worked as the director of the Ekibastuz thermal power plant, and in 1961 he was retired.

Former member of the Politburo, former Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (Council of Ministers) of the USSR L.M. Kaganovich (1893-1991) from the end of 1957 became the manager of the Soyuzasbest trust in the city of Asbest, Sverdlovsk region (some sources also point to him as the director of the Ural Potash Plant, but this is unlikely). Since 1961, Kaganovich also retired, having lived on it for almost a hundred years.

So, in the last two cases, there is a basis for comparison, and, it must be said, the result is

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humanly worthy both for Malenkov and for Kaganovich. Of course, it was very difficult for them – especially for Kaganovich with his emotional nature – to adapt, and this often affected, as those who worked with them at that time remember. But both former members of the closest Stalinist "team" did not behave like a lord, without sticking out, modestly and without arrogance. They left a good memory in those enterprises that they led.

For Malenkov and Kaganovich, Stalin's closest associates, living in the name of realizing the ideas of, as they say now, "social justice" was the norm both when they organized the lives of many millions of Soviet workers, and when they then under

the beginning was a few thousand and even hundreds of subordinates.

However, the former top leaders of the USSR did not achieve much success in modest posts. And although the upward movement was closed to them from all points of view, they could have shown themselves more brightly in recent years. Alas, neither the employees of the Ust-Kamenogorsk hydroelectric power station and the Ekibastuz thermal power plant, nor the employees of the Soyuzasbest trust spoke about Malenkov and Kaganovich as outstanding organizers. How people were warmly remembered, but nothing more.

And what would be the nature drawing of the surviving, but "ordinary", so to speak, Beria?

In his "letter from the bunker" dated July 1, he wrote, addressing his colleagues in the Presidium of the Central Committee:

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. "Of course, after all that has happened, I need to be firmly called to order, indicated my place and firmly pulled up so that I can be remembered for the rest of my life, but understand, dear comrades, I am a faithful son of our Motherland, a faithful son of the party of Lenin and Stalin and your faithful friend and comrade. Wherever you want, for any job, the smallest, send, take a closer look, I can still work faithfully for ten years and I will work with all my heart and with all my energy ... "

In other words, Beria himself wanted to see himself as before in the working ranks - albeit not at the head of it, but, in any case, not outside the ranks.

He further wrote:

"I speak from the bottom of my heart, it's not true that since I held a big post, I won't be fit for another small job, it's very easy to check in any region and region, state farm, collective farm, construction site, and I beg you: don't deprive me of [opportunities] to be an active builder [in] any small area of our Motherland, and you will be convinced that in 2-3 years I will be strongly corrected and will be still useful to you ... "

It's up to you, dear readers, but behind these lines I see a person with confused, but not insignificant feelings. Moreover, a person without a hint of some kind of "elitism", a person who, although he occupied the most important posts in the state for decades, has not yet learned to separate himself from the people and is ready for ordinary work.

And for the same Khrushchev, it was impossible to offer himself as chairman of a collective farm or state farm! For Khrushchev - although he was at the heights of power and did not shy away directly

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"communicate" with ordinary people—the needs of the people were something quite abstract.

Khrushchev did not know how to see a person behind the state.

And Beria knew how!

He didn't even "heal" the cut off for his overcoat, which was laid down by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, for himself, but gave it away "for a circle."

And if we conduct a mental experiment: leave Beria alive after he was removed from top posts, at large and send him, say, to some Novokhopyorsk as a director of an industrial plant, or to a Kuban state farm, then he would remain a high-class manager there too. .

This is one of the reasons why the Khrushchevites could not have left Beria alive and in business, even if it was a small one.

All the injustice of his
resignations.

And if Beria had worked for the country not as the director of a state farm, but as the "director" of the entire Soviet society, then ...

That is what?

Well, if Beria had remained alive under the supreme power, then his leadership of the country would have ensured the development of a very strong social policy in Soviet society. As the economy developed, Soviet society would become more and more affluent, educated, free, and joyful.

At the Anti-Beria Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in July 1953, during a speech by Avraamy Za Venyagin, then head of the First Main Directorate (PGU) under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, there was

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significant incident. The reader already knows that Zavenyagin slinged mud at Beria and reproached him for "playing the economy" in financing "atomic" work. Further - according to the uncorrected transcript:

"Malenkov. This business will have to be controlled, because money was spent there without any control.

Zavenyagin. It certainly is.

Kaganovich. They built not cities, but resorts.

Zavenyagin. What the resorts built, I can't say, they built the cities."

Kaganovich had never, either before July 1953 or after, been in any closed "atomic" city, so he spoke from other people's words. But Kaganovich's remark shows that such a rumor - "Beria is building resorts for nuclear workers" - went around among the Soviet leadership.

Knowing firsthand what these cities are like, I can confirm that in the "Beria" forties and early fifties, resorts were not built in the CCGT system, but cities were built. However, the layout and architecture of the "atomic" cities were well thought out, and Beria's merit in this was undeniable and enormous.

An architect and a builder by education, he managed to collect intelligent architectural and planning forces from the very beginning of "atomic" work in the CCGT system. He wanted the people of the new Soviet industry to live in conditions worthy of

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of the future they created and protected.

I think that in connection with the anti-Berian collision described above, the reader will be interested to know that's what...

Until the end of his life, Beria was deeply respectful, according to the testimony of a number of people who knew him, Boris Glebovich Muzrukov.

Muzrukov, twice Hero of Socialist Labor, is a legendary figure in the nuclear industry. He received his first Gold Star on January 20, 1943 for managing Uralmash, which produced T-34 tanks. He was awarded the Second Star on October 29, 1949, after the successful test of the first Soviet atomic bomb RDS-1, for the production of the first Soviet plutonium at Combine No. 817, stationed in the closed city of Chelyabinsk-40. Muzrukov was in the first in the USSR group of twice Heroes of Socialist Labor.

From 1955 to 1974, Boris Glebovich headed the largest and oldest nuclear weapons center in the USSR at Arzamas-16.

In the book about Muzrukov (Bogunenko N.N. "Muzrukov", M.: Molodaya Gvardiya, 2005, p. 259) it is reported that the director of Combine No. 817 wanted to make a new city, "atomic" Chelyabinsk-40, beautiful, and the life of its inhabitants more pleasant. To do this, Muzrukov "sometimes included in the title of construction some architectural structures that are optional in the captious look of stern auditors."

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The following is a direct quote:

"Subsequently B.G. Muzrukov said that in this way a good concrete road was built to the lake, the shore of which was decorated with an embankment with a balustrade (the pride of Sorokovka to this day. - S.K.). At this time, a government decree was issued limiting excesses in construction. Beria, in order to verify the implementation of this decree (initiated by him. - S.K.), undertook several revision trips to closed cities and punished (only with reprimands, not bullets. - S.K.) those leaders ditelei, who, in his opinion, was unnecessarily luxurious. He was also supposed to visit Chelyabinsk-40..."

As we can see, the money in the nuclear industry was spent after the first "atomic" success not "without any control", as stated at the Plenum of the Central Committee, but just under the strict control of Beria himself. But here's what happened next:

"Some memoirs contain an obvious hint that the all-powerful curator was previously informed about the overspending of state funds on the road and the embankment in this city. Surely, Boris Glebovich knew what charges Beria could bring against him. But it was not in his nature to shirk responsibility. He met Beria himself when he arrived, took him along a new road to the lake, to the balustrade. She looked great in the evening, against the backdrop
solar sunset.

Well done, Boris! Very beautiful! — such was the conclusion of Beria regarding construction innovations in Chelyabinsk-40...”

Could the architect Beria react differently? Moreover, the architect is not one building and not even a city, but a whole society!

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In the nuclear industry, not resorts were built, but cities. But they built beautifully, smartly, respecting nature and not forgetting that a person needs not only to work, but also to live an ordinary everyday life, relax, and develop.

Therefore, if Beria had been at the head of the USSR, if he had not been killed, it was the socially rich life that would increasingly acquire the rights of citizenship throughout the Soviet Union.

Let us turn to such an important aspect of the life of any person and any family as housing. Contrary to the well-established delusion, the ideological, material and technological foundations of mass housing construction in the USSR were laid not under Khrushchev, but even under Stalin. Large-block and large-panel houses are still a Stalinist development, they began to be built under Stalin, and under Stalin that construction boom was planned, which became a sign of Khrushchev's USSR already.

In Soviet times, the word “Khrushchev”, which has survived to this day, was used, which the evil-speaking intellectual liberals later supplemented with the word “Khrushchev”. But in those years, when entire blocks of new buildings began to grow rapidly even in small towns, millions of people were happy to receive such separate apartments. And from those same years there was a bright, joyful, warm word “Cheryomushki” - from the new microdistrict of Moscow.

They say that Khrushchev's personal contribution to the planning of new apartments was the notorious

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attached bathroom. It is unlikely that this was the case in reality, although the fact that this is attributed to Khrushchev also says something about him. But here's what, if not Khrushchev, then the Khrushchevites are to blame for sure, it's in distorting the idea of a micro-district.

The authors of this socially rich idea were carried away by the idea that each microdistrict should be a microcity. That is, to include at a distance of five to ten minutes walk from the house everything that people need in everyday life: shops, a school, kindergartens, a clinic, a consumer service center, a post office, house kitchens, canteens, a restaurant, sports grounds, etc. a stadium, a cultural center, a library, a cinema, and even a swimming pool and a pond.

In addition, of course, there are vast green areas, squares and, separately, a park.

All this was mandatory, and depending on the specific conditions, a micro-district could host a theater common to the entire large city, a scientific library, a concert hall or a sports complex, a research institute, a university, a technical school, a bus depot, a plant, a factory etc.

The Khrushchevites ruthlessly and maliciously mutilated this idea of a new communist city, allegedly in the name of saving money. Something was left, something was cut, something was thrown out altogether. Especially stupid and even vile was the fact that within the systemically circumscribed Khrushchev

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mi microdistrict did not provide a full-fledged active recreation of the Soviet people.

Well, let's say, what is one skinny basketball or volleyball court for thousands of young people?! Willy-nilly, you will sit at the TV... And there you will reach for the kitchen for a glass - especially if you can sip jelly seven miles to a cozy cafe with meringues, if it, this cafe, exists at all.

Of course, people who primarily dreamed of an apartment did not notice and did not know that everything could be even better, more convenient, more fun, smarter...

But it could be so!

Yes, in the USSR Khrushchev did not become a reality.

In the USSR, Beria, all smart, promising urban and social ideas would have been picked up, as they say, on the fly with the undoubted and interested support of Beria personally. After all, he was both by education and by vocation a town planner, he asked the party in the 20s to release him from the Cheka as a builder!

As you know, the foundation of personality is laid early, and if we look at Beria's youth, we will see that life itself brought him up like this - attentive to the needs of people.

Even before the revolution, while studying in Baku, he had to not only study, but also earn money to support his mother, deaf-mute sister and five-year-old niece.

After the revolution, one of the first serious tasks for Beria was his appointment to the ok

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October 1920, Executive Secretary of the Extraordinary Commission for the Expropriation of the Bourgeoisie and the Improvement of the Life of the Workers.

Improving the life of the workers - this was absorbed into the soul forever, and the principles learned in the young Soviet Baku became, without exaggeration, second nature for Beria.

Here are some examples...

The new People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria gets acquainted with the apparatus of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD... As the legendary in Soviet intelligence Pavel Gromushkin recalled, when he saw a very thin girl, Beria immediately asked if she was sick?

And, having received a negative answer, he nevertheless gave the order to the head of the GUGB Merkulov to send the girl to a sanatorium - let her, they say, feed herself.

A major Chekist Pavel Sudoplatov makes a serious mistake, and during the report of Beria, he begins to have a severe headache. Beria immediately sends Sudoplatov home, and the next day he sends lemons to his house, brought by Beria as a gift from Georgia.

A talented young man Oleg Lavrentiev, a recent front-line sergeant, who during his military service correctly pointed out a possible variant of a hydrogen bomb, and now a freshman of the Physics Department of Moscow State University, was invited to the chairman of the Special Committee of Beria. He wants to personally see what kind of replacement for atomic luminaries is growing? And the first question is extremely fluff

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to the fluffy guy: "Do you have a toothache? Perhaps, it is necessary to treat? The question can be outwardly explained - Lavrentiev's cheeks were then like those of a hamster. But if Beria were not automatically attentive to people, he would begin to care - is everything in order with the teeth of some student there?

Physicist Yuli Khariton, future three times Hero of Socialist Labor, long-term scientific director of the nuclear All-Russian Research Institute of Experimental Physics at Arzamas-16, and then chief

designer of KB-11 (the embryo of VNII-EF), asks for a vacation. Beria approves, but at the same time gives an additional instruction: "Provide good treatment."

All this is not work "for the public", it is from the need, ingrained in the flesh and blood, to delve into the interests of those for whose sake the Soviet state is called to exist. That is why it can be argued that Beria's USSR would have been a society with a strong and priority social policy.

Lavrenty Pavlovich could arrange a dispersal for the director of the "atomic" enterprise, who neglects social issues, and then, having arrived at plutonium plant No. 817 and seeing the opposite attitude towards the problem of the director of the plant B.G. Muzrukov, tell him: "Well done!"

This, too, is a feature of a business character.

I will refer once again to the book about B.G. Muzrukov, where the memoirs of an employee of the plant No. 817 (PO Mayak) from 1948 to 1960 Yu.A. Gusev.

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On page 243 there are also the following lines:

"After the execution of L.P. Beria, I plucked up courage and turned to Muzrukov with the question: what kind of person was Lavrenty Pavlovich, how did he solve the problems of the work of the plant? Boris Glebovich told me the following story. Before one of Beria's next visits, in 1951, Muzrukov received a call from Moscow from Moscow and was told that the day before, at one of the enterprises of Minatom, Beria had dismissed the director for neglecting the development of the social sphere of the facility. B.G. Muzrukov, having met L.P. Beria, also suggested questions on his part, primarily in the social sphere, but he asked to show production first. Then, on the way to the hotel, he saw a construction site and asked: "What is this?" Boris Glebovich explained that there would be new houses here. And Beria said: "This is good ..."

This, then, is how Muzrukov saw Beria - as a person - already after tubs of mud were officially poured on the LP. However, the real, real Beria was the way Muzrukov described him.

Beria did not know how to lisp - he was purely deprived of cheap sentimentality, as I understand it. But to take care of people and, if necessary, to sympathize with them, Beria knew how to behave in this way
brought up.

By the way, after the successful testing of the first Soviet atomic bomb RDS-1 in 1949, Beria held the only meeting of the "atomic" Special Committee on the road at the same plant No. 817. And this unprecedented meeting was completely devoted to the issues of, as they said then, "social and cultural life".

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The result was a special resolution of the Council of Ministers on the development of the social sphere in the nuclear Sorokovka.

However, the study of the declassified documents of the Soviet Atomic Project shows how attentive the apparatus of the Special Committee and the First Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR was to social issues in the activities of the entire CCGT system. And it came from Beria himself.

But, perhaps, the outstanding positive potential of Beria in the implementation of a broad social policy in those years when he led Georgia was most visibly manifested. Under the leadership of Beria, all social indicators of Georgia quickly reached the first (or even absolutely first) places in the USSR.

The radical socialist reconstruction of Tbilisi, new institutions and schools, hospitals and housing, roads, parks and embankments, the funicular - nothing escaped Beria's eyes and attention. He could come to the construction site at night, without an escort, to understand how the work was going.

But, it is very possible that he also came because he wanted to be surrounded by the future without interference, because any construction is directed towards the future and works for the future.

This is how - looking to the future - and would be the social image of the USSR of Beria. This image of the country was laid down already in the late USSR of Stalin, but even then it began to be distorted by the "fifth column" and simply selfish

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"partoplasm". However, Comrade Beria would have had the determination and ability to deal with all those who interfered with the free and developed social life of the masses in the USSR.

At the same time, powerful social development would consolidate Beria's USSR as a state of dozens of large and small nations.

And the leadership of Beria would become another strong guarantee of the inviolability of the Soviet union multinational state.

Chapter 10

Beria and the unifying national policy

What would be Beria's national policy?

It can be said right away that it would be convincingly unifying.

Khrushchev's national policy was not, if you think about it, actively unifying, it was simply floated, so to speak, with the flow.

There were fifteen union republics with a number of national autonomies - well, okay. The Soviet Union was formed a long time ago, so what else is needed?

Khrushchev and his successors were not smart enough to understand that the Soviet Union was not just a multinational, but a uniquely multinational state. And because of its uniqueness, because of the different levels of development of different national parts of the USSR, the Soviet Union must be constantly improved and strengthened. Strengthen not only in words, but in deeds, putting at the forefront not only issues of national development, but also such interethnic cooperation that would make the union state in the eyes of the

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settlements of the union republics as the most attractive form of their national existence.

Khrushchev "had the wit" to commit only one serious interethnic act - to transfer the former Crimean ASSR (after the war - the Crimean region) from the Russian Federation to Ukraine. The transfer was timed to coincide with the celebration of the 300th anniversary of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia, but Crimea was never part of Ukrainian lands and was recaptured from Turkey by the force of Russian weapons.

The transfer of Crimea to Ukraine was an unwise step, despite the fact that in the conditions of a unified Soviet Union it could look like a rather formal one - what difference does it make whether Crimea is listed as the RSFSR or the Ukrainian SSR?

However, although Crimea was connected to the territory of Ukraine by two, albeit narrow, but isthmuses, and from The territory of the RSFSR was separated by the Kerch Strait, if not wide, but by the sea, it was strategically expedient to keep Crimea as part of the Soviet Russian Federation.

After all, in Ukraine, even in Soviet Ukraine, parochial sentiments never completely disappeared. And this parochialism could not have the best impact on the development of the Crimea and its status. Crimea, which in terms of area was a medium-sized region, geopolitically was of such great importance that no other region of the USSR had. Geopolitical the importance of the Crimea could only be compared with that acquired after

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war with the Kaliningrad region of the RSFSR, and even then the Crimea should have been given priority.

While Crimea was part of the RSFSR, all its problems were solved in Moscow, and this ensured their optimal solution precisely from the all-union positions. The transfer of Crimea under the jurisdiction of Kyiv removed Crimea from the direct control of Moscow, that is, the control of the all-Union governing bodies. Even in the conditions of a single Union, this was strategically stupid.

Beria would never have allowed such a stupid thing to change the status of the Crimea. But what has been said above about the Crimea is only a kind of introduction to the main analysis of Beria's possible national policy.

Perhaps only Beria could properly continue and develop the Stalinist national policy. He understood perfectly well that Russia had long been established as a multinational country and can exist only as a multinational country for the benefit of all peoples, its components. But the basis and leading force of multinational Russia can only be Great Russia, made up of the Great Russian branch of the Russian people.

For centuries, Russia has evolved precisely as a single country, and not as a multinational conglomerate like the Austro-Hungarian Empire. If we look at the initial Rus', then it is already stretched for thousands of kilometers from north to south - along the path "from the Varangians to the Greeks", uniting different peoples. The unifying, assimilating influence of Russian civilization

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where it was powerful. We do not know, for example, of another example of the voluntary entry of peoples into the composition of a more powerful state, except for the accession of Georgia and Armenia to Russia. sharp the expansion of the territory of the Moscow state under Ivan the Terrible, although it was accompanied events such as the Kazan campaign of the tsar or Yermak's campaign in Siberia, was not basically violent. We do not have a single case of the transition of some Russian medieval prince into voluntary citizenship of the Golden Horde, but even during the Mongol-Tatar yoke there were not isolated examples of the transition of the Tatar Murzas and Baskaks into allegiance to the Moscow Grand Duke.

Everything healthy in the geopolitical environment of Moscow has always been drawn to Moscow. If someone is not tolerated Moscow and rejected Moscow, this was evidence of his internal rottenness and such nationalism, which went to the detriment of its own people - it does not matter, big or small.

Beria understood this. In a speech at the 19th Party Congress in October 1952, he was the only one who emphasized—following Stalin—the leading role of the Russian people in the USSR. Beria then said:

“The force that cements the friendship of the peoples of our country is the Russian people, the Russian nation, as the most prominent of all the nations that make up the Soviet Union.”

In the fifth volume of Beria's personal materials, I cited the text of L.P. Beria at the 19th Congress in full, but here I will only remind the reader that

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a significant part of this speech was devoted precisely to the problems of the formation and development of a socialist nation in the conditions of the multinational Soviet Union.

Thirty years ago, these passages of Beria's speech might have seemed trivial, but, firstly, we must not forget that at the time when Beria's speech was delivered, the question had not been settled to the end. The very concept of "socialist nation" was then no more than three decades old, and only from the end of the 30s it was possible to talk about this concept in relation, for example, to the Central Asian republics, as more or less real.

Secondly, in October 1952, Beria also said such things that today it would not hurt to remind all peoples within the Russian geopolitical space, which completely coincides with the borders of the USSR in 1985.

For example, Beria said: "The friendship between the peoples of our country is based on the commonality of their vital interests."

Beria, in his speech, substantiated this thesis - today far from being obvious to everyone - with figures and facts. But it was still a keynote speech that did not contain an analysis of the negative aspects of national life in the USSR. Such an analysis was undertaken by Beria and his collaborators after Stalin's death (although I do not rule out that it was started during Stalin's lifetime), and the purpose of the analysis was to comprehend the real state of affairs and form reasonable proposals.

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I have in mind, of course, Beria's famous notes to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the situation in the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus, as well as in Lithuania. They are described in detail in my books *Beria: The Best Manager of the 20th Century* and *The Great Beria*, to which I refer the interested reader. Here I will say that Beria looked at things correctly and soberly.

In a multinational state led by one powerful nation, it is impossible to ensure a harmonious national policy without constant work to develop the advanced socialist nations. And this development is impossible without national cadres devoted to the ideas of socialism and the Soviet Union.

The peoples of the union republics must understand that the existence of a united Soviet Union is in their own interests. But at the same time, they must actually see that Great Russia is interested in the national development of the republics and encourages it. In the Russians, representatives of the Center, the national republics should see not auditors, not governors, but senior, more experienced comrades who are sincerely interested in solving the problems of this particular republic, since they were sent by the Center to work in it. However, national development, including economic development, must proceed within the framework of the development and strengthening of the all-Union economic and social organism.

Actually, Beria, even during the life of Stalin, in the same speech at the 19th Congress, actually stated

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those approaches that were later put in the conceptual basis of his post-Stalin notes. Let the reader judge for himself:

"Under the conditions of the Soviet system, all the peoples of our country acquired and developed their statehood. The national outskirts of tsarist Russia under Soviet power turned from colonies and semi-colonies into truly independent states - Soviet republics, having

its territory, national autonomy, its constitution, its legislation. In the authorities, in the bodies of economic and administrative management, in the judiciary of the union and autonomous republics, national districts, districts and villages, people elected by the people, who know the life, customs and psychology of the local population (bold italics mine. – S.K.), conduct public affairs in their native language, understandable to the entire population...”

And in his notes on the distortion of national policy in the western regions of Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania, Beria illustrated this general thesis with figures and facts from, so to speak, the opposite. He showed that ignoring national characteristics and the psychology of the local population leads to the preservation of nationalism and creates many unnecessary problems that can and should be avoided.

I think it will be interesting for the reader to compare the corresponding passage from Beria's speech in 1952 at the 19th Congress with the following quotation from Stalin's speech at the Congress of the Peoples of the Terek Region on November 17, 1920. At this congress of representatives of the Chechens, Ingush,

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Tin, Kabardians, Balkars, Karachays and Terek Cossacks, Stalin said (I quote from the collected works of Stalin, vol. 4, 1947):

“The whole point of autonomy is to draw the highlanders into running their country. Here you have too few local people who know how to manage their people. That is why Russians work in the institutions of the Food Committee, the Cheka, the Special Department, and the national economy, who do not know your way of life, language (bold italics mine. - S.K.). It is necessary that your people be involved in all areas of government. The autonomy that is spoken of here is understood in such a way that your people who know your language and your way of life are in all governing bodies.

This is the meaning of autonomy.

Autonomy must teach you to walk on your own feet—this is the goal of autonomy...”

As you can see, what Beria said in 1952 was conceptually close to what Stalin said in 1920 and what was first published in the journal Life of Nationalities in 1929 (No. 40 of 12/15/29) and then - in 1947 in the 4th volume of the collected works of Stalin.

By the way, at the same Congress of mountaineers in 1920, Stalin said this:

“If it is proved that sharia is needed, let there be sharia. The Soviet government does not think of declaring war on Sharia” (SS, vol. 4, p. 402).

And it was published in the USSR in 1947 in a half-million edition! Another conversation is that not all highlanders sincerely accepted the friendly hand of the Soviet government, soiled themselves with betrayal and cooperation with the Germans.

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during the war, and at the direction of Stalin and under the personal leadership of Beria, they were evicted from the Caucasus. But here, as they say, each nation chooses for itself...

The well-known liberal “historian” Professor V. Naumov claims that Beria, in his notes to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU on personnel policy, allegedly exposed Stalin, but this is a lie. In his notes, Beria pointed out the accumulated negative problems, but these problems themselves were not the result of the supposedly vicious policy of Stalin, but the result of a whole complex of objective and subjective factors.

The main negative factor was, of course, the legacy of tsarism and capitalism. It's for Western regions was not a common phrase, but a living phenomenon. After all, in 1953 the oldest the indigenous inhabitants of the Baltic States and the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus, born in The USSR turned no more than 14 years old, because these regions entered (more precisely, returned) to the USSR only in 1939 (the Baltics even in 1940).

The entire indigenous adult population of these regions was formed under the conditions of either tsarism or anti-Soviet bourgeois regimes in the Baltic states and Pan Poland. The indigenous Western Ukrainian, Western Belarusian and Lithuanian populations for the most part had a low educational and cultural level, there were not enough national intelligentsia cadres, and

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the existing ones were far from always loyal to the Soviet government.

Especially in Lithuania and Western Ukraine, on the other hand, a militant, bandit-style, nationalism. The boy wearing a red tie on his chest, Bandera could "tie" on neck another "tie" - from hemp.

And "knitted".

But after all, these hot regions were also the Soviet Union, and life in them had to be equipped with the same thoroughness as in the Ryazan region or in Siberia. And not everyone understood this, and Beria in the spring of 1953 wrote about the situation in Ukraine:

"The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the regional party committees of the western regions still cannot take into account that the fight against the nationalist underground cannot be conducted only through mass repressions and Chekist-howl shackling operations, that the stupid use of repressions only causes dissatisfaction population and harms the cause of the struggle against the bourgeois nationalists..."

Beria correctly believed that it was possible to effectively fight against the influence of nationalists only if when an educated part of the population breaks away from them and starts working for the Soviet government. The cadres decide everything, and in the success of the national policy everything is decided by the national cadres — if they are socialist national cadres.

It was not possible to immediately create socialist national cadres in new regions, and I had to follow the path that

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The USSR went in the 1920s, when new socialist cadres were created with the help of the old intelligentsia. And, for example, in Western Ukraine, the situation was, according to Beria is:

"The population of Western Ukraine is especially painfully perceived by the indiscriminate distrust of local cadres from among the intelligentsia. For example, out of 1718 professors and teachers, 12 institutions of higher education in the city of Lviv among the Western Ukrainian intelligentsia only 320 people belong, there is not a single director of these educational institutions native of Western Ukraine, and among the 25 deputy directors, only one is Western Ukrainian..."

It was, of course, much more difficult to win over the old intelligentsia to one's side than to expel them from official, legal social life by order of command. But it was a vicious path that does not eliminate social abscesses, but drives them into the depths of the social organism.

In the Decree of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU of May 26, 1953, adopted on the note of Beria, the following was also reported:

"It is necessary to recognize as an abnormal phenomenon the teaching of the overwhelming majority of disciplines in higher educational institutions of Western Ukraine in Russian. For example, at the Lvov Institute of Trade and Economics all 56 disciplines are taught in Russian... The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the regional party committees of the western regions do not understand the importance of preserving and using the cadres of the Western Ukrainian intelligentsia. Actual translation

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teaching in Western Ukrainian universities into Russian is widely used by hostile elements, calling this event the policy of Rus

fictions."

In the universities of the main part of Ukraine, many disciplines, especially technical and natural sciences, were taught in Russian, but this was a natural process given the natural bilingualism of the educated part of the population of Eastern Ukraine. In Western Ukraine, however, everything was different, and Beria understood this more subtle than many Eastern Ukrainians, not to mention many Great Russians.

After the assassination of Beria, Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites began to deliberately resent the terminology of his notes and broadcast that there is no special Western Ukrainian specificity, that all Ukrainians are united, etc. But this was the position of an ostrich, "hiding" from reality, burying its head in sand.

Yes, and here Beria was stronger than all his colleagues in the post-Stalinist administration of the USSR. He thought deeper and saw sharper, but for all that, he also had rich personal experience in conducting a balanced national policy in difficult social conditions. After all, Beria was not only a Caucasian by birth, but also grew up in the Caucasus, studied there, lived and worked.

And Beria did not just work, he actually became an outstanding reformer in Transcaucasia and especially in Georgia. Without a correct vision of national problems, Beria would not have achieved success.

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And he got them.

In the book of 1998 about Dmitry Shepilov, the former secretary of the Central Committee and a candidate member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, who "joined them", his interview of February 23, 1989 with journalist Nikolai Barsukov is given.

There is also this passage in this interview:

"..Beria and Khrushchev were incompatible. They had completely different points of view on the solution of literally all issues. For example, Beria offered in Lithuania, Belarus, etc. carry out a complete nationalization of the cadres, removing all Russians from the governing bodies, primarily from the internal affairs bodies. Khrushchev, on the contrary, was categorically against it, expressed distrust of the national cadres..."

Shepilov lived a long life. Born in 1905, he passed away in 1995. And in 1989 either his memory or his conscience let him down. Beria did not propose a complete nationalization of the cadres with the removal of all Russians from the governing bodies, and even more so from the internal affairs bodies. Beria considered only intolerable such a state of affairs, when in the new national regions, which have been part of the USSR for eight years only after the war, national cadres are either almost absent and not educated, or not involved in the official life of society.

Khrushchev from 1938 to 1949 was the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine and simultaneously from 1944 to 1947 - the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (Council of Ministers) of the Ukrainian SSR. He was directly responsible for the ugly, anti-state state of affairs with cadres in Western Ukraine.

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and therefore tried with all his might to prove that the national cadres there were not at all reliable.

But the truth was that Khrushchev knew how to select only the cadres he needed and did not know how to select and grow cadres that the country and the party needed.

On the whole, Stalin's national policy in the USSR was carried out correctly, and it had a solid system base - genuine, natural, organic attention of the state system in the USSR to the needs and needs of the working people, and not thieves and schemers. Attention to all working people regardless of their nationality.

In a speech at the 19th Congress, Beria cited many comparative figures. Thus, in the Uzbek SSR, one tractor accounted for 70 hectares of crops, and in Pakistan, for 9,000 hectares. In Soviet Azerbaijan, the provision of medical care was 8.5 times better than in Turkey and 23 times better than in Iran. The population of the union republics felt these advantages of a common life within the USSR visibly, in their daily existence. However, the old was tenacious, any excesses and mistakes of the Soviet government were immediately discussed in several languages at once.

And in the conditions of national republics, it was necessary to bring the essence of the Soviet national policy to the national masses not only in deed, but also in word. The good Soviet poet Yaro

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Slava Smelyakova has poems about a laundress living a hard life, washing linen day after day:

And the fool does not know that, Rinsing underwear,

That in Russia the dictatorship is not someone else's, but hers ...

The lines are bitter, and they correctly reflected the then state of affairs in the still poor post-war country. However, the dictatorship then in Russia was still popular. And the son of a washerwoman could already become an engineer, scientist, doctor. The washerwoman herself might not understand this, and it was not so easy to find words that would reach her tired soul.

How much more difficult it was to do this, looking for words other than Russian in at least 14 languages of the peoples of the USSR... But Beria, in his speech at the 19th Congress, said that "in the Soviet multinational state, more than 60 nations, national groups and nationalities.

And each of these nations, national groups and nationalities had their own - large or small, written or oral, but their own traditions, their own, in the words of Beria, way of life, customs and psychology. The future of the Soviet Union, and hence the future of all these sixty nations, national groups and nationalities, depended on how fully and intelligently they were taken into account in Moscow's policy.

How would the national policy develop in the USSR under the leadership of Beria? There can be no doubt that it would develop in such a way that it would not

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would put no chance of success for anti-Soviet separatist activities in the national republics.

The centripetal tendencies in the USSR of Beria would have been ensured, among other things, through a rational division of labor in the Union republics.

During the leadership of Georgia, Beria clearly sought to create on the territory of the republic such enterprises that would be included in the all-Union cooperation. I will only give one, but a vivid example. In Tbilisi, not without the direct efforts of Beria, a large aviation plant, which already before the war was producing modern combat vehicles. The fighters produced in Tbilisi during the war fought on all fronts.

It is interesting to know what state the aircraft industry is in today's Georgia and to whom is it needed now?

Just as today's Georgia does not need the science that developed in the republic under Beria as a natural and integral part of the great multinational Soviet science.

In the field of agriculture in Georgia, Beria's policy was similar. He believed that it was necessary to make maximum use of the unique climatic possibilities of the Caucasus for specialized agricultural production oriented towards subtropical crops, and to obtain "general", so to speak, crops, such as grain,

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public deliveries within the framework of the all-union balance.

Light and food, including fruit and vegetable, industry of Georgia was also developed by Beria taking into account the possibilities of wide deliveries of products outside of Georgia.

Life itself improved Beria's understanding of the problems of national politics. So, The nuclear project of the USSR was the focus of the efforts of a number of national republics - in Kazakhstan, in the republics of Central Asia, in Ukraine, rich deposits were discovered uranium raw materials, and mines, enrichment plants were built there, infrastructure was created.

Beria well understood the power of large associations, was a unifier in essence of his nature, but a unifier who is aware of the fact that any unification — of individuals, collectives, peoples — will be firmly natural only when all members association, and above all by the leadership, takes into account the originality and distinctive features of all parts that make up a whole.

At the Anti-Beria Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in July 1953, Beria was accused of all mortals. sins, including the intention to destroy the unity of the Soviet peoples, encourage separatism etc. However, this was a lie and slander just because Beria - as a person - was to his liking. maximum scope, large scale, it was interesting for him to work powerfully and on large tasks. And where could a large lich

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the ability to express oneself more fully and visibly than within the framework of a great power that is confidently gaining such a pace that brought it to the leaders of the world?

That is why L.P. Beria was a natural patriot of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and was filled with the desire to strengthen and develop the USSR as a strong mutual beneficial union of the peoples that make it up.

Since the time of his work in the Caucasus, Beria understood that nationalism and its derivatives are separatism cannot be reliably eliminated by suppressing it. Repressive measures in a period of aggravation of the historical situation are necessary, he understood this well - as an experienced Chekist. If somewhere there is armed nationalism, terrorist nationalism, then it is impossible to do not fight, including with an armed hand. However, it is not for nothing that Beria in his notes on national policy wrote that "the fight against the nationalist underground cannot be waged by

only mass repressions and Chekist-military operations. No wonder he also used the word "stupid" in relation to the repressions carried out against the nationalists.

But the most skilful use of repression can only be an operational measure that relieves the acuteness of the situation, but does not eliminate the situation itself. Beria understood this perfectly, not only as a Chekist, but also as a politician, as a statesman of socialism.

He understood from his work in the Caucasus that nationalism could not be effectively suppressed, his

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one can effectively only weaken it, then deprive it of its attractiveness in the eyes of the national masses, and only after that — EXPECT.

This approach required skill, tact, knowledge...

Time at last!

But only this approach was truly successful.

Beria understood the essence of the problem in this way. And therefore, in the USSR of Beria, those centrifugal tendencies would have been impossible, which gradually, under the toast of the "unbreakable union of free republics", developed in Brezhnev's USSR and destroyed Gorbachev's USSR.

Chapter 11

Beria and international politics as a guarantor of Russia's power

What could be the international policy of Beria?

This question can also be given a very definite answer. This policy would strengthen and elevate the Soviet Union and Russia, but would strengthen it not at the expense of unequal relations with the outside world—as is the case in the case of the United States and the West in general, but precisely at the expense of interstate relations of a new type, when a great power treats small countries emphatically on an equal footing.

Already those few months that Russia lived without Stalin showed that Beria was quite talented in the foreign policy sphere and had completely independent and promising views in this area.

While Stalin was alive, Beria was little attracted by him to solve foreign policy problems, especially by diplomatic methods. Episodes like the elimination of Trotsky, of course, do not count. Actually, Stalin did not really need Beria as a diplomat - Stalin himself was an outstanding diplomat, which

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he proved it more convincingly in the course of international conferences with his participation and in a number of negotiations in pre-war, war and post-war times.

Molotov was enough for Stalin to help in this area. In addition, Molotov was outwardly imperturbable, and Beria was often an impulsive, open person. Molotov was more suited to the psychological "image" of the foreign policy of the imperturbable Stalin.

Here is what Beria wrote in that part of the letter to Malenkov "from the bunker", where he addressed Molotov:

"..Your exceptional role in the field of foreign policy, your excellent attitude towards me, when I was at conferences (I told many comrades about this) in Tehran, Yalta and

Podsdame (so in the letter - S.K.), where, as you know, I was not a delegate, but was by the nature of my work, although you insisted ... "

It seems that Molotov knew how to hide his feelings not only in the foreign policy arena, but also among colleagues, because in fact Beria could not help but annoy Vyacheslav Mikhailovich already because of the dissimilarity of natures. Yes, and Molotov could not help but envy the more talented Beria. But here - Beria was, as we see, confident in the excellent attitude of Molotov towards him.

At international conferences in Tehran (28.11.-1.12.43), in Yalta (4-11.02.45) and in Berlin (17.07.-02.08.45) Beria was responsible for the protection of the Soviet delegation (in the Crimea and for the protection of other delegations), although by the beginning of 1945 he was along

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with Molotov, Deputy Chairman of the GKO Stalin.

In the 1940s and early 1950s, Stalin connected Beria to contacts with the leadership of foreign states, but only in the countries of people's democracy. On the whole, even then Stalin relied on Molotov, as well as on Zhdanov and Malenkov, and sometimes on Mikoyan. A quite significant role was later played by Andrey Yanuarievich Vyshinsky, who in 1949 replaced Molotov as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

But this did not mean that after the death of Stalin, Beria could not prove himself in an outstanding way and in such specific activities as foreign policy ...

After the war, the Soviet Union became a world power of the first magnitude. The European part of the country lay in ruins, the standard of living of the population was in some places below the minimum level of survival, and in a number of regions people were not just starving, but dying of hunger. However, Russia still had such a world weight that even the weight of the British Empire could not be compared with, over which the "sun did not set" yet.

Never before has the role of Russia in the world been so powerful and paramount — for the first time, Russia was viewed by everyone not just as a great power, but as the second power in the world, as a superpower with a chance to become the sole leader of the world.

For all that, the international position of the USSR was very difficult, and not only

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mu that it was necessary to restore the economy and the social sphere in the face of a severe need to eliminate the US nuclear monopoly as soon as possible.

Additional problems arose precisely because of the new international status of Russia. Now it, also for the first time, by the way, in its history, turned out to be the leader of a new international community - the world socialist camp.

We still had poorly developed theoretical and systemic questions of internal socialist construction, and now we had to deal with the theory and practice of international socialist construction. And all this, I remind you, for the first time in world history - there was no one and nowhere to borrow experience from. Moreover, the foreign policy of the USSR with Stalin and the foreign policy of the USSR without Stalin were, as they say in Odessa, two big differences.

After Stalin's death, the foreign policy of the USSR was again headed by Molotov, if we mean the chair of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. But Vyacheslav Mikhailovich from any point of view and in any respect was not Iosif Vissarionovich, and he could not lay claim to sole wise leadership. He did not have a particularly original vision of the problems of state life, so there was nothing surprising in the fact that Beria began to "stick out" here and there ...

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In hindsight, after his arrest, he repented in a letter to Malenkov:

"...when discussing the German question, of course, I am unconditionally to blame here and deserve any condemnation...

..My act at the reception of the Hungarian comrades, not justified in any way. Nagy offer
It was not I or someone else who should have brought in Imre, but you had to do it, and then I jumped out
idiotically, in addition, along with the correct remarks, I allowed liberties and swagger, for
that, of course, I should warm up hard ... "

It will be necessary to speak about the German question separately, but as for the "reception of the Hungarian comrades", then the point here was...

On June 12, 1953, negotiations were held in Moscow with a delegation of the Hungarian People's Republic consisting of M. Rakosi, I. Nagy, E. Gere, A. Hegedyush and others. From the USSR, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Beria, Molotov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich and the USSR Ambassador to Hungary E. Kiselev. During the conversations, the question was raised about the separation of the highest party and state positions in the Hungarian People's Republic so that Rakosi, who headed both the Hungarian Working People's Party and the Council of Ministers Hungary, retained the Central Committee, and Nagy became prime minister.

Rakosi was against the division and asked how the responsibilities are distributed between

Central Committee and Council of Ministers in the USSR? Beria - according to Khrushchev - said then: "What is the Central Committee, let the Council of Ministers decides that the Central Committee should deal with cadres and propaganda."

Khrushchev's "memories" must be believed with

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great caution, but here he conveyed the collision clearly truthfully. By 1953, Beria's views were exactly like that and completely coincided with the position of Stalin himself.

In this seemingly droplet of history, in fact, a lot was reflected ...

And Beria's readiness to take the situation "on himself", and his directness in relations with his colleagues in socialist camp, and the desire to build interstate relations above all through intergovernmental, that is, through practical multifaceted cooperation with focus on economics.

But, importantly, Beria did not look at our foreign economic relations as a way to "feed" the countries of people's democracy and thereby turn them into freeloaders of the Soviet Union. Under Khrushchev and then Brezhnev, this vicious practice was strengthened and strengthened, not strengthening the USSR, and weakening it. Under Beria, things would have been different.

To verify this, let us return once again to Mikoyan's speech already known to the reader at the anti-Beria plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in July 1953. Then Mikoyan was indignant at the fact that Beria did not did not want to agree to a halving (!) of Czechoslovakia's contractual obligations for the supply of diesel engines to the USSR for the oil industry. Mikoyan said (I quote from an uncorrected transcript):

"We had a multi-year supply agreement. True, maybe supplies could go a little better, but that's not the point (wow! - S.K.).

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And Beria was furious when he somehow found out about the long-term agreement .. On what basis is such decomposition, Such an indulgence for the Czechs and so on. And after that the twist went, two months with the Czechs

were talking.

The same with oil equipment ... "

In those years, the scheme of economic relations between the USSR and the socialist countries was only being created and adjusted. And for the USSR it was very important from the very beginning to put itself right.

When the Czech Škoda factories were privately owned, it would never have occurred to their owners to raise the issue of reducing contractual obligations for deliveries from 800 diesel engines to 400 diesel engines, and even within the framework of a long-term agreement that ensures the dynamic and stable loading of production.

A private Skoda would stretch out and provide supplies.

But the "fraternal" Czech state economy was not averse to starting to speculate on "fraternal" relations and treat the orders of the USSR carelessly...

This is exactly what Minister of Trade Mikoyan agreed to, this is what the Khrushchevites began to do after the removal of Beria.

And this is exactly what Beria would not have done!

Of course, with Beria's approach at the initial stage, it would not have been without friction, without "fraternal" "insults", and even "fraternal" blackmail ...

However, in the end, in the countries of the world socialist camp, they would begin to look at the USSR not as a feeding trough, but as a hard

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business relations, but an exceptionally profitable partner due to the vastness of the domestic market.

And the ideological, political closeness would be manifested in the fact that the USSR would not use its power for the economic suppression of small socialist countries, would not seek to obtain unilateral benefits - as great capitalist powers and corporations try to do in relation to small countries.

No, Beria, unsettled by his arrest, judged himself too harshly, defining his behavior in the Presidium of the Central Committee and in the Council of Ministers of the USSR as "idiotic", "free" and "cheeky". In fact, his behavior was proactive and energetic.

Yes, Beria's behavior in everything, including foreign policy affairs, contrasted sharply with the state sluggishness of his other colleagues, but was Beria to blame?

And his state energy and leading qualities would be very useful to Russia not only within the country, but also in the foreign policy arena.

Khrushchev behaved in the outside world at times impudently. He banged his shoes on the table at the UN - here you really need to evaluate his behavior as idiotic and cheeky ...

At the same time, Khrushchev could behave almost like a lackey. There is a very expressive photograph – on June 4, 1956 in the Kremlin, Khrushchev obsequiously shakes hands with the monumentally frozen Joseph Broz Tito.

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He presses, almost bent over into an arc, smiling like a sexual officer who is about to be given a generous tip.

Is it possible to imagine Beria behaving in such a way? In relations with external partners, he behaved extremely correctly and politely, but with an undoubted sense of both his own and state dignity.

And just on the Yugoslav plot, I will now stop ...

The first time the leader of People's Yugoslavia, Tito, came to Moscow as head of state in April 1945, and at the same time the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Cooperation between the USSR and Yugoslavia was signed. There is a photo taken on April 11, 1945, also in the Kremlin — a taut Tito in a marshal's uniform makes a speech to Stalin and Molotov. Tito in this photo looks like a diligent student answering to strict teachers, who are very similar to Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Stalin and his deputy Molotov.

And already in 1948, relations between the two countries were actually interrupted - Tito began to clearly deviate towards the more generous West, with which he had always been inclined to get along. Letters from Stalin and Molotov to the Yugoslav leadership did not change the state of affairs, but Tito actually changed Russia.

There was nothing good about that, but Stalin here, as they say, bit the bit, although we could not seriously change something in Yugoslavia

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Whether — the authority and influence of Tito were decisive there. At the same time, Stalin's tough stance led the situation to a dead end, and Tito led to the West.

However, interstate relations had to be restored somehow. And the initiative here after Stalin's death was shown again by Beria.

At the Anti-Beria Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in July 1953, Malenkov spoke about this following blowing:

"Last week, on the eve of the day we decided to consider the case of Beria in the Presidium of the Central Committee, he came to me with a proposal to take steps through the Ministry of Internal Affairs towards normalizing relations with Yugoslavia. I told him that this question should be discussed in the Central Committee. What kind of proposal is this? .. "

About what this proposal was, just below. And now I draw the reader's attention to the fact that Beria did not weave some sinister threads of some sinister plans behind the backs of his colleagues, but came to Malenkov (the head of the Soviet government, by the way) and openly expressed a completely sensible idea.

Yes, our relations with Yugoslavia began to deteriorate in 1948... Yes, there is a lot of truth in Stalin's and Molotov's accusations and claims against Tito and Ranković, but...

But something must be done.

There is no doubt that Beria's post-Stalinist thought about the need to restore relations with the largest South Slavic country was reasonable and timely.

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change. It is possible, by the way, that Stalin himself came to her ... After all, it was not for nothing that after 1949 he made Vyshin his main assistant in foreign policy instead of Molotov

sky.

And now let's return to the transcript of Malenkov's speech, where he outlined Beria's proposal on Yugoslavia:

"The materials seized from Beria contain the following document:

"I take this opportunity to convey to you, Comrade Rankovich, great greetings from Comrade Beria, who remembers you well.

Comrade Beria has instructed me to inform you personally in strict confidentiality that he and his friends stand for the need for a radical revision and improvement of relations between the two countries.

In this regard, Comrade Beria asked you to personally inform Comrade Tito about this, and if you and Comrade Tito share this point of view, then it would be advisable to organize a confidential meeting of specially authorized persons. The meeting could be held in Moscow, but if you consider this unacceptable for some reason, then in Belgrade as well.

Comrade Beria expressed confidence that this conversation, except for you and Comrade Tito, will not be known to anyone ... "

After reading the text of the document, Malenkov summarized:

"Beria did not have time to implement this measure due to the fact that we turned events regarding him personally in a different direction ..."

Rankovich (1909-1983), mentioned in the note, served as Minister of the Interior of the SFRY in 1953, so addressing

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The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria to a colleague was quite justified and understandable. Moreover, everything was correct in diplomatic terms as well — it was reasonable to carry out the delicate mission of normalizing relations at first through departments that were accustomed to delicate assignments, firstly, and who knew how to keep their mouths shut, secondly..

Curious fact! And in the Yugoslav question, as in all the others, Malenkov distanced himself from Beria. However, the handwritten text of the note cited by Malenkov was deposited in the archive, apparently written by Beria's hand. So, in the original there are the words not "Beria ... and his friends ..", but "Malenkov, Beria and their friends ..."

At the same time, the tone and style of Beria's note, with all due respect to the addressees, is the tone of one of the leaders of a great power.

In July 1953 Beria's business Yugoslav initiative was filed as a crime. In less than three years, Khrushchev received Tito in the Kremlin, curving his servility.

But why kholuyski?

Ivan Chigirin, the author of one of the most profound books about the Soviet era, White and Dirty Spots of History, believes that "Khrushchev passionately desired ... to get closer to the West through the Yugoslav "bridge" ..."

Well, the opinion is not without foundation.

For the Khrushchevites, Tito was a "bridge" to the West, and for Beria, he was a partner that should not be neglected at all and that it makes sense to tear him away from the West.

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And now about the German question...

I already wrote about this in my first book about Beria, and now I will give additional information on this subject, first referring to the transcript of Malenkov's speech at the plenum of the Central Committee on July 2, 1953:

"..The German question was discussed in the government. It was about a serious trouble in the position of the GDR. We all came to the conclusion that, as a result of the wrong policy, the GDR has made many mistakes, that there is great discontent among the German population... In the last period, about 2 years, about 500,000 people fled to West Germany. ..

We considered that the most urgent task was for our German friends to quickly and resolutely carry out measures to improve the political and economic situation in the GDR ..., we believed and continue to believe ... that it is necessary to correct the course towards accelerated construction socialism.

It must be said that when discussing the German question, Beria proposed not to correct the course towards the accelerated construction of socialism, but to abandon any course towards socialism in the GDR and to steer the course towards bourgeois Germany. In the light of everything that we have now learned about Beria, we must re-evaluate this point of view of his. It is clear that this fact characterizes him as a bourgeois degenerate..."

If you know that literally half a month before the utterance of these words, Beria - the only one from the top leadership of the USSR - took an active personal part in eliminating unrest in the GDR, then Malenkov's accusations and suspicions look especially unworthy.

But more than that!

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Beria, the only one from the entire top leadership of the USSR, not only listened to the reports of the apparatus on the actual (and very alarming) state of affairs in the GDR, but also studied the problem, personally involving qualified experts in the analysis and development of recommendations. The manager of the USSR Council of Ministers, Pomaznev, in his slander against Beria, filed by Malenkov and Khrushchev on July 2, 1953, blamed Beria, among other things, for the fact that the de Beria secretariat "is intensively looking for an expert on the economy of the countries of people's democracy."

The situation in the GDR was the subject of heated discussions in the highest post-Stalinist leadership. On May 27, 1953, after another discussion of German problems at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a commission of the Presidium of the CE was formed, consisting of Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Khrushchev and Bulganin, which was supposed to develop specific proposals within three days. At the same time, it was recommended to proceed from the fact that "the main reason for the unfavorable situation in the GDR is the erroneous course towards building socialism in the current conditions ..."

Only Molotov did not agree with such a formulation of the problem and on May 28 he inserted the word "accelerated" before the words "building socialism"...

It is clear that the most "working", so to speak, member of the commission was Beria, and not so much because of his personal in-depth study of the issue, but because of his involvement in the analysis

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the leasing of experts, which Beria did even before the formation of the commission.

As a result, on June 2, 1953, the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 7576-rs "On measures to improve the political situation in the GDR" was adopted. The hand and approaches of Beria are clearly visible in the text of this document. Thus, he rightly considered, for example, that in Germany one should not speed up the creation of agricultural cooperatives similar to Soviet collective farms, but confine oneself to the creation of partnerships for the joint cultivation of the land and machine and tractor stations.

At the Anti-Beria Plenum of the Central Committee, Malenkov accused Beria of intending to "abandon any course towards socialism in the GDR and head towards bourgeois Germany," but this was yet another Malenkavian exaggeration. Beria was indeed inclined to abandon the plans of the socialist GDR, but he had in mind not a return to bourgeois relations on the territory of the GDR, but the unification of the two Germanys - on the entire territory of Germany - into a democratic, neutral and demilitarized state, with the conclusion - the house from the territory of Germany of all occupying forces.

It was a very true idea, the constant supporter of which in the Soviet leadership was none other than ... Stalin himself.

Little known today, but a Soviet note dated March 10, 1952 (another one followed in April 1952) proposed the creation of a neutral Germany and free

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burs. It goes without saying that this initiative was not only approved by Stalin, but it came from Stalin!

The general secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), Walter Ulbricht, reacted to Stalin's proposal with natural apprehension, but Ulbricht was "rescued" by the opposite side, rejecting Soviet ideas. The well-known Social Democratic leader of the FRG, Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt, admitted in his memoirs:

"The rejection of Soviet notes (even if it was just a matter of weighing all the pros and cons) was also programmed by those circles in the West who, in relation to Germany, in no way wanted to take into account the possible - the possibility of its non-alignment (that is, joining NATO. - S.K.)."

I will note in brackets that Brandt discovered a strange "logic".

Before that, he wrote that he did not believe and does not believe that "Stalin was ready to give up his part of Germany", but that he believed and believes that "the West would do the right thing if it tried to find out everything that was related to this issue.

Then Brandt added: "And the federal government (FRG. — S.K.) would simply be obliged do it."

But what right did Brandt have to disbelieve Stalin if the Western leadership itself did not dare to go on an experimental, so to speak, test of Stalin's readiness to "reject

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his part of Germany"? After all, in 1952, when Stalin was alive, neither the West nor the government of the FRG did anything towards the unification of the two Germanys!

Why?

Yes, of course, because both the West and the revanchists in the FRG needed a militarized and anti-Soviet separate Germany within NATO, and not a neutral and unaligned united Germany.

At the same time, the then Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, the "patriot" Adenauer, as we see, even agreed to the preservation of the occupation of his homeland by foreign troops.

A united and neutral Germany without the presence of US occupying forces in the center of Europe would have been a more profitable and stable option for the USSR than a separate GDR, which created many problems for us, from political to economic.

Going for a united Germany and throwing off the "German" burden that weighed down the USSR was tempting in almost all respects.

Although this could only be done on the basis of strong mutual guarantees, including mutual and simultaneous termination of the occupation of Germany.

Stalin understood this, Beria also understood, but the same Molotov - alas, no.

Austria, for example, was also occupied at that time and divided into 4 zones of occupation. However, in 1955, a peace treaty was signed

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thief, the troops of the USSR, the USA, England and France were withdrawn from Austria, and Austria began to exist in the form of a single democratic, neutral and demilitarized state, which it is to this day.

The State Emblem of Austria is a single-headed eagle holding a sickle in one paw and a hammer in the other. And this once again confirms that a strong social policy was implemented in Austria, which is not surprising - large military spending does not undermine the Austrian economy.

Something similar could have happened in Germany, although here the US political sabotage would have been more powerful, of course. But it was possible to try in 1953. And if the German question had been raised by the Soviet Union in the 1950s cleverly and far-sightedly, then much could have gone differently in the world.

Realizing this, Beria was persistent. There is an interesting passage in Khrushchev's speech at the St. Petersburg Plenum of the Central Committee. Nikita Sergeevich then spun a lot of things in general, worthy of careful analysis. And this is what he said (according to the uncorrected transcript):

"..his impudence (L.P. Beria. - S.K.) was simply unbearable. When we discussed the Germans, these people made a mistake, they should have been corrected, not bullied. And now it was necessary to see this man, when he yelled at Ulbricht and others, it was just a shame to sit. And we were silent, and one might think that we agree with this ... "

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Khrushchev was referring to the visit of an East German delegation led by Walter Ulbricht and Wilhelm Pieck to Moscow in the summer of 1953. The exact date of the visit, oddly enough, is not known today, although historians indirectly refer to it as June 12, 1953 (on June 16, mass unrest began in East Berlin, which engulfed the southern and western parts of the GDR the next day).

From the Soviet side, the meeting with the Germans was attended by G. Malenkov, N. Khrushchev, L. Beria, V. Molotov, political adviser to the chairman of the Soviet Control Commission in Germany, V. Semyonov, and the commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, General A. Grechko.

Was Khrushchev telling the truth when describing Beria's behavior? I think he was lying, even speaking the truth. After all, it happens!

Ulbricht was a stubborn man. Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt wrote about him: "I have never met him, but I have repeatedly heard about him, including from my Eastern interlocutors, as a know-it-all and a dull person. Without knowing him at all, I nevertheless... was impressed by his stubbornness (meaning the position of Ulbricht in 1971. — S.K.)..."

Brandt's assessments must be treated with caution, but something in Ulbricht's nature is noticed here, it seems to be true. And it is not surprising that Beria at a meeting with the Germans in Moscow in the summer of 1953

year was emotional. At the same time, Khrushchev about "treating", of course, with

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lied. Beria was often rude, not because of rudeness, but because of his expansive nature, and the Soviet leadership understood this, which follows, among other things, from such a passage in Khrushchev's speech on July 2, 1953 at the plenum of the Central Committee...

After the above words from the transcript, it followed:

"..And you, dear ministers present here, are accustomed to this and therefore, as if unquestioningly, accepted all sorts of insults and smiled another time (animation in the hall), thinking that this is a friendly pill, that it is not bitter ..."

So it was, after all - Beria was rude, but quick-witted (as an example of such a nature, I can cite rocket technology designer Sergei Pavlovich Korolev). Therefore, his sharpness against the Germans was both psychologically explicable and, more importantly, justified. There was an argument going on between them!

Ulbricht resisted Stalin's line and brought the situation in the GDR, as they say, "to the point". It was difficult to react to this calmly, and even at a confidential meeting, and even without having the authority of Stalin in the eyes of the Germans ...

In addition, Beria, as the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, was aware that the West and the United States were preparing major provocations in the GDR, and "combustible material" for them was provided not only by the "fifth column" in the GDR, but also by the stupid policy of Ulb- straight.

Stalin could have put everything in its place and given out "an earring to all sisters" without raising his voice. But Stalin was no longer there. And vra

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it was necessary to zoom in on the stubborn Ulbricht. So Beria was yelling - someone had to do it! That is why, presumably, Malenkov, Khrushchev and Molotov were sitting at the meeting, taking water in their mouths, because Beria was right in reproaching the Germans not only in essence, but, alas, in form. There are also interesting moments in the memoirs of Willy Brandt, who wrote in the 70s:

"There is a lot to be said for the fact that this uprising (June 16-17, 1953. — S.K.) prevented a possible radical change in the Soviet policy towards Germany... Stalin died. One of his successors, the notorious head of the secret police (ek, how they were all shackled only in this role by the LPB. - S.K.) Beria, contacted the opposition German communists, in favor of a new political course. For the sake of creating a unified German state, the SED had to sacrifice itself and, together with the West German KPD, go over to

opposition...

Was this not a second chance that arose due to a serious revision of the security interests of the USSR? ..

Stalin's intentions in 1952 and the essence of the conflict between his successors in 1953 will remain a mystery for a long time..."

Brandt wrote and this is what:

"..after the overthrow and execution of Beria, Ulbricht at the end of June (an inaccuracy, this could not have happened before July 8-9, 1953. - S.K.) at the plenum of the SED Central Committee complained that Beria allegedly "wanted to sell the GDR ". Later, Khrushchev also accused Malenkov of intending to "sell" the GDR."

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Ulbricht, of course, had to follow the right line, which, moreover, corresponded to his personal attitude towards Beria, and Brandt used a "damaged telephone" ... However, Brandt's testimony is curious, as is the following passage from his memoirs, referring to the summer of 1953:

"The interested Germans ... had no idea what the matter was leading to. Adenauer knew more, but did not want to share his knowledge with people who were inclined to ask questions. Churchill, whom he visited in mid-May, relayed to him information from Moscow indicating that trends towards a change in Soviet policy should be taken seriously. The old Englishman did not find support among his own bureaucracy. The Americans, who were immediately contacted by Adenauer, also felt that it was not worth getting involved in finding out the details. However, after a while, at least to people well-informed, it became clear that something serious was behind this: after the overthrow and execution of Beria Ulbricht at the end of June...",

and further - according to the text of the last quotation above.

This testimony of Brandt depicts an interesting, it should be noted, moment!

On the one hand, from this evidence it can be understood that the British had reliable informants in Moscow, but it was, of course, not Beria, declared at the plenum of the Central Committee "English spy."

On the other hand, one can understand that, receiving information from Moscow about the Beria line (and,

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in fact, also Malenkov), the Americans were not interested in the Germans finding out about it and believing in the seriousness of Moscow's new intentions regarding the plans for a united Germany. After all, if the same Adenauer, and even with the support of Churchill, became interested in the idea of a united, non-aligned Germany, then this idea - in the event, of course, if Beria had remained in power - could have been realized!

But did the Americans, the pro-Atlantic-minded British and the revanchists in the FRG need it? After all, such a foreign policy of the "agent of imperialism" Beria would fundamentally undermine the entire American imperialist policy of establishing US political hegemony in Europe!

Is not it?

Moreover! From these later confessions of Brandt, it can also be assumed that the Khrushchevites' line of consolidating the split in Germany was indirectly supported by the Americans through their Moscow agents of influence, who gained more and more weight in Moscow after the double assassination of Stalin and Beria.

I dwelled in detail on the German aspect of Beria's foreign policy approaches, because there is every reason to think that if Beria had remained in power, the question of a united Germany would have been resolved in the 1950s as positively as the question of united Austria.

The probability of this would be the greater, the more powerful the Soviet Union would look. And in the summer of 1953 he was just on the eve of the event,

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which had a paramount foreign policy potential. I mean the successful testing of the first Soviet thermonuclear bomb RDS-6s (to which Beria, by the way, also had a direct relationship - the only one from the top Soviet leadership).

After August 1953, after the mighty Soviet thermonuclear explosion, the Soviet proposals not only for neutral Austria, but also for neutral Germany could have sounded completely different, and it was Beria who understood this more than any other of his colleagues.

A united neutral Germany, formed along the lines of Austria and liberated from the influence of the United States, would create a completely different world situation, objectively beneficial for the USSR. However, only Beria could lead to this, make appropriate proposals to the West and the Germans, while Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites led the matter to consolidate the split in Germany, which indirectly undermined the USSR.

Knowing the actual development of events after 1953, it is interesting to compare Beria's line on the "Yugoslav" question and the "German" question.

On Yugoslavia: why give away what can be returned?

In Germany: is it worth holding on to something that you cannot reliably hold on to?

At the same time, Beria was by no means going to "sell the GDR", as Ulbricht claimed. Of course, a united Germany of the 1950s model—would it become a reality—would not be socialist, but bourgeois. But her neutrality, absent

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The reduction of military spending, getting rid of the burden of spending on the occupying troops, as well as the influence of the Social Democrats, Socialists and Communists would ensure a strong social policy in a united Germany. At the same time, such a Germany, which became a fact with the active position of the USSR, would be friendly to the USSR.

Moreover, what could happen in the future if the USSR, having the opportunity to pay more attention to internal development and, above all, to the development of the social sphere, somewhere by the middle of the 60s would ensure an impressive increase in the well-being of the people ? It could well have been with a smart policy.

But then the Germans, seeing the material advantages of socialism for the vast masses, might think whether it would be worthwhile to give power in Germany to such a Bundestag and government that would lead Germany along the socialist path by constitutional, elective means?

And the mighty Soviet Union could become the guarantor of the free socialist choice of the Germans in a united Germany.

Could after all be, ultimately, and so!

That is, in general, the idea of a united Germany was rich, and besides, from the very beginning it was not Beria's, but Stalin's.

It must be said that Beria was intelligently active not only in relation to the German aspect of Soviet foreign policy. In his letter "from the bunker" on July 2, 1953, he wrote to Malenkov and members of the Presidium of the Central Committee:

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"..At the same time, like all of you, I tried to make proposals to the presidium aimed at the correct solution of issues, such as Korean, German, answers to Eisenhower and Churchill (so in the letter. - S.K. .), Turkish, Iranian, etc."

Let me briefly remind the reader of what we are talking about.

By 1953, the war in Korea had already been going on for three years, and things for both sides - the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the interventionist forces led by the United States operating under the UN flag - were going, as they say, with varying degrees of success.

On March 19, 1953, the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "Question of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs" was adopted, the essence of which was proposals to curtail the war in Korea and resume negotiations on a truce.

The line to curtail (of course, if possible) all external conflicts, ongoing and potential, in which the Soviet Union was directly or indirectly involved, was for Beria after the death of Stalin the general one.

I think the main reasons here were the pragmatism and common sense of Beria. It was clear that the very fact of Stalin's death, albeit not radically, but reduces the current influence of the USSR in the world. The enemies of Russia after the death of Stalin could not help but grow bolder, and it was very important to concentrate on a set of primary issues, not being distracted by secondary issues or fraught with the fact that the USSR could get bogged down in them for a long time, scattering forces and weakening itself.

At the same time, no one could be allowed

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sit on our heads. Wherever it was expedient, it was necessary to give an immediate rebuff to any anti-Soviet action. Beria also understood this.

Thus, on April 16, 1953, US President Eisenhower spoke at the American Society of Newspaper Editors with accusations of the Soviet Union of aggravating the international situation and starting an arms race (whoever mooded!).

On April 17, Churchill in Glasgow fully supported Eisenhower.

In hot pursuit, on April 24, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU discussed these speeches and decided to publish a response article in Pravda and Izvestia, which was published on April 25 in both newspapers.

By the "Turkish" and "Iranian" questions, Beria meant this ...

First, with his participation, the issue of settling mutual relations with Turkey, including the issue of the regime of the straits and the renunciation of our territorial claims against Turkey, was being prepared. Secondly, at the same time, negotiations were underway with Iran on financial claims, trade and border disputes.

And here Beria was a supporter of a compromise. After the Second World War, Iran, and even more so Turkey, increasingly firmly entered the orbit of US policy. In such a situation, we would still not be able to secure the "open" Bosphorus and Dardanelles, and even aggravate the

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there was no reason for the situation on the border with Turkey.

Things were not easy for us in Iran either... The attempt of the USSR to support the Iranian Kurds, and especially those forces in Iranian Azerbaijan that could bring this Iranian province into the Azerbaijan SSR, was not crowned with success, they had to yield there.

At the same time, democratic processes were also developing in Iran. From the end of 1951, a broad movement began to nationalize the oil industry, and in 1951 a

relevant law nationalizing, among other things, the Anglo-Iranian oil company.

Under these conditions, it was reasonable to bring Iran and the USSR as close as possible, showing compliance. On the part of Russia, a great power, compliance with Iran would not have looked like weakness, so Beria thought right here too.

Let's remember: he was tough where it was required - in terms of deliveries of diesel engines from Czechoslovakia, for example. But where it was expedient for Russia to yield, Beria was ready to yield. This is exactly what a wise leader must do – there cannot be one, predetermined, line in relation to various external partners and even friends. One thing must remain unchanged — the obligatory consideration of the strategic interests of the USSR.

I cannot say with certainty, but it is possible that the arrest and murder of Beria will contribute to

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They argued that in August 1953, Iranian General Zahedi, bought by CIA agents, carried out a military coup and established a pro-American military dictatorship in Iran. One way or another, by the end of 1953, all our positions in Iran were lost.

It is interesting, again in the light of today's knowledge, to also ask the question - how would Beria behave in the Cuban problem after it arose? Would the decisions and actions of the virtual Beria be similar to the decisions and actions of the real Khrushchev?

I must confess that the answer to this question, when I asked it, was at first not very clear to me. Before that, I was inclined to assess Khrushchev's "Caribbean" actions as a whole positively, and only by virtually putting Beria in Khrushchev's place in 1962, I realized that everything far from clear.

Let me remind you that the Cuban revolution in its first phase had not a socialist, but rather an anti-Baptiste character. By the end of the 50s, the Cuban dictator Batista had bothered everyone, even his patrons in the United States. In 1956, Fidel Castro launched a liberation struggle, in 1959 he and his "bearded men" entered Havana, and soon Cuba turned to the USSR for support.

The Soviet Union almost immediately supported Castro economically, and this was wise. Military assistance with equipment and advisers was also reasonable. But the idea of deploying Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba can no longer be called reasonable.

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According to Khrushchev and Khrushchev's marshals, this would have been a response to the deployment of American nuclear medium-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) "Jupiter" in Turkey and Italy since the late 50s. In the course of Operation Anadyr, our MRBMs were delivered to Cuba, already targeting the United States.

As a result, by the autumn of 1962, a Caribbean missile crisis arose, the course of which was fraught with an exchange of nuclear strikes, and the result was the mutual withdrawal of our IRBMs from Cuba, and the American ones from Turkey.

But was there a need to take the situation to the extreme?

Now they are trying to present the matter in such a way that by 1962 the United States had 6000 nuclear charges, and the USSR - only 300. Therefore, they say, the security of the USSR was not ensured, especially after the US IRBM appeared in Turkey with a flight time to Moscow of 10 minutes. We allegedly could only respond with a strategic air strike a few hours later.

However, in reality, everything was like that, and - not at all like that ...

Of course, America acted provocatively by deploying its medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, which made them equal in strategic effect to Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). However, in reality, even then the United States would not have dared to launch a first nuclear strike against the USSR.

Firstly, at that time Soviet strategic aviation clearly had the potential to

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veto strike, and the fact that it could be delivered only a few hours after the first US strike did not fundamentally change the situation.

Secondly, in the United States only since 1963, the Minuteman-1V ICBM with high firing accuracy began to enter service, while the Jupiter IRBM did not differ in particular accuracy.

Thirdly, after the launch by the Soviet Union on October 4, 1957 of the first artificial satellite of the Earth, and even more so after the space flights of Gagarin and Titov in 1961, America knew that its territory was no longer invulnerable, that in the event of the first nuclear strike by the United States, they are guaranteed a retaliatory nuclear missile strike by the USSR.

In the USSR already in 1960-1961, directorates of divisions and brigades of the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN) were formed in different regions of the USSR and the first control and communication centers of the Strategic Missile Forces were created.

On April 9, 1961, the first test ground launch of the R-9A ICBM (8K/75, NATO code "55-8, SAPIP") developed by Korolev on oxygen + kerosene fuel took place at the Baikonur training ground. The firing range is over 10,000 km.

Since the end of the 1950s, the Dnepropetrovsk Missile Center began to develop with the Yuzhnoye design bureau of Yangel and the powerful Yuzhmash rocket plant. Yangel led the development of strategic missiles on the NDMG + AK27I fuel pair, which ensures a quick launch and long-term ICBM stay at the starting position.

The first launch of a two-stage Yangel

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The R-16 ICBM (8K 64, NATO code "55-7, 5Keap") ended in a catastrophe on October 24, 1960 - then Yangel almost died and the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, Marshal Nedelin, died. But already on February 2, 1961, the R-16 successfully launched, and in 1961-1963 the complex was put on combat duty. The firing range with a "light" warhead is 13,000 km.

Our successes in the field of creating ICBMs were powerful and visible (launches were made in the waters of the World Ocean), and Russia owed these successes not least to the efforts of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria. If Beria had survived, if he had not been killed, these successes by the beginning of the 60s could have been even more powerful, because Beria's business style always ensured quick success.

Therefore, Beria would certainly support Castro. I would support him in his energetic manner and without trifles. The situation was promising, mutually beneficial for both sides.

But Beria certainly would not have brought to an unnecessary aggravation of the situation. He was not fond of chess, but he knew how to count options and calculate the possible consequences of certain actions.

By 1962, America, although it would very much like to burn the Soviet Union in the fire of an atomic war, was already aware that this was impossible - in the USSR such retaliatory strike forces were created that would certainly hit America with a boomerang.

So it was in the real USSR Khrushchev. But those

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more so it would be in Beria's virtual USSR. After all, Khrushchev was only amateurishly fond of rockets, while Beria competently participated in the creation of the rocket industry and the development of rocket technology. Thanks also to Beria, by the beginning of the real 60s in the USSR, forces of retaliatory nuclear missile strike were created, getting America out of our national territory.

Soviet missiles in Cuba failed to enhance our security and did not raise our prestige. On the contrary, the Soviet Union had to agree to humiliating unilateral inspections of the progress of the removal of our IRBMs from Cuba. And the fact that the Americans carried out only air checks from helicopters hovering low over Soviet sea transports without stepping on their decks could not bring much consolation.

We foolishly initiated the Cuban Missile Crisis, and then, without much glory or profit, ended it.

Khrushchev conducted Soviet foreign policy mediocre, almost in a Trotskyist manner. In fact, the foreign policy of the USSR under Khrushchev did not strengthen, but weakened the USSR, forced it, with unresolved internal problems, to play the role of a great power in such regions of the world where we could not gain a firm foothold, because economically there prevailed West.

A striking example of Khrushchev's stupidity can be considered the assignment of the title of Hero of the Soviet

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Alliance to Algerian leader Ahmed bin Belle and Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser...

Yes, and the Golden Star for Fidel Castro was a political overkill. The Order of Lenin would have been more appropriate.

Brezhnev's "team" did not differ in particularly wise and rational foreign policy either.

Afghanistan became the "none" of indiscretion here for the USSR.

But Beria's foreign policy would definitely work to strengthen the power of the USSR. At the same time, a powerful, internally strong Soviet Union would ensure the sustainable development of the world socialist camp and strong anti-imperialist positions for all the freedom-loving peoples of the world.

Chapter 12

Beria for science, culture and education

The real Beria has done a lot for the development of science and education in the USSR for two decades of his major state activity.

And in order to understand what else Beria could do in this direction, it is necessary, perhaps, start a little way back.

The concept of "Russian science" arose only in the late Peter's times, but if we mean not the development of the achievements of European science by Russian people, but their own scientific research, then in the Peter's era we could only boast of geographical research within Russia, as well as in the north -west of the North American continent and in the zone of the Far East.

Already Peter's surveyors Ivan Evreinov and Fyodor Luzhin went to distant lands on the personal order of Peter and in 1721 reached the central group of the Kuril Islands to

Simushira inclusive, putting fourteen islands on the map. And in the year of Peter's death, the first scientific Russian expedition began under the leadership of Vitus Bering.

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Alas, the weak flame of scientific knowledge ignited by Petrine reforms in tsarist Russia never flared up with an even powerful flame, and bright figures like the chemists Butlerov and Mendeleev, the mathematician Lobachevsky, the physicists Stoletov and Lebedev did not attract either the tsarist dignitaries or the tsars themselves. It can be safely asserted that the support and development of domestic science was not then included not only among the most important state priorities, but generally fell out of sight of the ruling circles of imperial Russia.

The situation was drastically changed only by the Great October Socialist Revolution, but in the first years of Soviet power there was no need to talk about any serious development of science - it was not always possible to at least save what little that was already there.

However, by the end of the 1920s, the situation began to improve before our very eyes, and by the beginning of the war, the highly developed and fairly powerful Soviet science had become a fact. At the same time, the level of Soviet scientists and engineers in most areas of scientific knowledge was quite comparable with the advanced world level.

If in the sphere of directly economics we had to use foreign developments every now and then — for example, most of the Soviet industrial pioneers were built according to Western projects, then in the field of scientific work, Soviet scientists in the back ranks of the intellectuals of the world most often did not wince and sometimes took leadership positions even in

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30s. The "father of cybernetics" Norbert Wiener openly admitted that only one mathematician in the world either stepped on his heels or showed his back, and that was the Soviet mathematician Kolmogorov.

All this was formed not from scratch, but not in some miraculous way - the sphere of science in Stalin's USSR was the object of the most interested and active attention, first of all, Stalin personally, but most importantly, the whole social atmosphere in Stalin's USSR was imbued with the spirit of inquisitiveness and striving for knowledge and understanding of the surrounding world.

And this is the essence of the scientific approach to being.

"Whoever wants - he will achieve! Who seeks will always find!" - these were not only the words of a popular Soviet song, but also Stalin's principle of life in the USSR. Moreover, any true scientist could take these words as a motto.

But these same words were also the motto of Beria's whole life.

In the current Yeltsinoid "Rossiyanina", scientific knowledge is not only not supported, but actively suppressed. This can be seen even from the anti-scientific nature of the title of the collective academic monograph "Science and Scientists of Russia during the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. Essays. Memories. Documents" (M., Nauka, 1996). The compilers of this collection wrote: "The selfless work of Russian scientists during the Great Patriotic War...", etc.

Yes, not "Russian", gentlemen, scientists of the townsfolk, but SOVIET scientists ... However, the words "with

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"Vetsky", the current bastard, including the academic one, is afraid just like the obscurantist is afraid of the light of truth. So for Beria in this collection, its authors found only a few disparaging words - they say, there was such an ignoramus, not able to evaluate the results of scientific work and standing behind the scientists with a whip.

But the real Beria was always sensitive to scientific knowledge, starting from the fact that, being one of the leaders of the Georgian Cheka, he asked to be allowed to go back to study. As the publicist and historian Yuri Mukhin aptly noted: he asked "from generals to students."

Before being appointed to the Azerbaijan Cheka, Beria graduated from the Baku Polytechnic School and began to study at the Baku Polytechnic Institute, from where the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Azerbaijan "pulled" him to work as a Chekist.

Without becoming a certified engineer himself, Lavrenty Pavlovich understood perfectly well that the new Russia needed a lot of its highly qualified specialists. And as soon as, by the will of Stalin, the personnel security officer Beria was at the head of Transcaucasia and socialist Georgia, the first secretary of the Transcaucasian regional committee of the CPSU (b) and at the same time the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Georgia began to make active efforts to develop Georgian science and culture. It was under Beria that their heyday began.

In 1913, there was one university in Georgia, and by 1941 there were twenty-one. And among them: industrial, engineers of railway transport named after V.I. Lenin, agricultural

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Institute named after L.P. Beria, veterinarian, medical, dental, pharmaceutical, theatrical, artistic (Academy of Arts) - in Tbilisi; pedagogical institutes in Gori, Kutaisi, Staliniri and Sukhumi...

The list was headed by Tbilisi State University named after I.V. Stalin.

In 1938, an institute of physical culture was also opened in Tbilisi, obviously on the initiative of Beria, who always paid special attention to this side of life and was personally not alien to sports hobbies. It is indicative that of the six institutes of physical culture that existed in the USSR before the war, two were opened in Transcaucasia (except for Tbilisi, in Baku). This, after all, also manifested the style of Beria.

In 1913 there were three theaters in Georgia, by 1941 there were forty-eight. The number of students in schools more than quadrupled during the twenty Soviet years and amounted to 665.3 thousand in 1937, with a population of then Georgia of 3.5 million. Of course, this was the case throughout the USSR, but Beria's Georgia was in the lead here.

In terms of the number of students, Beria's Georgia surpassed England and Germany. And the quality of higher education in Georgia was then very good, because from the beginning of the 30s, when Beria headed the Transcaucasus and Georgia, it began to be widely practiced to send young talented Georgian boys and girls to study at the best universities in Moscow and Leningrad. In the second

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half of the 30s, they began to return to their homeland and formed an energetic backbone of scientific and creative national personnel.

It was under Beria that the foundations for the future glory of Georgian mathematics, Georgian applied science and engineering were laid. An illustrative example is the young mathematician Nestor Vekua, who just in 1937 (!) started lecturing at Tbilisi University after graduating from Moscow State University.

In fact, in the pre-war USSR, of all non-Slavic peoples, only Georgians began to play a significant role in the all-Union scientific, technical and cultural life. And this is not least (I would even say - in the first place) due to the policy of Beria personally in the field of education, science and culture. In a matter of years, from 1931 to 1938, he managed to develop the creative potential of Georgians to the maximum and make it significant on an all-Union scale.

In 1938, not only in the Caucasus, but throughout the country, the anniversary of Shota Rustaveli's poem "The Knight in the Panther's Skin" was widely celebrated. Here, too, Beria's hand was felt, as she was also felt in the fact that in Georgia in 1934 the Republican Union of Architects was created - one of the first in the USSR.

In Azerbaijan and Armenia, subordinated to Beria along the party line, such unions were also created quickly, with the same assistance of Beria, an architect and builder by his first education.

The fact that Beria was attentive to people is

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art even when he was involved in economic and defense affairs throughout the USSR, is already proved by the fact that the great film actor Nikolai Cherkasov turned to Beria with a request to assist in promoting the script about Mayakovsky. Cherkasov dreamed of playing this role, but turned to Beria with such an unusual request because, as he himself wrote, he was very impressed by the attention paid to the artist by the deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

About the Chairman of the "Atomic" Special Committee L.P. Much has already been written about Beria and his role in the Atomic Project of the USSR - both honest lines, and half-truths, and false nonsense. But it is indicative that a scientist so thorough in his assessments as Academician Yuliy Borisovich Khariton, the scientific director of the "atomic" Arzamas-16 for almost half a century, spoke of Beria as polite, well-mannered, attentive, in the end - just a normal person with whom one could calmly and in a businesslike manner discuss all pressing issues.

Khariton wrote this already in the 90s. But Academician Pyotr Leonidovich Kapitsa, a scientist with a well-deserved worldwide reputation, but in human terms, a much smaller figure compared to his purely scientific significance, wrote a letter to Stalin on a real, so to speak, time scale - November 25, 1945. And there he devoted a lot of space to Beria's assessment.

Kapitsa judged many things (not only about Beria) not as a scientist, but from the top. About Beria, he wrote that

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he, Kapitsa, "doesn't succeed" with Beria, that Beria's attitude towards scientists to him, Kapitsa, is "not to his liking", etc.

Kapitsa wrote like this:

"...Comrades Beria, Malenkov, Voznesensky behave in the Special (meaning Special. - S.K.) Committee as superhumans. In particular Comrade. Beria. True, he has a conductor's baton in his hands. This is not bad, but after him the first violin should still be played by a scientist. After all, the violin gives the tone to the whole orchestra.

Comrade Beria, the main weakness is that the conductor must not only wave his baton, but also understand the score. With this, Beria is weak.

Well, firstly, as the future showed, Beria, unlike Malenkov and Voznesensky, understood the "score" not so badly - there is a lot of not only memoirs (often unreliable), but also documentary evidence.

Secondly, there was also a sensible "first violin" among the scientists — Igor Vasilievich Kurchatov. True, unlike Kapitsa, he did not work with Rutherford, but he gave the right tone to the Soviet "atomic" "orchestra" under the baton of "conductor" Beria.

But for us now it is interesting that even Kapitsa in November 1945 wrote the following in a letter to Stalin:

"I personally think that Com. Beria would have coped with his task if he had given more effort and time. He is very energetic, perfectly and quickly orients himself, well distinguishes the secondary from the main, so he does not waste time

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Apparently, he has a taste for scientific questions, he grasps them well, precisely formulates his decisions ...

"I offered him to teach him physics, to come to my institute ..."

After all, dear reader, this is the assessment of a person personally unfriendly to Beria.

At the same time, in the same letter, Kapitsa gives us indirect, but important evidence that Beria was not vindictive, and Kapitsa knew about it. Otherwise, he would not have added the following postscript to the letter: "PPS I would like Comrade. Beria got acquainted with this letter, because this is not a denunciation, but useful criticism ... "

In December 1945, the same Kapitsa gave us one more evidence that he treated the intellect of not only Stalin, but also Beria without fools. On December 1, 1945, Kapitsa sent a letter to Beria on the organizational issues of the work of the Special Committee, where he wrote about all the existing problems without any facilitating adaptation of the text to the intellectual level of the addressee.

If this level were not high in Kapitsa's eyes, he would probably use a different dictionary.

In the last letter, Kapitsa also wrote a lot, to put it mildly, not very smart, but made a number of sensible suggestions and comments. And the activities of the Special Committee showed that Beria took everything into account.

Once I already had occasion to cite an assessment of Beria's intellect by one of the oldest physicists of the nuclear weapons center in

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"Arzamas-16" German Arsenievich Goncharov (1928-2009), Hero of Socialist Labor, laureate of the Lenin Prize. And now I'll say it again...

For more than ten years, starting from the second half of the 1990s, German Arsen'evich, together with retired colonel Pavel Petrovich Maksimenko, former head of the representative office of the USSR Ministry of Defense at the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics in Arzamas-16, was preparing for publication of a multi-volume collection of documents "Soviet Atomic Project".

The declassified documents were published in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of February 17, 1995 No. 160 "On the preparation and publication of an official collection of archival documents on the history of the creation of nuclear weapons in the USSR."

So, already at the end of his life, after studying many thousands of documents with Beria's visas, after studying the transcripts of various meetings, and so on. Goncharov came to the conclusion that Beria understood the technical issues of the atomic project at the level of a doctor of technical sciences!

That's it - no more and no less.

And now - about the style of Beria from a somewhat unusual angle. In the All-Russian Research Institute of Experimental Physics, the largest and oldest Soviet nuclear weapons center in Arzamas-16 (also known as Moscow-300, Kremlev, Sarov), throughout the Soviet years, an administrative moment in the relationship between leaders and subordinates, especially in the scientific community

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de and in the design bureau for the development of nuclear charges was almost absent.

The same can be said about the second nuclear center - "understudy" in the Urals - All-Russian Research Institute of Technical Physics ("Chelyabinsk-70", "Snezhinsk").

On the one hand, this was facilitated, of course, by mass high responsibility, but, on the other hand, the ease of the atmosphere came from "above".

Here is a real illustration...

One of the veterans of VNIIEF, the former director of Plant No. 2, Sergei Mikhailovich Babadei, once recalled how in the 60s, passing by the office of Anatoly Vasilyevich Syrunin, deputy research and design sector of the charge KB-1, he heard rhythmic claps and

female singing.

Babadei could not resist and looked out the door. There, in a circle of a dozen women from the copying office, Syrunin himself danced with a handkerchief in his hands - a man generally not easy-thinking.

It turned out that a week earlier there had been an emergency in the design bureau, the tight deadlines were being missed, and the "copying" had to work at a frantic pace, and Syrunin, urging the women on, said that they would miss the deadline. And they proposed a bet "on the American", that is, the loser fulfills any desire of the winner.

The boss lost. And his subordinates - not even scientists, not engineers, but ordinary copyists, made the boss dance.

And he did not refuse the word.

Babaday concluded his story like this: "Here

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how we used to work. It was necessary for the cause - and "Lady" could be danced.

Another "atomic" example comes from the book of the recently deceased theoretical physicist Vladislav Nikolaevich Mokhov, Lenin Prize laureate, who worked at the Sarov Nuclear Weapons Center since 1955. A non-standard person, he could express not only interesting physical, but also social ideas. Here is what he remembers about his first years of work in Sarov:

"The created... free environment of work and communication, which was quite consciously supported by the leadership of VNIIEF, was of great importance."

But where did this looseness of relations between the lower and higher in the nuclear industry come from? Is it not from the era of Beria?

"And what does Beria have to do with it?" the reader may ask.

Well, firstly, at that time the entire leadership of VNIIEF was, so to speak, originally from the "Beria era". And the order in the "parish" is determined, as you know, by the "priest".

Secondly, I will continue quoting V.N. Mokhova:

"Our team has developed an extraordinary... freedom of discussion and exchange of opinions... Apparently, L.P. Beria considered this acceptable and necessary to create a creative atmosphere. We could spend hours discussing not only scientific and technical problems, but also philosophical questions related to nuclear weapons,

including purely political aspects..."

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As you can see, a prominent Soviet weapons physicist directly points to the personality of Beria as a source of creative atmosphere in the Soviet scientific environment! It turns out that it was from Beria that a business-like, but mutually benevolent, atmosphere came in relations between efficient workers, between people of business who honestly do this common, one for all, business?

Indeed, in the navy, a young lieutenant addresses the admiral in the wardroom not by rank, but by his first name and patronymic, not because the lieutenant is cheeky, but because such an order has been established in the navy by admirals.

So Andrei Sakharov, not understanding what he himself testified, in his memoirs of the meeting with Beria poured dirt on Beria, but clearly conveyed the conversation with Beria accurately. And from it it followed that Sakharov was absolutely not internally restrained during Lavrenty Pavlovich's conversation with him, and only Beria himself could set such a course of the conversation.

What about the fact that a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Chairman of the Special Committee, Marshal of the Soviet Union found time to meet with a recent sergeant, freshman of the Physics Department of Moscow State University Oleg Lavrentiev? How can this be explained, if not by Beria's genuine, unofficial interest in the young talented scientific change?

After all, it is also a style.

The French say: "A man is a style." And Lavrenty Beria had an intellectually and humanly well-founded style. I have already

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mentioned in this book about the recently deceased rocket scientist Chertok, the author of the voluminous memoirs *People and Rockets*. In these memoirs, Chertok often bites the Soviet system and its creators, including Beria, but licks the current anti-Soviet system. But even Chertok wrote that in the first years of their work, the administration of the Central Committee through the efforts of the apparatus of the Central Committee was highly developed among the rocket scientists, and the rocket scientists envied the nuclear scientists, where Beria left the full initiative to the head of the PGU Vannikov and his deputy Zavenyagin.

That was Beria's style.

Actor Nikolai Cherkasov writes a letter to Beria asking for help in promoting a film script about Mayakovsky, whose role Cherkasov dreamed of playing. But why does the actor turn to politics? Yes, because, I remind you, that Cherkasov, in his own words, was struck by the attention and attitude of Beria towards him at a personal meeting.

Actress Yulia Solntseva, the wife of film director Dovzhenko, asked Beria in the early 1950s to support Dovzhenko, around whom an unhealthy situation. And Beria turns to Malenkov, asking for help.

All this is in the documents, but there are also similar memoirs ... So, the actress Lidia Smirnova wrote that Beria - without any amorous hints - helped her with an apartment.

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It's also style!

And what about Beria's idea of introducing republican orders for cultural figures in a number of national republics?! Beria thought about it during Stalin's lifetime. And he certainly discussed it with Stalin beforehand, otherwise he would not have expressed these thoughts aloud to others during the living Stalin, since Stalin was justly partial to this kind of amateur performance.

Then this wonderful idea with the republican orders of Shevchenko, Lesia Ukrainka, Nizami, Rustaveli, Navoi, etc. Lavrenty Pavlovich will be blamed at the Anti-Beriev July Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU after his arrest. Like, he tried to win cheap popularity. But the idea was sensible, promising - exactly what is in the style of Beria!

They say that Beria loved music and literature, he himself was no stranger to art, he painted watercolors. It may very well be that he had the education of an architect, and an architect must be able to draw and feel volume. But what there is no doubt is that Beria was a thinking, creative, searching nature, which is the essence of the scientific and artistic approach to life.

If such a leader would lead the country, it would be a country invincible by anyone and never.

Khrushchev understood the art, how - you can't say it more precisely here, like a pig in oranges. He had no need for artistic impressions, he was anti-intellectual.

Khrushchev's potential as a major political figure

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the worker (which is already there, he had it at one time) was completely exhausted just in time for the beginning of 1953. Stalin understood all this better, those around him, and Khrushchev himself, for sure. That is why he went into all serious trouble, that is why he became one of the accomplices in the murder of Stalin, because he understood that he had ended as a politician and from now on he can be at the pinnacles of power in the USSR, only intriguing and politicking.

He began to intrigue - in his selfish salvation.

Was he before science, before culture? At one time existing as a member of the Stalinist Bolshevik "team", Khrushchev, from the mid-50s, increasingly turned into a tradesman in the nobility.

Brezhnev in this sense did not go far from Khrushchev - he was also a stranger to high movements of the soul and was never a romantic - unlike Beria - was not. Therefore, Brezhnev and culture existed in parallel, non-intersecting planes.

They say that Brezhnev, even as General Secretary, could enthusiastically "hammer the goat" in dominoes.

I can't imagine Beria in such a situation, even on vacation. As, however, and Stalin. |

Brezhnev understood, of course, that a great power is impossible without science and culture. Well, well, he didn't interfere - develop and develop. However, Brezhnev, unlike Beria, did not have a genuine taste for the new, for

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advanced frontiers of knowledge capable of strengthening the power of the country and moving people forward and upward.

This is one of the reasons why, due to Khrushchev's human mediocrity and Brezhnev's political dullness, the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin and Beria began to develop as it had developed — more and more at random, more and more sideways and down.

Under Beria, everything would have been, perhaps, different - bright, creative, irrepressible, intelligent and humane ...

Chapter 13 Beria is a citizen of the world of socialism

The manager of the affairs of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Pomaznev, in a slanderous memorandum addressed to Malenkov and Khrushchev, filed by them after the arrest of Beria, also mentions a certain conflict system.

tuition around the question of the operation of the building of Moscow State University. They say that Beria then, emphasizing that the issue is not small, said that "this building is equal to the capital of Dupont and other American billionaires."

In this casually dropped phrase of Beria, one can clearly see the feeling that Mayakovsky well expressed:

The Soviets have their own pride

We look down on the bourgeois ...

Yes, Beria was a naturally Soviet person, because nowhere, except for the great country of socialism, where the cost of a single high-rise building was equal to the fortunes of billions of arders, Beria could not have been realized as a personality so fully.

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The great theater director and innovator Stanislavsky urged his brothers in the creative workshop to love the theater in themselves, and not themselves in the theater. The first, even in the theater, does not always happen, and even outside the theater, and even in the sphere of power ...

Beria sincerely, of course, because of his personal qualities, did not love himself in the USSR, but the USSR in himself.

After all, he was a really great manager, and a great manager, among other things, is interested in the very process of managing people and creating new social values. Where, if not in the USSR, were there endless possibilities for this?

Where, if not in the USSR, was there more scope for a great manager who also possesses political power?

After all, the USSR was, in a sense, the largest supercorporation in the world with huge material, raw material and human resources! And Beria was not only the authorized manager of this supercorporation, but also its owner to the extent that he honestly fulfilled the duties of a manager entrusted to him by society.

But more than that! The stable and effective development of the supercorporation "USSR & K°" ensured the spread of the influence of this supercorporation to a huge part of the world - the world socialist camp, as well as to other countries wishing to free themselves from imperialism.

static pressure...

In the event that the assets of the supercorporation

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As the "USSR & K°" units grew and grew, the sphere of its activity could spread to the whole world in general!

What exciting, unprecedented, brilliant and enticing prospects these were for Beria, the supermanager of the world's greatest supercorporation!

And for this reason, Beria could not but strive for the greatness and power not only of his Motherland - Russia, the Soviet Union, but also for the all-round strengthening and development of socialism on a global scale.

In this sense, one can speak of Beria as an unfulfilled great manager of the world socialist camp, as an unfulfilled citizen of the world of socialism ...

The concept of "citizen of the world" is usually understood as equivalent to the word - "cosmopolitan" (in fact, the Greek *Koztoroiez* is translated as "citizen of the world"). Cosmopolitans have not been favored in Russia for a long time, since tsarist times. However, the word "cosmopolitan" acquired a particularly negative meaning in Russia in the 1940s, when the struggle against "rootless cosmopolitanism" began in the USSR. In my previous books I dealt with this problem and now I will simply say that this struggle was necessary and timely. One can only regret that everything in the USSR then came down to a campaign, without becoming a feature of the life of Soviet post-Stalin society.

However, regardless of the Soviet campaign, the concept of "cosmopolitan" in self-respecting countries of the world is also never given special respect.

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did not use. After all, the main part of any nation loves its Motherland, and those who are indifferent to it and its fate, the people cannot but look with condemnation.

Therefore, for example, in the "Encyclopedic Dictionary", published by the publishing house "Big Soviet Encyclopedia" in 1954, cosmopolitanism was rightly defined as "reactionary preaching of the rejection of patriotic traditions, national independence and national culture".

It was also said there that "in modern conditions, aggressive American imperialism is trying to use the false ideology of China for the moral disarmament of the peoples and the establishment of its world domination", and also that "K. is the reverse side and masking of aggressive bourgeois nationalism.

The Soviet "Dictionary of Foreign Words" of the same times defined a cosmopolitan as a person deprived of a sense of patriotism, cut off from the interests of his homeland and alien to his people.

Well, everything is defined very precisely and essentially...

Finally, "Dictionary of the Russian language" S.I. Ozhegov's edition of 1975 gives the following interpretation of the word "cosmopolitanism": "A reactionary bourgeois ideological trend, which, under the guise of the slogans of a world state and world citizenship, rejects the right of nations to an independent existence and state independence, national traditions and national culture, patriotism.

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Beria was in relation to cosmopolitanism, of course, the antipode. He was an unconditional Soviet patriot, putting the interests of the Soviet Union first in any matter. But to feel like a "citizen of the world" and a "citizen of the world of socialism" - these were two very different and even antagonistic things.

Here are some quotes...

1) "The bourgeoisie, by exploiting the world market, has made the production and consumption of all countries cosmopolitan. To the great chagrin of the revolutionaries, it tore the national soil from under the feet of industry..."

2) "Communists differ from all other proletarian parties only in that, on the one hand, in the struggle of the proletarians of various nations they single out and defend the common interests of the entire proletariat, independent of nationality."

3) "...Communists are reproached for wanting to abolish fatherland, nationality. The workers have no fatherland. They can't take what they don't have..."

And finally:

4) "The proletarians have nothing ... to lose but their chains. They will gain the whole world."

This, of course, is the "Manifesto of the Communist Party" of Marx and Engels. Is it necessary to explain much about what is said above about the rejection of nationalism on the principles not of cosmopolitanism, but of proletarian internationalism?

Cosmopolitanism is a kind of nationalism in disguise of a parasitic world elites.

Internationalism is the overcoming of

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nationalism in the name of the worldwide brotherhood of the working people of all countries. Marx and Engels wrote:

"National isolation and oppositions of peoples disappear more and more with the development of the bourgeoisie ... the world market ...

The rule of the proletariat will hasten their disappearance even more... To the extent that the exploitation of one individual by another is destroyed, the exploitation of one nation will also be destroyed.

another. Together with the antagonism of classes within nations, the hostile relations of nations among themselves will also fall.

Until 1945, the entire world of socialism at the state level was limited to Russia and the underdeveloped Mongolia. By the summer of 1953, in addition to the USSR, China, Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, North Korea, North Vietnam entered the orbits of socialism.

And - after all - Yugoslavia.

As already mentioned, Beria was an undoubted patriot of the Soviet Union. At the same time, I doubt that Beria was a staunch internationalist in the early Marxist sense.

of this concept.

The life of the world in the 20th century did not go exactly according to Marx - the world revolution did not work out. This is not the place to explain why this happened (besides, I will return to this subtle point in the afterword to the book). For now, I will simply note that after the victory of October in Russia and the formation of the USSR, two main approaches arose in the world left movement.

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Trotskyism considered the USSR as the base of the world revolution and believed that Russia should live in the name of this goal, neglecting national goals for this. Trotskyism believed that, if necessary, Soviet Russia was obliged to risk itself in order to ignite the "global fire" of the war of labor against capital.

Stalinism considered the world communist movement as a factor for strengthening the USSR and believed that Soviet Russia would fulfill its international tasks in the best possible way when it built a powerful and prosperous socialist society on one sixth of the planet, which by the very fact of its existence will advance the world towards world socialism.

Stalin was a Bolshevik, Trotsky was in fact an anti-Bolshevik, although from the summer of 1917 he was a member of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party. It is not for nothing that Lenin, in his political testament, "Letter to the Congress," directly referred to "Trotsky's non-Bolshevism."

Beria was, of course, a Bolshevik, that is, a Stalinist. But Stalin did not reject internationalism! At the same time, he always soberly assessed the situation and set the USSR the task of becoming the base of the international struggle for world socialism when this task arose before the peoples of the USSR and the CPSU as a practical one - after the formation of a real socialist camp as a result of World War II.

This approach of Stalin can be clearly seen in his activities of the last years of his life, and the names

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but it was clearly stated by Stalin in his final speech at the closing of the 19th Congress of the CPSU.

Khrushchev started out as a Trotskyist. It turned out so rather not from ideological considerations, with which Nikita had a hard time, but from career considerations, but ... Trotskyism is like cat urine, once it has been touched, it is very difficult to wash off.

Once in power in the USSR after the death of Stalin, Khrushchev behaved like a Trotskyist. His policy towards the friendly countries of people's democracy, towards the countries of the "third world" in Asia, Africa and Latin America was, in fact, an attempt either to dictate or to export the revolution, and without any hope of lasting success. At the same time, Khrushchev's Soviet Union very often helped various countries in the outside world not on mutually beneficial terms, but in order to make these countries unreliably and hypocritically "love" the USSR and its leader.

Such a policy weakened the USSR, but did not strengthen world socialism and did not expand it geographically.

By the time of Stalin's death, the post-war restoration of the national economy of the USSR was completed, and a rapid all-round growth of the economy, science, culture, and social sphere began. Now the USSR could really claim the role of the leader of all healthy countries and forces in the world. Stalin thought so. But his foreign policy was not and in no case would become a policy of appeasement and handouts.

Stalin died, but the smart policy of the USSR in

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Even after Stalin, the 1950s could have greatly expanded the boundaries of world socialism. At that time, a number of Asian countries, including India and Indonesia, looked in this direction, as well as Latin America, and France and Italy...

However, Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites blew the chance for socialism here too. They tried to cajole, not to captivate.

On the other hand, Khrushchev was carried away by projects on the "liberated" Black Continent, which was "liberated" from colonial oppression, not least because the colonial powers themselves decided to replace political colonialism in Africa with economic neo colonialism.

And it wasn't just in Africa.

Beria, no doubt, would have approached the problem of the development of world socialism in the same way as he approached any problem in general. He would not break into smiles, like Khrushchev (Beria knew how to smile authoritatively, sovereignly), but he would not behave like a reckless merchant either. He would not have knocked his shoes on the podium at the UN. I would just get up and go out - plant, they say, a farce without me.

In the same businesslike way, he would conduct business with the countries of socialism or countries moving towards socialism.

If you want to cooperate, we are ready.

Help you? We are also ready, but you also have something to help us. Moreover, you must understand that it is beneficial for us that you become stronger and richer. Because we are all

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members of one large planetary family — the world of socialism.

And if you want to wipe your asses in the front of the West - we do not interfere.

In a letter to Malenkov "from the bunker" dated July 2, 1953, Beria also wrote that "the work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs could be adjusted within a year both within the country and in foreign countries and provide qualified advice to the security agencies of the countries of people's democracy" .

One phrase, but very capacious. Thus, it follows from it that Beria naturally considered the problems of the USSR and the problems of the countries of people's democracy as interrelated and, moreover, as a single complex, which must be solved comprehensively and in interconnection.

But at the same time, Beria did not believe that the USSR should play a commanding role - the words "qualified council" speak for themselves. The advice can be stupid. And then the best intentions will turn, like Khrushchev's, into their opposite. On the other hand, qualified advice is neglected only by presumptuous fools.

In a strong, healthy family, the advice of a more experienced person and the help of a stronger person are not perceived as a boon by anyone - neither by those who advise and help, nor by those who are helped and advised. But advice is given when it is appropriate and needed, and help is always mutual in nature.

Strong, but mutual!

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I am sure that Beria's world socialism would have been built in this way.

This would be all the more possible since Beria was a Caucasian, namely, a developed Caucasian is able to become a true internationalist, while remaining a patriot of his nation. Moreover, a Caucasian who does not profess internationalism, at the same time realizing the leading role of the Russian people, cannot be considered a truly intellectually and morally developed person.

A vivid example of such social ugliness is the "Georgian" Saakashvili and everyone like him.

Beria, brought up in the Caucasus, in an environment daily educated by a good dozen people, was brought up benignly.

He was able to see the meaning of each national "tree", and behind these "trees" there is a "mixed" multinational "forest".

Chapter 14

L.P.'s unspoken speech Beria at the XX Congress of the CPSU

At the beginning of the book, I cited excerpts from the false "phantasmagoria" of Leonid Mlechin, who described such a virtual 20th Congress of the CPSU, at which Beria, not Khrushchev, spoke with the final word.

In Mlechin's insinuations, the Soviet Union under Beria's hand would by 1956 be one total Gulag. Well, I hope that the book almost read by the reader proves otherwise.

But what could the 20th Congress of the CPSU have been like if Comrade L.P. Beria? And what could Beria say from the podium of the party congress in the virtual year 1956?

Before thinking about this, let me make one preliminary remark. In Mlechin's "phantasmagoria" there is a certain demonstrative and fundamental inaccuracy. According to Mlechin, Beria spoke at the virtual 20th Congress not only with the closing speech, but also with the Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU. However, Beria, promoted by Mlechin to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, would not have done at the congress

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a report on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPSU, as Mlechin said.

Leonid Mlechin's mistake is tantamount to self-disclosure for him!

On the one hand, he wanted to show that under the virtual Beria, as well as under the real Khrushchev, the party would have played the leading role in the political power system of the USSR. Like, one "partocrat" was worth another.

On the other hand, Mlechin knew - after all - a lot about the real Beria. And therefore, he could not help but know that Beria gave priority to the Soviet power, that is, to the Council of Ministers of the USSR as the highest executive body of this power. Accordingly, Mlechin made Beria not the General Secretary of the Central Committee, but the Presovmina of the USSR, but at the same time, without hesitation, he handed the report of the Central Committee to his virtual Beria.

This is how all the falsifiers of history do not make ends meet.

As for Sergei Kremlev, I have no doubt that with a reasonable development of events, that is, with the state approach of the Stalinist "team" without Stalin, Beria at the next session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR sometime in the autumn of 1953 or in the spring of 1954 could to be elected Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR instead of Malenkov. And then I would speak at the 20th Congress as the Predsovmin.

At the same time, his report, not bearing the character of a report of the Central Committee of the party, could, nevertheless, be the main one as the report of the communist Beria not only to the party, but to the whole

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country about what was done by the Soviet government and what plans it has for the country on throws.

Precisely the Soviet government, and not the Central Committee of the CPSU.

The former chairman of the Council of Ministers, Malenkov, could take the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, providing this post not only formally, but also in fact, with the highest priority in the state.

Such a distribution of duties in the "tandem" "Beria - Malenkov" would be optimal for them, and for the country, and for the emerging world socialist system.

I think that Nikita Khrushchev would no longer be sitting in the Presidium of the Beria Twentieth Congress. He, most likely, would have been a pensioner of national significance. In 1954, he turned 60 years old, and he could well have retired. And, perhaps, he would still have labored in the Central Committee of the CPSU as one of the secretaries, but by the time of the Twentieth Congress, the CPSU itself would have a different meaning than before, with Beria alive.

Not in the Central Committee on Staraya Square, but in the Kremlin, in the Council of Ministers of the USSR and in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, promising and current issues of state and public

the life of the country.

The Central Committee would deal with questions of ideology, agitation and propaganda, political and moral education of the masses. And the tone in CE would no longer be set by figures like Khrushchev, but by scientists, philosophers, social scientists ...

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The question of the priorities of local authorities would be difficult. If in the republics the republican councils of ministers could naturally play the "first violin", then in the regions it would be more difficult to transfer power from the regional party committees to the regional executive committees. But here, too, the transition period could have passed successfully if strong first secretaries of the regional committees had passed to the leadership of the regional Soviets of working people's deputies.

Previously, the following practice was widespread... Economic and other leaders were appointed and removed in fact by party bodies. Exclusion from the party practically meant the beginning and dismissal from work, but an appointment other than the party committee could not take place.

Under the new conditions, it would be more reasonable if party committees — regional committees, district committees, city committees, while retaining the functions of selecting and controlling personnel, would only have the right to raise the question of removing unworthy leaders, regardless of whether they were party members or non-party members, and if not the consent of Soviet or economic structures to submit the issue for discussion by labor collectives with the obligatory procedure of closed voting of full-fledged members of the collective on the discussed leader.

By 1956, the restructuring of power would hardly have been completed, but it would have been successfully moving forward - it would not have happened otherwise for Beria.

So what could Beria say to such a congress and such a country in the final speech, which the congress could well give him?

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Perhaps this is:

— Comrades!

First of all, I would like to congratulate all of us on this congress. It was a congress of renewal and striving forward...

The times when the country was under the heavy impression of the death of our great leader, Comrade Stalin, are a thing of the past. We preserved the unity of our ranks and purged them of those nobles whom Comrade Stalin so hated.

Comrade Stalin died on the eve of the decisive changes conceived by the Party in Soviet society, but we Soviet Communists, faithful to the precepts of our leader, brought about these changes.

First of all, we strengthened the authority of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Soviet government. Our Communist Party was, remains and will be the leading and guiding force of Soviet society, but in the new conditions the very meaning of party leadership is changing. And we realized it in time and took it into account. Now the party should be, first of all, a moral guide in the life of society. Not every leader is required to be a communist, but every communist is required to be the political and moral leader of the non-Party.

In the first years of Soviet power, during the years of the socialist reconstruction of Russia, the activities and leadership of the party permeated all aspects of life in the country, and this was understandable -

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it was the communists and party organs that were the bearers and spokesmen of the new, it was precisely in the party organs that the most politically mature and most devoted to socialism forces were concentrated.

Now, thanks to the tireless work of our Communist Party in the education and political development of the Soviet people, we already have millions of politically mature and devoted to socialism, educated by socialism, Soviet citizens.

In our ministries and departments, in the management of factories, factories, mines, state farms and collective farms, in scientific institutes and design bureaus, there are also concentrated such cadres of which the Party can be proud, as a mother is proud of worthy educated and raised children. NEWS.

Now the Party can place in their reliable hands the task of solving specific pressing issues in the life of the Soviet Union and reserve the most important task of educating the masses and leading cadres in the spirit of devotion to their Motherland and the cause of the communist system.
evidence.

The party is deliberately shifting the center of social control more and more to Soviet and economic bodies, because special questions must be decided by specialists. Another thing is that these specialists should be educated in the spirit of conscious devotion to the ideals of socialism and the interests of the state and Soviet society.

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Now the question of personnel is especially important. If earlier we treated certain shortcomings of the leading members of the party more condescendingly, believing that who, they say, is not without sin, but works with diligence, today we must be absolutely intolerant of manifestations not only moral decay and noble rebirth, but also to manifestations of moral and ideological instability.

We can put up - up to a certain point - with individual shortcomings of a non-Party economic leader and try to correct him, but from each and above all from the leading member of the Party we must demand absolute ideological and moral purity. This is easier said than done, but that is what we must strive for.

I must remind you, comrades, that our new Rules, adopted under Comrade Stalin and drawn up under his direct leadership, say that Party members not only have the right, but are also obliged to develop criticism and self-criticism in every possible way.

Criticism and self-criticism is a powerful force capable of working miracles if it is skillfully used, if it is applied honestly, openly, in the Bolshevik way.

Criticism and self-criticism are effective when they are based on public interests, the interests of the state, when personal considerations, personal motives are thrown away, when people who are strong in their rightness, their conviction, openly and mercilessly, really do not

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looking at faces, they reveal and expose everything that hinders our victorious advance.

During the few years that we have lived without Comrade Stalin, the Soviet government has been able to firmly advance the country along the path of democratization of society and the improvement of the material situation of the peoples of the USSR. New grandiose construction projects are being successfully completed and started, for

For three years, the agriculture of the European part of the USSR, once destroyed by the war, was transformed in the Russian Non-Chernozem and Chernozem regions, in Ukraine and Belarus. |

The Soviet economy is getting stronger—we have received, or will soon receive, tens and hundreds of powerful new enterprises in all branches of the national economy.

Life is changing before our eyes, over the years new quarters of cities and new cities have grown, science and culture are successfully developing.

It is already clear today that the Directives of the Stalinist 19th Congress of the CPSU will be fulfilled by us, and in some ways, it must be assumed, even exceeded.

During the time that has elapsed between the two congresses, another major positive change has taken place in our lives, which significantly affects the balance of power in the world. The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union received powerful new thermonuclear and missile means of protecting the peaceful labor and recreation of Soviet people. Today we can clearly state that the peaceful future of the Soviet people and all peace-loving

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the peoples of the world are securely protected from encroachments on them by imperialist warmongers.

Comrades!

Today, the words of Comrade Stalin, spoken by him at the closing of the 19th Congress of the CPSU, are becoming more and more relevant and close to us.

Comrade Stalin said then:

“After the seizure of power by our party in 1917 and after the party took real measures to eliminate capitalist and landowner oppression, representatives of the fraternal parties, admiring the success and courage of our party, awarded it the title of “Shock Brigade” of the world revolutionary and labor movement...

Of course, it was very difficult to fulfill this honorable role while the "Shock Brigade" was the only one and so far it had to fulfill this advanced role almost alone. But it was. Now it's a completely different matter. Now that from China and Korea to Czechoslovakia and Hungary new "shock brigades" have appeared in the person of the people's democratic countries, now it has become easier for our party to fight, and the work has gone more cheerfully.

Dear comrades!

We all know that now our work to fulfill the behests of comrades Lenin and Stalin is going even more cheerfully. The camp of world socialism has grown stronger over the years and has good prospects for further peaceful expansion.

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because today all the freedom-loving peoples of the world are looking at us with hope and interest.

Here, in this hall, as four years ago, there are dozens of delegations of fraternal parties, among which there are many not just party leaders, but party and statesmen of their countries. The world of socialism today is a joyful reality, and our foreign comrades were not only dear guests of our congress, but they were full participants in it.

Today humanity is more and more aligned with Moscow.

I will again turn to the words of Comrade Stalin, which he said at the close of the previous Congress of our Party. Today they sound like a testament of our leader to us and future generations of all peoples of the world:

“Earlier, the bourgeoisie allowed itself to be liberal, defended bourgeois-democratic freedoms and thus created popularity among the people. Now there is no trace left of liberalism. There is no longer the so-called freedom of the individual - individual rights are now recognized only for those who have capital, and all other citizens are considered raw human material, suitable only for exploitation. The principle of equal rights of people and nations has been trampled underfoot, it has been replaced by the principle of full rights for the exploiting minority and lack of rights for the exploited majority of citizens.

The banner of bourgeois-democratic freedoms has been thrown overboard. I think that this banner will have to be raised by you, the representatives of the commun

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political and democratic parties, and carry it forward if you want to gather the majority of the people around you. There is no one else to pick it up...

The banner of national independence and national sovereignty has been thrown overboard. There is no doubt that you, the representatives of the communist and democratic parties, will have to raise this banner and carry it forward if you want to be patriots of your country, if you want to become the leading force of the nation. There is no one else to pick it up...”

This is what Comrade Stalin said, this is how the Communists of the world and their “Shock Brigade”—the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—should and do act!

This is how the entire great Soviet people operates, led by the advanced “Shock Brigade” of the world revolutionary and workers’ movement...

Comrades!

The 20th Congress of the CPSU is the first Party Congress that we held without our brilliant comrade and leader, our Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin. And so let me close our Twentieth Congress with the same words that Comrade Stalin ended the previous Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union:

“Long live our fraternal parties!

May the leaders of the fraternal parties live and prosper!

Long live peace among nations!

Down with the warmongers!”

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This is the kind of speech that Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria might have delivered at the 20th Congress if he had not been killed.

And then the audience would stand up and sing the party anthem - “Internationale”.

And in the huge Kremlin hall in different languages it would sound:

Only we, the workers of the world, the Great Army of Labor,

We have the right to own the Earth,

But parasites - never!

RB to chapter 14. I know that for many, such a picture looks impossible - even in virtual "reality". And it looks impossible for many because the lie for that era continues to be total in some very influential circles.

And very many brains are still polluted by this lie.

Accidental switching of the remote control... On a TV channel with the obligatory name "Culture" there is a program about the writer Zoshchenko – varnishing in relation to Zoshchenko, malicious and deceitful in relation to Stalin, Zhdanov and the Soviet government in general. At the same time, the same malicious lie of Zoshchenko is cited that Zinaida Reich, the girlfriend of the director Meyerhold (and not only Meyerhold), who was repressed in 1937, was allegedly gouged out eyes.

How long will you lie, "gentlemen", "masters of culture"?

But are they the only ones lying? Stalin, Beria are slandered even by intellectuals rotting

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their former comrades-in-arms, for example, Dmitry Shepilov (1905-1995), who rose up under Khrushchev and was overthrown by Khrushchev. However, it is possible that Shepilov is misrepresented by those who prepared his posthumous "memoirs," I don't know. But in any case, lying about the era and its creators is criminal.

After all, Stalin's assessments by Shepilov in an interview taken from him in 1989 by journalist Nikolai Barsukov and published in a book about Shepilov, published in 1998, are a clear lie.

Like, "the meetings of the Politburo under Stalin allegedly took place without discussing candidates, questions, problems," and everything was allegedly "decided by him and supported unconditionally by everyone."

Shepilov had indeed been acquainted with Stalin since 1935, but he never entered the circle of Stalin's closest collaborators; under Stalin he was not even a candidate member of the Politburo. He first appeared in Stalin's Kremlin office in 1947 and then went there no more than a dozen times until Stalin's death. Of course, Stalin saw Shepilov not only in his office, but there can be no question that Shepilov was included in Stalin's circle of regular contacts.

As for Shepilov's stay directly in Stalin's office, the chronology here is this:

1947: December 19

1948: March 31, April 17 and 19, May 11 and 28.

1950: April 24 and May 30

1952: 20 October.

And that's it!

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How and from where could Shepilov know about the technology of Stalin's daily many hours of discussion of state issues, to whom either Shepilov himself or Barsukov, Candidate of Historical (!) Sciences, attribute "the eyes of a cobra ... unblinking, piercing"?

Why cobras and not eagles, for example? His eyes are also unblinking and sharp.

But they lie about Shepilov himself...

In June 1957, he found himself "joining" the supposedly "anti-Party group" of Molotov-Malenkov-Kaganovich and lost his posts at the June Plenum of the Central Committee.

And in 1989, the journalist and candidate of science Barsukov had the following dialogue with him:

"B.: Is it true that after the plenum you walked along the Arbat, abandoned by everyone, as someone wrote in his memoirs?

Sh.: I didn't live on the Arbat, but on Leninsky Prospekt, and I went there by car..."

Eck, how all sorts of "children of the Arbat" want to drag our entire history to this ascending Arbat!

But the same Shepilov sometimes breaks through the truth when he testifies that Khrushchev at the end of the June plenum threw to his "comrades-in-arms" in their hearts: "What are you all about Stalin and about Stalin! Yes

all of us together do not stand the Stalinist city ... "

Well, Khrushchev knew better, as they say.

But today, knowing everything we know about Khrushchev, knowing about "his" deceitful anti-Stalinist report that was destructive to socialism after the end of the real 20th Congress, we can say that someone, but Nikita Khrushchev, was not worth only Stalinist, but also Beria Mr. ... on.

Chapter 15 Why was Beria killed?

There has long been talk about the double murder committed by Khrushchev, the murder of Stalin and Beria. However, legally certain is the murder of only Beria. He was first forcibly deprived of his freedom, and then - also forcibly - of his life. This was recognized in the USSR officially and in real time.

In other words, no one has ever questioned the fact of the murder (execution, execution) of Beria, but this, with a clear mind and a firm memory, is impossible.

With the assassination of Stalin, things are more complicated. Despite the fact that there is evidence of Khrushchev's direct admission of involvement in the murder of Stalin, made by Khrushchev on July 19, 1963 at a rally in honor of the Hungarian party and government delegation, despite a number of works confirming the murder of Stalin, according to Today there are publications where the fact of Stalin's assassination is called into question. It all comes down to "natural death".

Khrushchev's speech was broadcast on July 19, 1963 on All-Union Radio and Intervision. Ivan Chigirin, author of the book I value

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dirty and dirty stains of history", found a recording of the speech (archive No. 2465) in the Russian State Archive of Phonological Documents and compared it with the text published the next day in the Pravda newspaper. The most important work was done by Chigirin, and at the same time he revealed (as the "chronicler of the Central Committee" Zenkovich wrote about) that Khrushchev, in a speech abounding in anti-Stalinist attacks, said something that was omitted in a newspaper publication, namely : "In the history of mankind there were many cruel tyrants, but they all died (pause) just as from an ax, as they themselves supported their power with an ax."

Well, Khrushchev really blurted out something in a hurry that it would be better to keep it under your teeth.

Ivan Ivanovich Chigirin also pointed out other differences and concluded that the comparison of audio and newspaper material confirms that Khrushchev publicly announced the premeditated murder of Stalin on the air.

Yes, that's how it was.

Therefore, the question is quite appropriate: "Why was Stalin killed?"

A systematically correct answer to this question has been given more than once in recent years, including Ivan Chigirin, Yuri Mukhin, Sergei Kremlev... Stalin was killed precisely because his later life meant both the historical death of world capitalism and the political the death of various historical riffraff like Nikita Khrushchev.

At the same time, the false accusations of Beria in the org

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The rationalizations for the assassination of Stalin are falling apart more and more and no longer have the ubiquitous circulation as they once did. There are enough television kitsch fakes on this subject, but even semi-official "historians" do not support the version of Beria's involvement in the murder of Stalin. Beria did not kill Stalin. Beria himself was killed shortly after Stalin.

But why was Beria killed?

Well, the short answer to this question will be the same as to the question about the reason for the assassination of Stalin. After the elimination of Stalin, the enemies of Russia and socialism had to eliminate Beria as well, because Beria was not the only honest communist in the top Soviet leadership, but the only one who could frustrate the plans of external and internal enemies of Russia for the gradual dismantling of socialism in USSR.

Take Stalin...

It was indeed a synthetic genius of an encyclopedic nature. Not without reason in his library there were more than two tens of thousands of volumes, and he constantly turned to them, reading up to 300 ... 400 pages a day. (Let someone try to read at least a hundred or two pages in a day - at least a day off).

I will also note in brackets that Khrushchev, for example, hardly read Stalin's daily volume of book text in a year. Not to mention the fact that "politicians" like Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Medvedev, Putin, etc. hardly at all what they read, but at least they are aware of the fact that

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that a politician is obliged to constantly educate himself and develop himself by daily reading literature on a wide range of knowledge.

Stalin studied all his life - until his death.

But Beria also studied all his life - both from books and from his entourage.

Stalin was a genius.

Beria is damn talented.

But Stalin was strong as a politician and head of state, first of all, not because of his undoubted genius, and he achieved outstanding success thanks, first of all, not to his genius, but because he always relied on people, on the "team" in everything. , per team.

Stalin did not always immediately find those comrades-in-arms and collaborators on whom he could rely. Stalin was mistaken in people more than once, during his entire political life he was betrayed or let down more than once. The biggest example here is Khrushchev.

But, in the end, Stalin was always strong by those who surrounded him.

And only about Beria from all the top Soviet leadership could the same be said to the same extent as it was true of Stalin!

Beria here was, perhaps, even stronger than Stalin.

In fact, the ability to find people, select a "team" and work with it is, although not sufficient, but an absolutely necessary feature of any competent leader. In the strength of a well-chosen "team" was the strength and Alec

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sandra of Macedon, and the French kings Louis XI and Henry TU, and our Peter, and Napoleon, and Suvorov ...

And, of course, Lenin and Stalin.

They say that the environment plays the king. But the environment "plays" only a weak king, and a strong king gathers around him such an environment that multiplies the strength of a strong king tenfold, while remaining a "team" led by the leader.

Stalin, as the leader of the masses, had such an inner circle, each of whose members also knew how to rely on people, and so, in concentric circles, Stalin's competence reached the life of the broadest masses - like circles on water reach from the middle of a river to the banks .

But of all Stalin's comrades-in-arms, it was Beria who possessed the best ability to create his "teams". He surprisingly effectively organized all his "teams": the KGB in the GruzChK and then in the NKVD of the USSR; "Georgian", when he headed the Transcaucasus and Georgia; "industrial" before the war and during the war; "atomic" and "rocket" after the war.

That is why it was Beria who could become - after Stalin - the new center of crystallization of all healthy, creative tendencies in the life of Soviet society.

That's why they killed him.

"And if they hadn't been killed, what would have happened?" — Let's ask ourselves again.

At the Anti-Beria Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in early July 1953, the then Minister of Metal

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the lurgical industry and at the same time Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Ivan Tevosyan (1902-1958), who knew Beria from his revolutionary work in Baku, spoke about him:

"His goal was to become a dictator surrounded by obedient executors, and the political program, as shown by his actions, especially in recent months, was to renounce the gains of the October Socialist Revolution ...

His program was the creation of such a state bourgeois system that would be pleasing to the Eisenhowers, Churchills and Tito ... "

'Tevosyan, of course, was prevaricating, like everyone else at that plenum. But let us look at his statement with today's eyes, wiser with the knowledge of subsequent events.

Today, within the Russian geopolitical space, coinciding with the borders of the USSR in 1985, a system of puppet and semi-puppet bourgeois states has been created, the system in which would delight all the outstanding anti-Sovietists of the past, starting with Churchill...

But something "agent of world imperialism" Beria is not revered in these states.

Gorbachev is respected, Yeltsin is even more so...

Putin is generally considered to be a great reformer.

Sometimes they don't consider Khrushchev to say a kind word for work, and even about Brezhnev.

But Beria...

Beria, as he became after 1953, under the "damned" Soviet "totalitarianism", a "monster" and

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"sadist", and in the days of "holy" bourgeois "freedom" remained a "sadist" and a "monster".

What is it?

No, it is unlikely that if Beria had remained alive and in power, he would have implemented a program to create a state bourgeois system that "would have been pleasing to the Eisenhowers and Churchills" ...

This program was implemented after 1991 by others for whom Beria, Stalin, socialism and Soviet power were mortal enemies.

By the way, about Tevosyan ... A talented metallurgical engineer, who received flattering offers from Krupp himself during his internship in Germany in the 30s, he, according to the testimony of the former secretary of the Central Committee and candidate member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU Dmitry Shepilov, was dismissed by Khrushchev in 1956 from the post of Deputy Prime Minister of the USSR in no time. And why? Yes, because the metallurgist Tevosyan dared to argue with the "subverter" of the "personality cult" Khrushchev on a special issue. Khrushchev was indignant: "Why are you arguing with me?" Tevosyan snapped: "I'm a metallurgist and I know this question, but you're talking nonsense."

Two days later, Tevosyan was removed and sent as an ambassador to Japan, which was completely unknown to him, which in itself speaks of the level of Khrushchev's "state mind". Instead of having a prominent professional and connoisseur of the East as an ambassador in Japan, the most important country for Soviet Far Eastern (and not only Far Eastern) policy, Khrushchev made this appointment something like a link for the "disgraced"

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obstinate Tevosyan. Long after that, Tevosyan did not live long in the world - people of business do not live long without work.

Let us return, however, to the murder of Beria, which is directly connected with the murder of Stalin.

Like Stalin, Beria was killed so that in time the Soviet Union could be killed. That's why - in the end, Beria was killed.

And who killed Beria?

I mean, of course, not who specifically shot Beria, and I don't even mean his former colleagues who slaughtered Beria. It is more important to understand who was the systemic, so to speak, customer behind the murder of Beria.

If not the actual, then at least the systemic customers and organizers of the assassination of Stalin were external anti-Russian forces - I wrote about this in my book "Why was Stalin killed?" and in the comments to the third volume of Beria's personal diaries.

As for the arrest and murder of Beria, it was organized directly by Khrushchev. And he organized it with a seemingly much more local and purely selfish goal - to break through to the sole higher authorities.

Khrushchev broke through to her.

But did he break through to it himself, or was he "broke through" to power?.. And they "broke through" with goals that were by no means local, but strategic - to destroy socialism and the USSR .. Well, Khrushchev after the death of Stalin pushed objectively anti-socialist forces to the very top

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ly. This is what we understand and know today—socialism was rammed by Khrushchev, just as a fortress gate is rammed with a log during a siege.

However, one must also know to what extent Khrushchev, objectively discrediting, undermining and corrupting Soviet power, acted in this direction consciously? And did he act at all at least to some extent consciously, or was he used "blindly"? ..

These are far from idle and far-fetched questions! Not idle, including from the standpoint of analyzing the murder of Beria ...

The fact that Khrushchev was the main figure in the murder of Beria is beyond doubt. But it remains a mystery - what motivated Khrushchev? Was it only hatred for Beria and a thirst for supreme power, or, as in the case of the assassination of Stalin, was Khrushchev cleverly manipulated by agents of Western influence from Khrushchev's entourage?

Without going into a detailed analysis of this aspect of the era — such an analysis could take up a separate book, I'll just say that I'm convinced that Khrushchev against Beria was additionally incited and set up by agents of influence, and only Khrushchev set up other members accordingly. Presidium of the Central Committee. But consciously Khrushchev in 1953 and later was driven only by personal dislike for Beria, personal hatred of Stalin and personal ambitions.

But it was not only and not so much in his personal ambitions.

"Who benefits?" - the ancients asked in the case when they wanted to find criminals

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ka. Let us also ask: "Who benefited from the murder of Beria?"

The simplest answer immediately comes to mind: "From the top Soviet leadership to Khrushchev, and only Khrushchev." This is obvious, because all the rest were crushed by Khrushchev in three or four years after the assassination of Beria.

But was it only Khrushchev who benefited from the assassination of Beria?

No, it was also beneficial for the regenerating internal partoplasm — it did not have a quiet life under Stalin, and even got over scared, waiting for the Stalinist reforms in the spring of 1953. Under Beria, the rotting part of the state and, especially, the party apparatus would also not have a quiet life and would have lost leadership positions.

But most of all, the death of Beria was beneficial and turned out to be strategically beneficial for external anti-Russian and anti-Soviet forces in the West. For them it was vital

exclude the option of developing the USSR under the great manager of socialism, Beria, and instead transfer the USSR to the rails of Khrushchev's "development", leading to a dead end or a swamp.

In 1953, Beria was killed, and Khrushchev already in 1954 became the de facto head of the USSR and remained so for about ten years.

What did we get as a result of ten years of Khrushchev's increasingly "individual" "power"? ("Individual" and "power" in quotation marks because

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that in reality Khrushchev was manipulated with might and main by agents of influence.)

What did ten years of "Khrushchevism" give the Soviet Union and its peoples?

Firstly, the plans of Stalin and Beria to democratize Soviet society were frustrated... One of the specific details in this case turned out to be that after the death of Beria, the Gulag was returned to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

And what have we got in the purely economic and social spheres?

Well, already in the very first "Khrushchev" year, we had a disruption of the five-year plan in the field of agriculture as a result of a hasty reorientation of funds from the restoration of agriculture in the European part of the USSR to the adventure of virgin lands ...

We received a slowdown in housing construction, and when the mass building of cities with "Khrushchev" buildings began, we received bastard, gray new quarters that distorted the idea of a microdistrict beyond recognition. (Let me remind you in brackets once again that Beria was an architect, and under him this would have been absolutely impossible.)

Under Khrushchev, Russia was first put on the "oil needle" of expanded raw material exports, and under Khrushchev, the "corn epic" unfolded.

Under Khrushchev, the development of science and technology began to slow down, especially in a number of pioneer areas, including technical cybernetics and computers.

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Under Khrushchev, future provocations in the field of biology were laid - outwardly against Lysenko, but in fact - against the outstanding Soviet breeding schools.

Under Khrushchev, Crimea was transferred from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR. Although within the framework of the unified Soviet Union this did not look like a special crime, this belittled the primary geopolitical and strategic importance of Crimea for the entire USSR.

Under Khrushchev, multinational Russia, the great Soviet Union, got a lot of destructive and negative things that they would never have got under Beria.

How pitiful, against the background of all these and other failures of Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites, are the attempts to present Beria as some kind of conspirator against the country and the interests of the people.

When, after the death of Stalin, Beria returned to the united Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, the old employees frankly rejoiced, knowing the businesslike nature of Beria, in contrast to the former MGB party apparatchik Ignatiev. And Sergey Kruglov, a pupil of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Beria, was not like Lavrenty Pavlovich.

And if Beria wanted to carry out some kind of coup for personal purposes, he could quickly prepare a successful conspiracy and implement it with ease. But Beria could not even think

come up with the idea that you can use the case entrusted to him for personal purposes. In addition, any coup in that situation was an anti-state and anti-social affair, and Be

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Riya served the Soviet Union both as a party and statesman and as a conscientious member of society.

It took ten years of Khrushchev's, decomposing the system of socialism, then another twenty Brezhnev's years, completing the decay, and then almost another ten Yeltsin's years, destroying socialism, so that with the beginning of the 21st century a certain situation became possible, which would be absolutely excluded in Beria's virtual USSR.

I mean the situation when not the General Commissar of State Security of the USSR, not the Marshal of the Soviet Union, but just a lieutenant colonel of the KGB reserve could quietly, without firing and tanks, infiltrate "in power", and then just as quietly carry out a real , and not a coup invented by "historians". After the initial Gorbachev-Yeltsin bacchanalia of pulling the mighty economy into thieving pockets in the 90s, I was able to finish cutting the public property into "privatized" "chunks" already in the 2000s of the new century.

Thus, the Internet recently reminded us that on May 7, 2000, Vladimir Putin took office as president of the Russian Federation, and a few days later, secretly even from his official economic advisers, he signed a decree on the creation of Rosspirtprom, which state-owned stakes in 70 alcohol industry enterprises were transferred, including stakes in the largest liqueurs vodka factories.

In June of the same 2000, Putin, by appointment

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Dmitry Medvedev and Aleksey Miller, appointed to the leadership of Gazprom, established personal control over this industry as well.

Then came the turn of oil, and so on.

Here, among other things, in order to make such vile, selfish deeds become possible in Russia from the beginning of the 90s, Beria was killed in 1953.

And today it would not be an exaggeration to say that in 1953 Khrushchev actually committed three "significant" political assassinations - Stalin and Beria in real time, and an assassination of the Soviet Union and Soviet power delayed by almost 40 years.

Moreover, this third, delayed, murder could not have become a reality without the first two.

And I will finish this chapter - besides, the last one in the book, perhaps, like this ...

I have already quoted the anti-Beria memorandum to the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Government of the USSR, given by the manager of the USSR Council of Ministers, Pomaznev, addressed to Malenkov and Khrushchev after the arrest of Beria.

And I will quote it again.

In his slanderous note, Pomaznev tried, of course, to smear Beria with mud, but in fact he cited many examples there that objectively had the exact opposite meaning. In particular, Pomaznev wrote about how he was called in April 1953 to Beria "on the issue of the departments of the coal industry, the oil industry and high-rise buildings."

The following is a direct quote:

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"He said that he did not need so many assistants (in the above departments of the USSR Council of Ministers. — S.K.). The assistant must be a personally close person (bold italics mine. — S.K.)."

In my opinion, Beria spoke about the essence of his assistants in such a way that this alone characterizes him in human and business terms in the most flattering way. Let's think about his words...

To have as assistants a person whom you completely trust and who is personally "one of your own" for you is a natural and understandable desire for any leader. But far from every leader (or rather, almost no one) admits this publicly, and even to his own subordinate, and even to such a subordinate who reports not only to you, but also to others (the manager of the affairs of the Council of Ministers had an immediate superior the Presovmin himself, that is, Malenkov, also reporting to all deputies of the Presovmin). After all, the words that an assistant should be a personally close person could be interpreted by someone as indulging "nepotism", "blat", "nepotism", etc.

And they would go, and gossip would go ...

No, only an open, sincere person who cares not about looking better in the eyes of others, but only about expressing his thought most accurately, most fully and in the best way to ensure the interests of affairs and
do this thing.

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This was Beria's lifestyle - to be, not to seem.

And live big.

To live not as a hermit, knowing nothing but a cell and service, but to live, even resting, in order to do things better and faster later.

Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev, Yeltsin did not need assistants close to them personally. They needed personally devoted, personally devoted to the master of lackeys! And since the lackey in the "deep" of his petty soul can be personally devoted only to himself, then a team can never gather around "leaders" like those named above, but a gang always "clings together"!

This was often the case even in the post-Stalin and post-Beria Soviet Union, only until 1991 the bandits did not have a big move in the USSR, and they only secretly nibbled crumbs from the Soviet public "pie" like mice. It was only after 1991 that they began to tear apart the Soviet Union, like wolves tearing apart a horse they had driven to pieces. Now they are tearing apart Russia - already like carrion jackals.

Beria, on the other hand, needed assistants who would be personally close to him and who, being such, would help Beria in his leadership of a common cause, common to the whole country and all healthy forces in the country.

There are people who work to live.

Of these was Khrushchev, of these was, alas, Brezhnev.

But Beria lived to work.

It is precisely such leaders that socialism needs in order for socialism to develop and be invincible.

So that the brightest and most capable (what is there - the only truly bright and damnably capable by 1953) Stalin's successor would not be at the head of invincible socialism, Beria was killed.

Khrushchev eliminated Beria because he saw him as a rival.

Former associates of Stalin and colleagues of Beria succumbed to Khrushchev because Beria irritated them with his undoubted business superiority.

But Beria was terrible for the enemies of Russia, especially in the possible future.

In order not to allow humanity to develop in the name of the working man, these enemies were able to pull off the assassination of Stalin first.

After that, and for the same reason, they had to kill Beria.

So they killed him.

Afterword

History has not yet deprived us of a new chance

SO, my book about what the Soviet Union might have become if Beria had not been killed is, in fact, complete. It remains to write an afterword to it, and I will write it ...

Andrei, it seems, Konchalovsky expressed himself recently in the sense that we have never brought up that people who can control their own destiny.

As always, the Konchalovskys are petty and vile lies. In fact, they just brought up ...

They brought up a people who not only cannot, but do not want to control their own destiny.

And once we knew how to do this in Russia, but now - we somehow forgot how to be people. To be more precise, Putin's Kremlin is trying to wean us from this in every possible way.

Russia, meanwhile, again finds itself at a historical crossroads, with one path leading to the chaos of "colored" "revolutions", the other to the swamp of a semi-colony, and only a new socialist path leads Russia to the firm ground of a confident historical future.

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Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria said that without documents there are no archives, without archives there is no history, and without history there is no future. Therefore, any documentary book about Beria cannot be just a historical study of his era. It must necessarily be a book not only about the real past, which we can only study and comprehend, and not only about such an unfulfilled past that could become a reality, but did not ...

Any objective book about Beria should be a book that our today and possible tomorrow need. I tried to write this - the last, most likely - my book about Beria.

In the afterword to it, I intend to speak not so much about Lavrenty Pavlovich directly - a lot has already been said about him above, but about pressing problems. However, our current problems can only be understood when we know the past and understand the past correctly. This is exactly what Beria thought, and he was, of course, right. And I will take his wise advice.

The past can and should be understood. But the future, unlike the past, we can create ourselves, but with the obligatory consideration of the mistakes and delusions of the past.

How to create the future? What to build on the ruins of the staggering Yeltsinoid "Putinia Rasputinia"?

And will we be allowed to build and not self-destruct? After all, for the time being, only this is allowed to us, and it is precisely this - self-destruction - Ros

this one is engaged today with the voluptuousness of a political masochist.

Spanish communist Dolores Ibarruri,

Passionaria, once threw a fiery appeal to the Spanish masses: "It is better to die standing than to live on your knees!"
° Social idiotomasochism and at the same time the tragedy of our days is also manifested in the fact that today other words are true: "It is better to live standing up than to die on the knees"...

So far, we, as a society, as a state, are dying.

On the knees...

One of my Moscow comrades once lived next door to an old woman, as they used to say, "from the former." Coming from a wealthy noble family, she, during the revolution, still a girl, got stuck in the new Russia, and so she lived in it - at the very least - all her long life, surviving until the first days of Yeltsin's "Rossiania".

So, she, this failed princess, looking at the bacchanalia of Yeltsin's "freedom", at the nouveau riche who trample on the elementary rights of fellow citizens and at the ordinary fellow citizens themselves, enthusiastically supporting the collapse of the state, more than once loudly declared in her smoky voice: "The Soviet government has given a simple everything to the people. And he missed everything ... I.

Rough?

Yes.

But is it true?

Alas, yes, too!

But can Russia wash itself off and appear before the world in all its multinational beauty?

WELL, Russia has already missed its historical chance more than once, but often used it successfully - otherwise a great world power would not have arisen in history. And there are many such chances, missed and realized, in the history of Russia. So, at one time, a developed water system, stretching from north to south, brought to life "the path from the Varangians to the Greeks". And the peoples inhabiting the Slavic lands used this chance to create a first-class medieval state - Kievan Rus.

And then the Russian princes torn apart the united state according to the destinies, and the invasion of the Wild Steppe trampled the Russian chance into mud and manure.

But Russia regained a chance for greatness - in the new gathering of Russian lands, in the Moscow kingdom of Ivan [Near the Terrible ...

And then boyar greed and self-interest brought Russia to the brink of historical life and death — the Poles occupied even Moscow and established themselves in the Kremlin.

And again, we did not miss the chance for our own destiny, but again we began to lie on the lazy side of pre-Petrine Russia.

Great Peter gave us a new chance, and the greedy new nobility began to devalue him, and only "Petrov's daughter" – "merry Elizabeth", and especially her successor Catherine the Great like

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rallied the Russian chance from the palace parquet, but also failed to use it fully.

Then there was the "thunderstorm of 1912", the disgrace of the Crimean and Japanese wars, the first world massacre that Russia did not need... And the Russian historical chance could be drowned in a sea of external debts, in financial bondage.

But first Lenin and then Stalin told the peoples of Russia: "Here it is, our chance, take it yourself, into your own hands, and use it."

And we used it. And by the time of the murder of Stalin and Beria, they had created a mighty Soviet Russia. Russia with damn attractive, exciting prospects.

And again they did not keep their chance. And again - because of meanness, greed, self-interest and the government of the "elite".

Will we have another chance?

Well, to this day, a lot depends on a lot, but, ultimately, everything depends on how many people in Russia will correctly understand the past in order to correctly choose the future.

Therefore, let us take a look at the past again and again, not forgetting the present and keeping in mind future...

TODAY, more than ever, it becomes obvious that Thomas Mann was right when he defined anti-communism as the greatest stupidity of the 20th century. It is also becoming clearer that Lenin's famous formula, which says that one can become a communist only by enriching one's memory with the knowledge of all those riches that mankind has developed,

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has an inversion, that is, this formula is invertible. If a person has enriched his memory with knowledge of the intellectual and spiritual riches that humanity has developed, and if this person is honest with himself and others, then he will inevitably become a communist.

Not being a communist for a well-educated person is a crime in the 20th century. Honest modern intellect can only be communistic, otherwise it is a morally vile and civic cowardly intellect. Accordingly, anti-communism of the 21st century is no longer the greatest stupidity, but the greatest crime - moral and intellectual.

Let me remind you that one of the greatest intellectuals of the last century, physicist Albert Einstein, a contemporary of Stalin and Beria, in the 1940s, shortly before his death, published an essay with the quite unambiguous title "Why Socialism". There, Einstein clearly stated that humanity can either have a socialist future or none at all.

At the same time, I will add, the guarantee of a confident and creative (that is, socialist) future of mankind has been and remains the socialist future of Russia as the leading civilizational force of the Russian geopolitical space and the world.

Over the past forty years (twenty Brezhnev-Gorbachev plus twenty Yeltsin-Putin) Russia has gradually been brought to the situation that was well described by Lenin

in his autumn 1917 work, *The Threatening Catastrophe and How to Fight It*. In it, Lenin, among other things, wrote that the very fact of the catastrophe is secretly recognized even by the ruling classes, that effective recommendations for overcoming the crisis can be found even in the official press, but the ruling regime will never take these effective measures because they affect the selfish interests of a handful of landlords and capitalists.

Today, in this statement, only the word "landlords" is outdated, but it can be safely replaced by the word "officials". And, in fact, the circle is closed, and the path of Russia over the past hundred years can be - in a sense - characterized as a path from Rasputin to Putin, from one political puppet to another.

However, Russian history has set not only shameful, but also great milestones along this path, and therefore Russia still has a chance, but this chance is only and exclusively socialist.

Four hundred years ago, Russia experienced the Time of Troubles — with impostors, with the Kremlin occupied by foreigners. But the Time of Troubles ended with the fact that the militia of Minin and Pozharsky expelled the Poles from the Russian land, and the Russian campaign began to a new great era - the era of Peter.

Although the current time is sometimes defined as another Trouble (with regular impostors, with the occupation of the Kremlin by systemic agents of foreign influence), it would be more correct to say

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about the last twenty years of Russian history as the Time of Troubles. After all, a new turmoil in the minds became possible because the "fifth column" was actively stirring up and stirring up the country in order to catch small "fish" of its own benefit in the troubled waters of the social crisis.

Now the Time of Troubles is still in full swing, but we can say that it is ending — in the sense that the situation begins to appear before us in all its unsightly clarity. Dregs and rubbish have settled to the bottom or floated to the "tops" of power, and the essence of what has been happening in the world in the last century and a half, as well as the essence of what is happening today, is becoming transparent.

So, almost half a century after the assassination of Stalin and Beria and twenty years after the assassination of the Soviet Union, has it already become clear?

Well, it became clear, for example, the answer to the question: "Why is world socialism, from the point of view of positive development, a systematically inevitable, more perfect stage in the history of mankind, collapsed so quickly and catastrophically, and collapsed primarily in the most powerful country of socialism, in USSR?"

It is obvious that the world socialist camp and especially the USSR were a bone in the throat of world capitalism. Before the advent of the USSR, there was a clear scheme: developed metropolises and countries dependent or semi-dependent on them. The fate of the semi-colony was prepared after the First World War and Russia, but socialism took it away from such a fate, which in itself

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became a challenge and a threat to capital. The collapse of the USSR removed this threat. Therefore, the West actively brought down the USSR.

All this is true, but what has been said does not explain why the USSR was able to withstand the most difficult military trials and collapsed overnight in peacetime?

The chatter that socialism has turned out to be systemically untenable is nothing more than chatter! The essence lies deeper, and the origins of the correct answer go back to a very old event that happened a hundred years ago.

sixty four years ago. Without understanding the comprehensive meaning of that event, we will not understand our present day.

So let's start from the beginning.

In 1848, with the publication of the Communist Manifesto by Marx and Engels, a great idea appeared in the world.

This idea was just as necessary for the have-nots, that is, for the working people of the world, as it was disastrous for the haves, that is, for the bourgeoisie of all countries. The Manifesto was the first to say that the working people should not fight for the improvement of their economic situation under capitalism, but should get into their hands the political power that would give Labor control over the productive forces of society. Only then will the economy work to satisfy the material and cultural needs of all peoples, and not of an exploiting bunch.

The "Manifesto" ended with a precise call: "Proletarians of all countries, unite!"

Alas, the well-educated and developed part of the bourgeoisie read the Manifesto better and deeper than the working people and immediately realized that the unification of the working majority of all countries meant the rapid destruction of all the predatory privileges of the parasitic private property minorities.

The capitalists realized more quickly and more completely than the working people that from now on there is only one way to preserve capitalism, that is, the wealth and privileges of a handful. And this path is the separation of the working people of all countries and their diversion from the idea of conquest of political power by Labor.

Marx's call to unite forces was heard by the capitalists of all countries better than the proletarians, and since the end of the 20th century, the capitalists of all countries have united in the struggle to maintain their power. For subversive work, for the encouragement of a split, discord and nationalism among Labor, capital began to spend huge sums of money. If the First International was created by Marx and Engels, then the Second International was already headed by the agents of influence of capital, Bernstein and Kautsky.

Back at the end of the 19th century, the main part of those lands that soon became the colonial possessions of the European powers was "ownerless". In 1876, the colonies occupied no more than 10% of the territory in Africa.

And by 1900 - already 90%.

One of the reasons is the need for the capital of industrialized countries to find means of relieving social tension within their own countries.

private countries. The future hero of imperialism, Cecil Rhodes, said in 1895: "... Empire is a matter of the stomach. If you don't want civil war, you must become imperialists."

As we can see, Rhodes realized that Marx was right better than the workers, and he understood that it was more accurate and reliable to give "their" masses a part of the "pie" than to bring passions to the point that the working people would take away the entire social "pie" created by them. That is, capital, having studied Marx, did everything to ensure that the development of the world went "not according to Marx", but contrary to him, to the extent that capital succeeded.

Capital cannot achieve this forever, because there can be no globally stable capitalism. Capitalism and its latest modification, globalism, can only be locally stable.

For the time being, at the expense of the less developed regions of the planet.

Now the reserves of even the local stability of capitalism in the countries of the "golden billion" are exhausted. But then, at the beginning of the twentieth century and later, such a policy was successful, and therefore capital was able to carry out the First World War. And although capital was already before the World War exhausted his creative possibilities, and after the war turned into a "living corpse", a cadaver capitalism managed to ensure its existence even further.

The privileges of a handful always swim in the ocean of stupidity of the have-not majority. smart pod

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for the working majority, the path to social life is unification. However, modern the poor majority of both the entire planet and the population of Russia have not understood this to this day.

And it would be time!

As a result of the Russian October Revolution and the formation of the USSR, capital again found itself under the threat of death. The ideas of socialism have acquired a material and human base on one sixth parts of the earth. The powerful development of the Soviet Union, the very fact of its existence the future of capitalism is in question.

And now the subversive work of capital among the working people proceeded in two directions.

Within their own countries, it was necessary to continue the policy of dividing the working people and diverting them from the ideas of Marx. At the same time, it was necessary to feed "our own" workers more and more abundantly for by strengthening the colonial and neo-colonial exploitation of the peoples of the third world. At under such conditions, it seemed unprofitable for the working people of the same England to unite with the working people India or Egypt, from the exploitation of which the capital of England benefited and English masses.

Approximately the same thing happened in other European colonial empires - France, Germany, Holland, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Italy. In all these countries, where there is more, where there is less, the relative prosperity of the masses began to be ensured, among other things, at the expense of colonial incomes. The European masses were limitedly admitted by capital to the "pie" and

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began to receive one or another material benefit, squeezed out of the sweat and blood of overseas "subjects" of the metropolises.

The broad masses of the countries of the "golden billion" receive this benefit, by the way, to this day. Although the lion's share of social subsidies stolen from the rest of the world is now received by non-ordinary Europeans, and the broad masses in the USA.

In addition, capital had to by any means maximally stupid, debilitate masses in the entire world subject to capital, which is successfully implemented, although it leads to decay society and the future collapse of civilization.

Within the Soviet Union, capital had to organize and encourage from outside any anti-Soviet and anti-socialist forces, with the ultimate goal of destroying the USSR as a single, powerful and dynamic socialist power. The West carried out the same work in relation to the entire world socialist camp, and also, in the end, successfully, because he did not disdain any garbage and went to any secret crimes.

The Soviet Union was originally a healthy organism, but its social health turned out to be treacherously undermined. Imagine a handsome, intelligent, well-educated, athletic young man, morally and physically clean. And let's imagine a few scoundrels who hate and are dangerous the very fact of the existence of such a guy, whose example can captivate others.

And so the villains begin gradually and without

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it's not uncommon for our guy to inject portions of the drug into his body. After some time, a healthy organism will become sick, and then it will be easy to finish it off. Something similar was done with the Soviet Union. The new, young, full of strength, pure and sincere Soviet civilization, which proclaimed that man is a friend, comrade and brother to man, collided with the laws of the Old Testament, with the prudent meanness of the world of private property, which lives according to the principle "Man is a wolf to man".

No external manifestations of alleged concern for the individual in the Western world can change the inhumane essence of capitalism. Humanity in the West today is increasingly being expelled even from the world of television "wrapping" dreams.

So, meanness has won in Russia - most likely, temporarily, because otherwise the fate of both Russia and the world is terrible.

The SECOND thing that became clear in connection with the collapse of the USSR is that it was the USSR and the world camp of socialism that were the guarantors of the creative and humanistic development of mankind, and not the degradation and crisis, which are intensifying in the world every year and the way out of which is capitalism cannot give.

The categories of good and evil are considered by some to be relative, they talk about "moral relativism" and declare that what is evil for one is good for another. However, this is nothing more than an attempt at moral evasion. In fact, it is easy to distinguish between good and evil, and the more

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socially developed society, the easier it is to see and distinguish between them. Already the Christian commandments give us examples of the absolute interpretation of these categories. At the same time, for example, the murder of a murderer, a rapist, a traitor is not a violation of the principles of goodness, but their assertion.

It is in this sense that both Stalin and Beria were bearers of the highest, active good.

Capitalism, on the other hand, is evil, and often not even evil with a capital letter, so typical capitalism is morally petty, insipid and wingless.

In fact, Protestant ethics became the basis of the ethical views of capitalism, but it contradicts both the spirit of Christianity and the spirit of creative humanism. The God of the capitalist of the times of primitive accumulation was obliged to love not any neighbor, but only the rich. Poverty began to be considered not as a disaster, but as a vice, a crime, a punishment from God. At the same time, the capitalist appropriation of part of the labor of others was regarded not as theft, but as a matter "pleasing to God", because it led to the enrichment of those whom God supposedly "loved".

Is it really necessary today to prove how perverted and false such an interpretation of the concepts of good and evil is? In fact, even modern capitalism was forced, albeit feignedly, to abandon such an "ethics" at some point, it looked very unattractive, especially against the background of the social ideals of the Soviet Union.

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However, today the West is once again reviving the cult of wealth as a synonym for public respect. Compassion for the humiliated and offended is again out of favor with Western ideologists.

The English writer Orwell, in his novel 1984, described a society invented by him, where the Ministry of Truth spreads lies, where all social and ethical concepts are turned upside down.

inside out, etc. It can be said that it was in such a state that the principles of capitalist Protestantism were most fully expressed. However, for a healthy (that is, not parasitic and not selfish) human consciousness, the distinction between Good and Evil does not present any difficulty.

You cannot build your well-being on the well-being of people, and, on the contrary, you must respect the legitimate rights and interests of others; the weak should not be offended — they must be helped and protected; you can't rejoice in someone else's grief, but you have to sympathize with it, etc., and most importantly, you can't act the way you don't want others to act towards you, and, on the contrary, you must act towards others in such a way that how you want them to treat you.

Here is a healthy approach to life that does not destroy or humiliate it, but builds and exalts it. And just a healthy perception of life that does not threaten the natural rights of other people makes it possible to understand that the world of socialism is a world of good. And the world of modern capitalism is a world, ultimately, of evil.

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Today, when the Soviet Union and the world camp of socialism, as significant factors of world civilization, have been liquidated and the world is ruled by capital, it becomes crystal clear that the world ruled by capital is a dirty and rotten world of violence and wars. This is a world of kitsch, immorality, terrorism and drugs, a world of irreversible destruction of the natural environment, a world where, in the name of preserving the wealth and privileges of a handful, the future of all mankind is destroyed (that is, ultimately, the future of the most greedy handful).

This world is the antipode of both Stalin's USSR, which has become a reality, and Beria's virtual USSR, which has not become a reality. If Beria's USSR also became a reality, this would gradually remove the main contradictions of world development, because world socialism would develop, strengthen and expand. The USSR of Khrushchev and Brezhnev could not remove the main contradictions, and now they are becoming more and more aggravated.

On the one hand, over the past hundred years, mankind has made a phenomenal intellectual breakthrough, approached the possibility of comprehending many of the mysteries of being, the possibility of creatively transforming the planet into a world of harmonious relations between man and the nature around him.

On the other hand, the planet is increasingly turning into a cesspool — physical and spiritual. Up to 90 percent of the world's population live in material poverty, and the rest live in spiritual poverty. Trillions of dollars annually

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They are going to create ever more sophisticated means of warfare and to wage real wars, while the planet is threatened with an ecological catastrophe.

Only world socialism can positively and constructively resolve these contradictions. Otherwise, the world will face a cataclysm — ecological, economic and ethical.

The dilemma of the 21st century is this: "Either world socialism, or world cataclysm."

Already Stalin and Beria understood this very well.

The THIRD thing that has become clear is the enormous vitality of the socialist system in Russia. The triumphant socialist reconstruction of Russia (industrialization, collectivization and cultural revolution) carried out under the leadership of Stalin and with the active participation of Beria, despite the enormous destruction of the war, laid a huge margin of safety in all spheres of public life.

This reserve in everything - from the economy to science and culture, turned out to be so great that Russia has been living on Soviet reserves for two Muddy Decades. But the stock is gradually depleted and thins out.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics gave the world an unprecedented example of a new civilization - humane, with a huge potential for the creative development of society towards a free thinking individual. And this civilization is alive to this day, not only in the surviving remnants of humanity in Russian society.

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The vitality of this civilization is already proved by the fact that even the media of disinformation of the dead soul of the Yeltsinoid regime, and above all, television, cannot ignore the achievements of Soviet culture, constantly including many Soviet films, performances, retro concerts in the programs of almost all television channels. etc.

In fact, the entire cultural life of Russia, to the extent that one can speak of culture, is fed by the achievements and traditions of the Soviet era. Today, the question is often asked: "Why was there great art in the country before, masterpieces were created, but today, with supposedly freedom of creativity, there are none?" But the answer is obvious!

In the USSR, the social order was oriented towards good, because the state system and state ideology were oriented towards good.

Today, the social order is focused on kitsch, on violence, on mockery of the Soviet past, that is, on evil. And this already proves that the current regime is a product of evil and a servant of evil. All the social advocates of the regime are the same minions of evil.

To the chatter about "freedom of the individual", the windows of the first floors of Russian houses were dressed in bars — the country is turning itself into a prison cell. More precisely, the country is being turned into a voluntary prison by the regime itself, which even formally has now become a police force.

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Objective data coming from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation show, however, that honest law enforcement officers are ashamed of the title "policeman". However, the servant of the oligarchs, the current Kremlin, needs precisely the police forces. The Soviet militia, under the leadership of both NEVD Beria and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Beria, protected the peace of the people. The oligarchic Kremlin, on the other hand, needs a police force to protect the peace of those who have it. But such an approach is morally and professionally unacceptable for all healthy forces in the law enforcement agencies themselves.

The fact that the current regime is civilizationally criminal does not hide the regime itself. He openly tramples on common sense, he, in exact accordance with the scheme of Orwell's novel "1984", calls the truth a lie and elevates the lie to the rank of truth and state policy. It is precisely the Orwellian character of modern Russia that is finally revealed.

In 2007, during the previous election campaign, United Russia published the Putin Plan. There, in the coming years, the peoples of Russia were promised victory "over poverty and corruption, over economic and technological backwardness", they were promised "confidence in the future" and "decent work" with an average monthly salary of 25 thousand rubles, with doubling pensions.

Today, the Kremlin prefers not to mention that "plan", but for the "electorate" they are ready to

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The new "Putin's plans" are just as Orwellian as the last "plan".

In just 20 years, from 1930 to 1950, the socialist Soviet Union, despite the meager starting conditions and the most difficult war, went from a plow to an atomic bomb, from a semi-literate country to a power with world-class scientific schools, primarily in fields of mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology...

The "market" anti-communist "Russian" "Federation" over the same 20-year period - from 1991 to 2011, turned from a powerful and comprehensively developed republic - the basis of the USSR, into a civilizational backwater, where they degrade and come to the decline of all spheres of society's life with the massive brilliance of "foreign cars" on Russian roads.

The admiration of the regime's lawyers for such "brilliant" "foreign" occasions makes us recall Marie Antoinette. This French queen, who ended her days on the scaffold by the verdict of the revolutionary tribunal, shining still in Versailles, in response to the message that the people are starving because they have no bread, innocently remarked: "So let eat cakes."

Yeltsinoid Russia, deprived of its own food base, eats cakes and bananas at a time when its economic power is shrinking like shagreen leather in a Balzac novel. This skin shrank with every wish granted by its owner, bringing death closer.

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The Soviet Union held the first position in the world in terms of the number of doctors and hospital beds per capita. Today, in the rating of the League for the Protection of Patients' Rights, Russia ranks 133rd in terms of the level of medical care. There are 250 countries in the world, including island microstates like the islands of Tonga, Trinidad-Tobago, etc. Being among the most socially backward countries is also one of the vile and terrible results of Russia's capitalization.

Within the Russian geopolitical space, the borders of which coincide with the borders of the USSR in 1985, in just 20 years of capitalization, not only Soviet civilization, but civilization in general, has been threatened. In the next not even 20, but 10 years, Russia may disappear altogether as a modern civilized state with a developed social infrastructure. And Russia will disappear if the political system, the results of 20 years of "activity" of which are before everyone's eyes, remains the same.

In the rural expanses of Russia and in its small towns, the social terror of the authorities against the population intimidated by the "administrative resource" is increasingly manifesting itself, and the mass of residents of megacities, growing like cancerous tumors, is becoming more and more morally and intellectually wild. Social stratification in the country of former social equality has acquired a disgusting and increasingly arrogant character over the past 20 years. The explosive power of this "Putin cocktail" of luxury and poverty can become such that

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will blow up Russia even without US atomic bombings.

At the same time, these bombings are not ruled out, since the regime is exchanging Russia's military power for outwardly steel, but in fact soap "bubbles" of imported Mistrals.

But even if the West spares the current Russian civilizational castrato, and this geopolitical stump survives, it will survive as a third-rate raw materials and "screwdriver" appendage of Western quasi-civilization, as a producing country.

And resource-producing, "screwdriver" countries do not need any science-intensive sectors of the economy – aerospace, nuclear, instrument-making, machine-building, machine-tool building, etc. industry, nor science itself ... Such countries do not need culture, advanced education, mass medicine.

The Soviet Moscow State University was one of the five leading universities in the world. As a result of the "reforms" of Yeltsin-Putin-Medvedev, the rating of Moscow State University rolled back to the bottom of the first world hundred. The continuation of these "reforms" by the hands of Medvedev, Putin or some other new Rasputin can have only one logical result - the disappearance of Moscow State University as something of a center of science and education.

It is not excluded that Russia will fall out of the life of the world due to the transformation of its population into such an excessive community that it makes no sense even to exploit, but it is more profitable to leave it to the mercy of fate for extinction.

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At the same time, in the near future, Russia is facing the threat of a "color" "revolution". I don't know what the planners themselves call it, but I will call it "birch tree" – not as a reminder of the "oligarch" Berezovsky, but of those times when the symbol of Russia, the Russian birch, was defiled by the use of it by the occupiers on grave crosses.

Could the threat of the "birch revolution" be the end result of the existence of the USSR of Beria?

Of course not! There is nothing like this in a country developing along the path of Beria's reforms. could.

But in a country that was led along the path of Khrushchev, and then Brezhnev, Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Putin, collapse becomes the final logical result. And the logical result of the collapse is the threat of a "colored" "revolution".

"Color revolutions" have already become a well-established method of the West to eliminate tendencies that are not pleasing to the West in the political life of countries that are not included in the chosen circle of the "golden billion".

What is unacceptable for the West and the USA in such countries of the world?

Healthy social organisms are unacceptable, and especially socialism that rejects the institution of private property.

National sovereignty is unacceptable, the expression of which is, in particular, the use of the country's resources in the interests of the country itself and its people.

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A foreign policy that opposes US claims to be the master of the world is unacceptable.

Mutually, not unilaterally beneficial economic relations are unacceptable.

A developed social consciousness and a human way of life, independent of the stupefying Western "values", are unacceptable.

Finally, in relation to the former Soviet republics of the USSR, any unifying tendencies that can lead to the restoration of the Soviet Union in one form or another are unacceptable.

Accordingly, the essence of the classical "color revolution" is the replacement of a socio-political regime objectionable to the United States and the West with a regime either directly puppet or dependent on Western patrons.

The technology of the "color revolution" is useful for the West even when processes are brewing in a country led by pro-Western politicians that can replace the anti-people regime.

folk. In essence, this is countermine technology, which is detonated to forestall an enemy mine ready to explode.

In this case, the result of the "revolution" will be the replacement of the rotten pro-Western regime with the same pro-Western one, but with a new, more attractive signboard regime.

So, after all the "reformist" stories about the "revival", the threat of the "birch revolution" becomes quite real for Russia. At the same time, any variant of the "birch revo

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lucia" in Russia will be a disaster for Russia, but also for the rest of the world - too.

One way or another, taking into account the constant weakening of the nuclear weapons status of the Russian Federation, Russia may well be turned into Libya, Egypt, Syria, or something even worse, except perhaps without turning the current inhabitants of the Kremlin into a bloody steak like Gaddafi. For what? As they used to say in the Abwehr of Admiral Canaris: "There are no scum, there are personnel."

But the "cadres" are failing more and more often, and the "grapes of wrath" are gradually swelling up, and therefore, an acceptable option for the West may turn out to be the organization in Russia not even of a "birch revolution", but of a "birch" chaos with the prospect of a NATO or UN occupation.

This threat is real for us, and it is produced primarily by the policy of not even the "Washington regional committee", but the policy of the Yeltsin-like Kremlin itself. Recently, Argumenty Nedelya reported (No. 1, 2012) that plans to build new Russian submarines are under threat "because of the greed of Russian steel businessmen." A source in the Russian military-industrial complex told AN that "if the issue with steel is not resolved, then we will have to forget about the further production of our submarine missile carriers", and that "already launched boats had to be assembled from ready-made sections of the hulls of a hundred - ryh projects.

And what if tomorrow "Russian" "businessmen" refuse to supply metals to Russian

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ballistic missiles? For strategic bombers?

It would seem that if the question is as follows: "Either Russia will have businessmen, or it will not have strategic defense," then the way out suggests itself — immediate nationalization without redemption or at the price at which the industrial giants of the USSR bought these "businessmen".

But even this, internal, threat to the external security of Russia, the current "Rossiania" is not able to eliminate. What can we say about the external threat of the "birch revolution"!

So is it possible for Russia to fight this threat?

Can.

And it is necessary.

However, success in this struggle is possible only if the peoples of Russia and, above all, their educated strata understand—in real time, that is, urgently, in the next year or two—some simple and understandable but still misunderstood truths.

Which?

But just those that honest authors write about in their books. Those about whom much was said in my last book about Beria.

This book has become for me a kind of afterword to that past era. But I would like the reader to consider it as a kind of preface to the yet future era, the image of which we have to shape.

If on the banner of this future era there will be - among other great names of Russia -

the name of Beria is also written, then our future will be creative, rightful to the people, abundant and free.

No matter how hard the enemies of Russia try to put us under the banner with the names of, for example, mediocre father and son - Alexander P and Alexander III, these two figures do not attract mass attention, do not become a subject of controversy. Everything is clear with them. But Beria today is argued no less, and sometimes even more, than about Stalin.

Why?

Yes, because Stalin and Beria are not only our past, but also the nerve of our current and future problems. "What would the country be like if Stalin were alive?" This question has been asked before and is being asked today.

And this is the right question.

However, no less interesting and urgent - in my opinion - is the question: "What would the country be like if Beria had remained alive?"

Well, I asked myself this question.

And I tried to answer it - to myself and to the readers.

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Literary and artistic edition

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Sergei Kremlev

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"To live another 20 years!" recorded by L.P. Beria

in his diary shortly before his death.

Probably, everyone who cares about the fate of the Fatherland wondered: what if these hopes came true and Beria led the country until the 1970s? What if not Judas and mediocrity like Khrushchev, but the only worthy heir of the Leader, stood at the head of the USSR? If neither the accursed 20th Congress, nor the "exposure of the personality cult", nor the anti-Stalinist hysteria, nor the betrayal of the ideals of socialism had happened? What unprecedented heights, what power and prosperity, what greatness would our Motherland achieve? ..

With the main oron vuannomite,

completing his many years of work on the study

personality and accomplishments of L.P. Beria, answers all these questions. This is the best epitaph for the greatest statesman of the USSR after Stalin. This is a farewell bow to the unbending patriot-communist, the creator of the Superpower, the last genius of the unforgettable Stalinist

era. Eternal memory to him!

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